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Abstract 
'Reminiscence work' is currently a popular component of care provision for older 
people in the UK. However, despite the prevalence of positive 'anecdotal' reports, 
systematic research has so far failed to show consistent evidence of the benefits of 
reminiscence work for older people. This thesis addresses this problem in two ways. 
First, a discourse analytic approach is used to illuminate current debates about the 
value of reminiscence work. In practical terms, this involves a detailed analysis of 
spoken and written texts about reminiscence and reminiscence work, including 
journal articles, conference papers, training manuals, and transcripts of interviews 
with practitioners, proponents and critics of reminiscence work. This analysis is 
presented in three substantive chapters, which demonstrate that discursive 
formulations of the nature and value of 'reminiscence' and 'reminiscence 
work/therapy', produced by its practitioners and proponents, are orientated to the 
constitition of social relations in which older people are positioned as respected and 
valued participants in social encounters and in community life. This orientation is 
shown to be in conflict with discursive formulations produced in accounts of 
research, which formulate the value of reminiscence in psychological rather than 
social-relational terms. The discrepancy between 'anecdote' and 'evidence' is 
accounted for in terms of this difference in orientation between practice and 
research. 
Second, the thesis applies the same discourse analytic approach to the study of 
conversational activity in reminiscence groups. Data for this analysis consist of 
transcripts of audiorecorded reminiscence groups conducted in three different care 
settings. The analysis is presented in two substantive chapters, which continue with 
the theme of social relations. It demonstrates that talk about the past in 
reminiscence groups affords the discursive accomplishment of 'membership' and 
positive age identities. It also shows how group workers' discursive practices, when 
similar to those of pedagogical discourse, can work to constitute negative age 
identities for older participants. The thesis ends with recommendations for both 
practice and research. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Over the last 10 years, reminiscence work has become a ubiquitous feature 
of care provision for older people in the UK. Older people in community 
settings and in residential homes gather in organised groups to reminisce, 
with aid of photos, objects, music that are representative of earlier times in 
their lives; they are encouraged to contribute to books of memories 
documenting living and working conditions of earlier times in particular 
communities and localities; they collaborate with others in the writing 
and performance of theatre productions which serve to celebrate, mark 
and share the narratives of their individual and joint experiences within 
and across generations. Such work currently enjoys a wide appeal across a 
wide variety of community settings and populations, and has gained the 
active support and promotion of a number of voluntary and professional 
groupings concerned with services for the elderly. 
The growing use of reminiscence work in the care of older people can be 
seen as just one strand of a wider concern to provide resources for cultural 
engagement, embracing such activities as oral history, adult education, 
and community publishing. Such is the popularity and burgeoning 
growth of reminiscence work that some have characterised it as a 'social 
movement' (Bornat, 1989b). Alongside these developments, there has 
been a corresponding growth of a research and practice literature 
examining the efficacy of, and offering guidance on, reminiscence work 
(eg: Butler, 1963; McMahon and Rhudick, 1964; Lewis, 1971; Coleman, 1974, 
1986; Kiernat, 1979; Lesser, Lazarus, Frankel and Havasy, 1981; Ryden, 1981; 
Norris, 1982, 1986, 1989; Gibson, 1989). 
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One recurrent topic of discussion in this literature is the failure of 
experimental studies of reminiscence groupwork to show consistent 
evidence of benefits reported in 'anecdotal' accounts produced by 
practitioners and proponents of reminiscence work (see, for example, 
Merriam, 1980; Thornton and Brotchie, 1987; Bornat,1989b; Norris, 1989; 
Gibson, 1989). Some have taken this lack of 'hard evidence' to signify that 
group reminiscence has no special beneficial consequences for older 
people, and have argued that research on reminiscence should be 
abandoned (Thornton and Brotchie, 1987). Others have argued that 
research has only just begun, and that rigorous empirical research will 
eventually corroborate 'anecdotal' reports of its benefits (Bornat, 1989b; 
Gibson, 1989). 
This call for further research is the starting point for this thesis. However, 
the research reported here departs radically from current approaches to 
researching reminiscence work. Research to date has been carried out 
mainly within the traditional psychological paradigm, taking measures of 
'psychological function' and 'psychological state' have been taken from 
older people before and after participation in reminiscence groups (eg: 
Perrotta and Meacham, 1981; Berghorn and Schafer, 1986-7; Baines, Saxby 
and Ehlert, 1987; Goldwasser, Auerbach and Harkins, 1987; Bachar, 
Kindler, Schefler and Lerer, 1991). Such research is informed by research 
which predates the growth of reminiscence work, and which has studied 
reminiscence as a 'mechanism' or 'function' associated with the ageing 
process (eg: Butler, 1963; McMahon and Rhudick, 1964; Lewis 1971). 
A fundamental argument of this thesis is that this research paradigm does 
not address the constructive consequences of language use. A wide range 
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of work in linguistic philosophy, sociology and psychology has 
demonstrated that language cannot be seen as a merely referential 
medium, describing a world which exists independently of its descriptions 
(eg: Wittgenstein, 1953; Austin, 1962; Garfinkel, 1969; de Saussure, 1974; 
Foucault, 1971,1972; Heritage, 1984; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Edwards 
and Potter, 1992). Rather, it is productive of that world. This point of not 
merely of philosophical interest. If language is constructive in this way, 
then the ways in which people construct the world through language have 
real consequences. 
From this perspective, reports of experimental studies of reminiscence 
work come to be seen as discursive formulations of the nature and value 
of reminiscence work, which have functional consequences in the 
contexts in which they are produced, cited, and otherwise mobilised. 
Moreover, there is no a priori reason to accord them higher status than 
other accounts emanating from practitioners and proponents of 
reminiscence work. Rather than having the final word, they are 
re situated as moves in an ongoing argument which is constitutive of the 
nature and value of reminiscence work. 
The research reported here is concerned in part with documenting the 
moves in this argument, and with identifying their consequences. It will 
demonstrate that this argument has consequences for the social relations 
of ageing - that is, for the position of older people in their relations with 
others, and in the communities in which they live. This is so, not merely 
in the sense that they might be denied the benefits claimed to ensue from 
reminiscence work. It is so in that discursive formulations of the value of 
reminiscence embody formulations of the nature of ageing, and can be 
used to justify or resist the social marginalisation of older people. The 
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argument is not just about the value of reminiscence, but about the value 
of older people. 
Research on reminiscence work cannot stand outside this argument, but 
must inevitably contribute to it, whether or not this is recognised or 
acknowledged by those doing the research. This study represents a 
conscious attempt to engage with this argument. It presents an analysis of 
reminiscence work and reminiscence research as a domain of discursive 
action. In practical terms, this involves an analysis of discourse about 
reminiscence and reminiscence work, produced by its practitioners, 
researchers and proponents. In addition, it involves an analysis of 
discourse in reminiscence groups, which current research approaches 
have so far failed to address. This analysis represents an attempt to take 
seriously practitioners' accounts of the value of their work, in that it 
addresses the actual terms of conversational engagement in reminiscence 
groups to which these accounts relate. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter presents a brief summary of 
the content and arguments of subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 2 presents an account of the history and current forms of 
reminiscence work, followed by a brief review of research on reminiscence 
and ageing, and reminiscence groupwork. This review focuses on the 
nature of the research, rather than on the detail and findings of specific 
studies. The chapter ends by identifying three problems with current 
research on reminiscence work: (1) the discrepancy between experimental 
and 'anecdotal' accounts of the value of reminiscence work for older 
people; (2) the problem of variability in the definition and 
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conceptualisation of 'reminiscence' as an object of research; (3) the lack of 
any account of group reminiscence as conversational action. 
Chapter 3 presents discourse analysis as a means of addressing these 
problems. It begins with an account of work demonstrating that language 
is medium of social action, which has informed current approaches to the 
analysis of discourse. Following this, the chapter sets out the analytical 
resources to be used in the substantive chapters of the thesis: Potter and 
Wetherell's (1987) approach to discourse analysis, conversation analysis, 
and the insights afforded by other work demonstrating that discourse 
embodies contradictory representations of the objects, events and 
experiences which it addresses. The chapter closes by noting how the 
discourse analytic perpective might address the problems of reminiscence 
research identified in Chapter 2, by (1) using variability in the formulation 
of the nature and value of reminiscence and reminiscence work as an 
analytical resource in identifying the functional consequences of these 
formulations, and (2) making possible an analysis of group reminiscence 
as conversational action. 
Chapter 4 presents an analysis of literature related to reminiscence and 
reminiscence work. This analysis shows that discursive formulations of 
the significance of reminiscence in later life embody arguments about the 
nature of ageing and the social position of older people, and that these 
formulations have consequences for the social relations in which older 
people are inserted. It shows further that, while accounts of research on 
reminiscence tend to formulate its value for older people in psychological 
terms, accounts produced by practitioners and proponents of reminiscence 
work tend to formulate its value in social-relational terms. On this basis, 
it is argued that while the accounts of practitioners and proponents can be 
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seen as pursuing the stated anti-ageist concerns of reminiscence work, the 
accounts of reminiscence research have different implications, and can be 
seen as working against these anti-ageist concerns. The discrepancy 
between 'anecdote' and 'evidence' is thus recast as a consequence of the 
differential orientation of these accounts. 
The social-relational theme is continued in Chapter 5, which presents an 
analysis of extracts from interviews with reminiscence workers, focusing 
on the ways in which they formulate the association between 
reminiscence and ageing. This analysis shows further evidence of the 
favouring of formulations which have positive social-relational 
consequences for older people in the discourse of practitioners. In doing 
so, it offers further evidence that these formulations embody arguments 
concering the nature of ageing and the social position of older people, and 
shows how practitioners' talk is structured in terms of contrary positions 
in this argument. Again, the point is that the anti-ageist project of 
reminiscence work is pursued through the discursive practices of 
reminiscence workers. 
Chapter 6 focuses on current debates regarding the status of reminiscence 
work as 'therapy'. It presents an analysis of both talk and texts related to 
reminiscence work: talk in the form of extracts taken from transcripts of 
interviews, conference workshop sessions and incidental conversations 
with care workers, psychologists and academics, and texts in the form of 
journal papers, conference papers and training manuals. This analysis 
demonstrates- that the designation of reminiscence work as 'therapy' has 
contradictory consequences in that, while it constitutes reminiscence as an 
activity affording 'special benefits'to older people, it has social-relational 
implications which are antithetical to formulations of reminiscence work 
6 
as an 'ordinary', egalitarian activity. This dilemma is apparent in 
practitioners' discourse, in its variable mobilisation of, and resistance to, 
formulations of reminiscence work as therapy. This resistance is shown 
to be part of more general resistance to formulating reminiscence work in 
the terms of professional discourse, and thus provides further evidence 
that practitioners' representations of reminiscence work are oriented to 
social-relational concerns, in this case to the social relations of care 
provision. At the same time, their espousal of the 'therapy' label brings 
with it an evaluative agenda which focuses on 'psychological function', 
raising again the problems identified in Chapter 4 concerning the different 
orientations of research and practice. 
In Chapters 7 and 8, the focus of analysis moves from discourse about 
reminiscence to discourse in reminiscence groups. Data for these analyses 
consists of transcripts of group reminiscence sessions in three different 
care settings: a residential home, a geriatriC day hospital, and a day centre 
for older people. The analysis in Chapter 7 addresses claims related to the 
beneficial consequences of group reminiscence for the 'identities' of older 
participants, and for the social relations between them. It shows how talk 
about the practices of the past works to constitute situated identities for 
older participants as members of the 'culture of the past', and how talking 
together in this way works to constitute membership in the present. 
Chapter 8 presents an analysis intended to address claims made regarding 
the potential of group reminiscence to effect changes in status relations 
between care workers and older participants. This analysis shows how the 
discursive practices of group workers afford older participants the 
opportunity to work high status identities as historical informants. 
However, this analysis also identifies practices which work low status 
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identities for older participants, through their similarity to forms of 
pedagogical discourse. The contradictory nature of group workers practices 
is identitifed as a consequence of the contradictions of care provision, 
which functions both to serve and supervise its recipients. 
Finally, Chapter 9 discusses the implications of these analyses for 
reminiscence work as an arena of care practice, and makes some 
suggestions regarding avenues for further research. 
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Chapter 2 
Reminiscence: Practice and Research 
This chapter presents an account of the history and current forms of 
reminiscence work in the UK. This is followed by a brief review of 
research on the significance of reminiscence in later life, and research 
oriented to the evaluation of the benefits of reminiscence groups for older 
people. The chapter ends by identifying some key problems of current 
research into reminiscence and reminiscence work. 
Varieties of reminiscence work 
Reminiscence work is currently practiced with older people in a wide 
variety of institutional and community settings, including residential 
homes, daycentres, day hospitals, geriatric wards in general and psychiatric 
hospitals, community centres, sheltered housing projects and libraries. 
Equally various are the defining characteristics of the older people who 
participate. Reminiscence work may be specifically targeted at older people 
who are socially isolated, confused, clinically depressed, suffering memory 
or sensory impairment, or categorised as having 'learning difficulties'. 
Whatever form it takes, and whatever the setting, reminiscence work 
involves talking with older people about the experiences and events of 
their lives. Its most common manifestation is the reminiscence group, a 
'discussion group' normally led by one or more group workers, whose role 
is to chair the discussion and to encourage reminiscence on the part of 
older participants. Discussions tend to be thematically structured -
schooldays, work, domestic life, the wars, and so on - and a small industry 
has grown up supplying pictures, sounds, artefacts and even smells from 
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the first half of this century, as prompts for reminiscing (eg: Help the 
Aged, 1981; Age Exchange, 1988; Winslow Press, 1989). Most often, this 
activity is seen as an end in itself, engaged in for the benefits it is thought 
to confer on those who participate. Occasionally, however, such groups 
will be set up with a tangible end-product in mind, often a collaboratively-
written account of participants' reminiscences. 
Reminiscence work may also be carried out on a one-to-one basis, either 
through preference, or where the temperament or circumstances of the 
older person preclude participation in a group. Such work is often termed 
'life history' work, and will often involve the production of a written 
account of the person's life experiences. 
Another form of reminiscence work is 'reminiscence theatre', pioneered 
by Medium Fair (Langley and Kershaw, 1981-82), and currently 
exemplified in the work of the London-based Age Exchange Theatre 
Company. This work involves the incorporation of older peoples' 
accounts of their life experience into theatre productions, which are then 
performed for audiences of older people in pensioners' clubs, theatres, 
community centres, sheltered housing units, homes and hospitals. The 
name' Age Exchange' also signifies an important intergenerational aspect 
of this work, with some projects involving the participation of children 
together with older people and professional actors and theatre directors in 
the production of plays based on memories of wartime evacuation, or of 
. the local area in which the children and older people live. 
Objectives of reminiscence work 
Gibson (1989), in a training manual which can be seen as constituting a 
'state of the art' account of reminiscence work, offers a useful summary of 
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reasons for encouraging reminiscence in work with older people. In her 
view, reminiscence offers the following benefits: it "encourages self-
worth"; it "confirms and enhances self-identity"; it "encourages and 
enriches social exchange"; it "alters others' perceptions and 
understandings" of older people; it "preserves and transmits the cultural 
heritage"; it "reverses the gift relationship" between younger and older 
people, and between care workers and their older clients; it "assists with 
the assessment of present functioning"; it "builds bridges between a 
person's past and present"; and finally, it is "for most an enjoyable 
experience". Reminiscence, then, is seen as ha.ving a range of beneficial 
effects, both personal and social. One or more of these formulations of the 
benefits of reminiscence work can generally be found in accounts of 
reminiscence work produced by its proponents and practitioners (eg: 
Lesser, Lazarus, Frankel and Havasy, 1981; Norris and Abu El Eileh, 1982; 
Cook, 1984; Norris, 1986; Thompson, 1988; Wright, 1988; Forrest, 1990; 
Gibson, 1992). 
A brief history of reminiscence work 
The emergence of reminiscence work has been traced to a number of 
influences. Bornat (1989b) and Thompson (1988) see the development of 
oral history in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a important precursor of 
reminiscence work. Both refer to a growing realisation, during that time, 
that the oral history interview was a two-way process - that the experience 
of collecting oral testimony was often as rewarding for those providing it 
as for those collecting it. Bornat also points to the influence of community 
publishing projects started in the 1970s, in which working-class people 
were encouraged to produce their own art and literature, with a strong 
emphasis on autobiographical accounts. These developments had 
characteristics which continue to be found in reminiscence work - a 
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recognition of the benefits to be gained from talking about one's past, the 
production of written accounts based on such talk, and a concern with 
empowering marginalised people by giving them a voice. Bornat (1989b) 
places great emphasis on this aspect of reminiscence work, characterising it 
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as a 'social movement', with an agenda whichlas much political as it is 
recreational or 'therapeutic'. This emphasis is also reflected in other 
accounts of reminiscence work (eg: Norris, 1982; Thompson, 1988; Gibson, 
1989). 
Another event cited as a major factor in the emergence of reminiscence 
work is the change in the view of reminiscence within gerontology and 
psychology in the 1960s and early 1970s. Around this time, papers began to 
appear which challenged the prevailing view of reminiscing in older 
people as a regressive and even pathological activity (eg: Butler, 1963; 
McMahon and Rhudick, 1964; Lewis 1971). These papers presented 
evidence suggesting that reminiscing was, in various ways, beneficial for 
older people, and that it contributed to 'successful ageing'. Robert Butler's 
1963 paper was particularly influential. He argued that reminiscing was 
part of a process of 'life review', engaged in by all older people, which 
involved 'taking stock' of one's life in preparation for one's approaching 
death. 
While these developments can be seen as providing grounds for 
encouraging older people to engage in reminiscence, a number of authors 
(Thompson, 1988; Bornat, 1989b; Gibson, 1989) point to one particular 
event as a catalyst for the current burgeoning practice of reminiscence 
work in the UK. This was the publication in 1981 of the tape/slide package 
Recall by the charity organisation Help the Aged. The Recall package was 
developed as part of a government-funded project, later taken over by 
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Help the Aged, which was concerned with improving the environment of 
mentally frail older people who were permanent residents of hospital 
wards. The package consisted of images and sounds depicting life in the 
first eighty years of the twentieth century - schooldays in the 1900s, youth 
in the 1920s, the First and Second World Wars, and so on. Cheap and 
simple to use, it proved to be very popular amongst those working with 
older people in care settings, who used it as a basis for running staff-led 
reminiscence groups. Recall inspired the development of other, more 
locally-oriented tape/slide packages (eg: Gibson, 1984, 1986), and also 
prompted moves to provide training for those running reminiscence 
groups. 
The flourishing of reminiscence work has resulted in publications 
intended to serve as a means of communication between practitioners, 
and as guides to practice. In the late 1980s, Help the Aged began to publish 
a newsletter called Recall Review, reporting on reminiscence work with 
older people in the UK. This has lately been reincarnated as Reminiscence 
magazine, published three times a year. Prominent among guides to 
practice are Norris (1986), Wright (1988) and Gibson (1989), the latter 
constituting a particularly comprehensive, state-of-the-art account of 
reminiscence practice. In addition to publications, there have been regular 
exhibitions and conferences on reminiscence and life history work. 
Notable in this respect are the three Exploring Living Memory exhibitions 
held in London in the 1980s, and a recent annual conference of the Oral 
History Society dedicated to reminiscence work. 
Researching the function of reminiscence in later life 
Research into the role of reminiscence in later life has focussed on its 
possible 'adaptive value', as a way of coping with the experience of 
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growing old. All reviews of the literature (Merriam, 1980, Romaniuk, 
1981; Kastenbaum, 1982; Molinari and Reichlin, 1985; Thornton and 
Brotchie, 1987) cite the American gerontologist Robert Butler as the 
inspiration for this research. Butler's 1963 paper, entitled 'Life review: An 
interpretation of reminiscence in the aged', presented clinical and literary 
evidence suggesting the universal occurrence of a mental process of 
reviewing one's life, prompted by a realisation of approaching death. 
After Butler's paper came a number of studies investigating the possible 
'adaptive functions' of reminiscence for older people. Some of these 
studies have investigated the relation between self-reports of older 
peoples' reminiscence activity, gained by means of questionnaires, and 
variables such as 'life satisfaction' and 'self concept' (Havighurst and 
Glasser, 1972), 'ego adjustment' (Boylin, Gordon and Nehrke, 1976), and 
'self regard/image enhancement', 'present problem-solving' and 'self 
understanding' (Romaniuk and Romaniuk, 1981). Others have used 
measures of reminiscence activity derived from interviews with older 
people, and investigated the association of these measures with measures 
of 'depression' (McMahon and Rhudick, 1964; Lieberman and Faik, 1971; 
Coleman, 1986), 'life satisfaction' (Lieberman and Falk, 1971; Coleman, 
1986), current life circumstances (Lieberman and Falk, 1971; Coleman, 
1986), 'self concept' (Lewis, 1971), and personality, 'ego strength', anxiety, 
and social interaction (Revere and Tobin, 1980). Some of these studies 
have also sought to identify different types of reminiscence, with 
correspondingly different functions (McMahon and Rhudick, 1964; Revere 
and Tobin, 1980; Romaniuk and Romaniuk, 1981; Coleman, 1986). 
The studies differ in terms of their design, the way reminiscence is defined 
and differentiated, the nature and circumstances of participants, and 
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whether their findings support the authors' hypotheses. The details of 
these differences are not immediately relevant to the purposes of this 
discussion. However, it is worth noting that Coleman (1986) concurs with 
other reviewers in stating that: "Taken together, as many studies seem to 
have found no evidence for the adaptive value of reminiscence as have 
found positive evidence" (pl1). Despite this equivocality, many of these 
studies are cited in contemporary accounts of reminiscence work as 
providing grounds for engaging in such work. 
Researching reminiscence work 
Research into the possible benefits of reminiscence work for older people, 
carried out in the UK and the US, has focussed almost exclusively on 
reminiscence groups. In the main, this research has used a pre/post test 
format, with various psychological and behavioural measures being taken 
before and after participation in a series of group reminiscence sessions. 
Measures used in these experimental studies are as follows: 
Self-esteem questionnaire (Perrotta and Meacham, 1981) 
Depression scale (Perrotta and Meacham, 1981; Goldwasser, 
Auerbach and Harkins, 1987; Bachar, Kindler, Schefler and 
Lerer, 1991) 
Life satisfaction inventory (Hobbs, 1983; Bender, Cooper and Howe, 
1983; Baines, Saxby and Ehlert, 1987; Berghorn and Schafer, 
1986-7) 
Tests of cognitive function (Bender, Cooper and Howe, 1983; Baines, 
Saxby and Ehlert, 1987; Berghorn and Schafer, 1986-7; 
Goldwasser, Auerbach and Harkins, 1987) 
Researcher ratings of participants' mood outside the sessions 
(McKiernan and Bender, 1990) 
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Observational measures of social, communicative, and other forms 
of behaviour outside the group sessions (Kiernat, 1979; 
Bender, Cooper and Howe, 1983; Baines, Saxby and Ehlert, 
1987; Goldwasser, Auerbach and Harkins, 1987) 
As well as these psychological and behavioural measures, a few studies 
have included measures intended to assess the effect of reminiscence 
groups on social relationships between older participants. Bender et al 
(1983), working with confused older people, assessed changes in 
participants' recognition of other participants from photographs. Berghorn 
and Schafer (1986-7) assessed changes in the number of other participants 
known to each participant, while Fielden (1990) used sociograms to assess 
changes in affiliation between group members. Baines et al (1987) is the 
only study to attempt systematic measurement of variables relevant to 
relationships between participants and group workers, by recording 
changes in staff knowledge of participants. 
Only two experimental studies have attempted systematic observation of 
activity which takes place within groups. McKiernan and Bender (1990) 
used time sampling methods to assess changes in participants' level of 
'engagement' in the group. Hobbs (1983) assessed level of participation 
based on participants' verbal contributions. 
In summary, these experimental studies have been concerned mainly 
with measures of changes in psychological state and behaviour. Only a 
few have looked for evidence of social-relational changes, and only two 
have departed from the 'before and after' format to look at what goes on 
during group sessions. The studies discussed have involved various 
populations of older people, including those diagnosed as suffering fom 
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depression and dementia. The studies differ in their design, and many 
have been criticised for failing to meet the criteria of experimental 
research (Thornton and Brotchie, 1987). For example, some included 
'control' groups, in which participants discussed topics related to the 
present rather than the past (eg: Berghorn and Schafer, 1986-7; Fielden, 
1990), while others did not. In another context, these issues would be a 
central topic of discussion, but here the aim is to illustrate in general the 
approach that has been taken to researching reminiscence work. Nor is it 
necessary here to discuss the findings of individual studies. It is, however, 
important to note that, taken as a whole, the findings of these studies are 
contradictory, and do not consistently show that participation in 
reminiscence groups is beneficial for older people (Thornton and Brotchie, 
1987). 
Besides these experimental studies, there are many reports of a more 
impressionistic nature, in which claims are made regarding the benefits of 
participation in reminiscence groups without any systematic 
measurement being reported (eg: Lesser, Lazarus, Frankel and Havasy, 
1981; Norris and Abu El Eileh, 1982; Cook, 1984; Forrest, 1990; Gibson, 
1992). These reports tend to place greater emphasis than experimental 
reports on such issues as participants' enjoyment of the groups, 
participants' engagement in the group sessions, and the effects of 
participation on social relationships between participants, and between 
participants and care workers. The following quote from Gibson (1992), 
reporting on a study involving reminiscence groups in day centres and 
residential homes in Northern Ireland, is typical of such reports: 
Although many residents had lived in close proximity to each other 
for years, engagement in reminiscence groups appeared to 
transform the quality of their relationships. Sharing the same 
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residential home had not meant shared lives. Through 
reminiscing in groups they discovered common origins and past 
experience of which they had no inkling. For such people living 
private lives in public places it was as if group reminiscence served 
the dual purpose of putting them in touch with their personal past 
as well as putting them in touch with other people in the present. 
In this way the then and there enriched the here and now. 
(Gibson, 1992: 34-5) 
These impressionistic reports are consistently positive. In addition, 
similar 'anecdotal' reports of the positive benefits of reminiscence work 
appear regularly in Help the Aged's Reminiscence magazine, and in 
guides to practice (eg: Gibson, 1989). 
Problems of reminiscence research 
The mismatch between anecdotal and experimental reports 
It will be apparent from the previous section that the literature on 
reminiscence work is characterised to some extent by a mismatch between 
'anecdotal' or impressionistic reports of benefits, emanating mainly from 
practitioners and proponents, and experimental studies which show no 
consistent evidence for such benefits. This problem is explicitly referred to 
in all areas of the literature, from academic articles and conference papers 
(Merriam, 1980; Thornton and Brotchie, 1987; Bornat,1989b; Norris, 1989) 
through to training manuals (Gibson, 1989). Responses to this state of 
affairs have varied. On the one hand, some have taken the lack of 'hard 
evidence' to signify that reminiscence has no particular benefits for older 
people, and concluded that research into reminiscence should be 
abandoned (Thornton and Brotchie, 1987), or refocussed as part of a more 
general set of issues concerning the dynamics of small groups (Bender, 
1991). On the other hand, others have argued that research has only just 
begun, and that more rigorous research will eventually corroborate 
anecdotal reports of benefits (Bornat, 1989b; Gibson, 1989). This problem is 
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not merely of academic significance, since the provision of resources for 
practice (materials, training etc.) may depend on the existence of 'hard 
evidence' of its benefits. 
Variability in the definition and conceptualisation of reminiscence 
A recent review paper, written by two clinical psychologists (Thornton and 
Brotchie, 1987), reviewing the empirical work on reminiscence, highlights 
the lack of conclusive evidence of its beneficial effects, and decries the lack 
of precise definitions of reminiscence, which inhibits progress in research: 
It is clear that even in studies using an empirical approach the 
definition and measurement of the key construct of reminiscence 
itself vary widely and seriously hamper any comparisons among 
studies. (Thornton and Brotchie, 1987: 95) 
The problem of variability in the definition and conceptualisation of 
reminiscence is raised in other reviews of the literature (Lo Gerfo, 1980-81; 
Merriam, 1980; Molinari and Reichlin, 1984-5; Buechel, 1986), where it is 
often identified as being responsible for the contradictory findings in the 
area. 
The missing account of activity in reminiscence groups 
This third problem is not raised in the research literature. It is raised here 
as a consequence of the perspective taken in the present study. To date, 
only two studies have undertaken systematic analysis of activity which 
takes place within reminiscence groups. This analysis has involved the 
sampling of behavioural indices of 'engagement' (McKiernan and Bender, 
1990), and recording the number of words and duration of speech of 
participants (Hobbs, 1983). Anecdotal and impressionistic reports of 
reminiscence work often present accounts of what occurs in the groups, 
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either reporting and interpreting the content of participants' talk, or 
describing changes in participants' behaviour, and make claims for the 
beneficial effects of reminiscence groups based on these accounts. It is 
arguable that a systematic analysis of what goes on in reminiscence groups 
would be an appropriate way of addressing these claims. However, the 
quantitative measures used so far are limited in this respect. What is 
needed is a means of going beyond merely measuring the amount of talk, 
and getting at what is accompUshed through the conversations which take 
place in reminiscence groups. 
In summary, then, the inconclusive findings of experimental studies of 
reminiscence work are at variance with the consistently positive nature of 
anecdotal and impressionistic reports. One possible explanation for these 
inconclusive findings, proposed in the literature, is variability in the 
definition and conceptualisation of reminiscence. At the same time, there 
is a notable absence of any systematic analysis of the conversational 
activity which takes place in reminiscence groups. One way of addressing 
the mismatch between experimental and anecdotal accounts, then, would 
be by means of a research approach which can handle variability in the 
construct of reminiscence, and which can address the conversational 
activity in reminiscence groups. The next chapter presents discourse 
analysis as a research approach which meets these requirements. 
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Chapter 3 
Discourse, Dialogicality and Social Action 
A central focus of the research reported in this thesis is the use of language 
in reminiscence work and reminiscence research. The use of language is 
clearly fundamental to group reminiscence, involving as it does people 
talking together about the past. The use of language is equally 
fundamental to reminiscence research. When participants fill in a 
questionnaire or test form, when coders categorise stretches of interview 
talk, when observers categorise a particular behaviour, when 
experimenters deploy operational definitions, they are dealing with 
linguistic categories and linguistic descriptions. Such uses of language are, 
in the main, treated as unproblematic. Language is treated as a neutral, 
transparent medium for the description of mental states, feelings, actions, 
events and so on. The relation between these things and the language 
used to describe them is taken to be one of reference - words refer to, stand 
for, things. Certainly, there may be disputes relating to such issues as the 
way 'reminiscence' should be defined, or the veracity of a particular 
description of an event which occurred in the past, or the reliability of 
questionnaire responses. Nevertheless, underlying all these activities is 
the assumption that an accurate definition, description or report is, in 
principle, achievable. 
This view of language, however, has been called into question by a 
growing body of work in linguistic philosophy, sociology, social theory 
and, latterly, in psychology. Common to this body of work is a view of 
language as a medium of social action, rather than as an abstract 
referential system (eg: Wittgenstein, 1953; Austin, 1962; Garfinkel, 1969; de 
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Saussure, 1974; Foucault, 1971,1972). This work has led to the 
development of a number of approaches to the empirical analysis of 
discourse. This chapter presents a brief account of this work and the 
research approaches it has engendered, and then moves on to consider 
their implications for researching reminiscence work. In doing so, it will 
provide grounds for the analyses of talk and writing about reminiscence 
and reminiscence work, and conversation in reminiscence groups, to be 
presented in subsequent chapters. 
Language as social practice 
The theory of speech acts 
The view of language as a medium of action can be traced to the later 
writings of Wittgenstein (1953) and in particular to Austin's (1962) theory 
of speech acts. Austin's theory was formulated in opposition to a view of 
language as an abstract, referential system. He was concerned to show that 
utterances are not only statements about the things to which they refer, 
but can also be seen as performing actions in the context in which they are 
produced. According to Austin, any utterance can be seen as performing 
three kinds of actions. First, it is a locutionary act - an act of saying 
something meaningful. Second, it is an illocutionary act - a 
communicative action, such as an offer, request, or command. Third, it is 
a perlocutionary act - it has consequences in the context in which it is 
uttered. Austin's work also drew attention to the importance of the 
context of an utterance in determining the nature of the action it was 
doing. This theory, with its emphasis on the importance of social context 
in determining meaning, and the function of linguistic utterances as 
actions, has had a profound and seminal influence on the study of 
language as social practice. 
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Ethnomethodology 
Austin's theory was developed primarily as a philosophical thesis to 
counter to prevailing philosophical views of language, and as such has 
proved problematic in its application to the study of actual talk (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987; Nofsinger, 1991). The ethnomethodological perspective 
on language use, however, is firmly rooted in the practicalities of everyday 
life. The project of ethnomethodology, as formulated by Garfinkel (1969), 
is to describe the methods and procedures of common-sense reasoning 
which people use to achieve shared understandings of their social world, 
and which are fundamental to the conduct and organisation of social life. 
A crucial move in this enterprise was to treat members' talk as a topic of 
research in its own right, rather than using it as a resource for 
understanding their actions, as in the form of interviews or other accounts 
collected as data for research. Ethnomethodological studies draw attention 
to three characteristics of talk which are pertinent to the present 
discussion. 
First, talk is indexical. That is, in order ro understand the meaning of an 
utterance, the recipient must examine features of the context in which it is 
produced - who produced it, what has been said previously, what activity 
the interactants are involved in, and so on. This is true of the vast 
majority of utterances, and is not confined to the class of words 
traditionally identified as 'indexical expressions' (eg: 'that', 'you', 'it', etc). 
The assumption that words simply 'stand for' or 'refer to' things fails to 
take into account the tacit procedures of interpretation which are required 
to bring 'words' and 'things' into correspondence in the particular 
situation in which the words are produced. Taking account of this fact ties 
the production of meaning to the particular concrete situations in which 
language is used, rather than locating it in the language itself. 
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Second, talk is reflexive. Any state of affairs can be described in a 
potentially infinite number of ways. Any description, then, will be 
selective,attending to certain features of that state of affairs, and ignoring 
others. In this way, talk works to constitute the context in which it is 
produced, and thus bears a reflexive relationship to that context. While 
the interpretation of an utterance necessitates an examination of the 
circumstances of its production, the utterance works at the same time to 
constitute the nature of those circumstances. This means that talk is not 
merely a referential commentary on actions, events and situations, but is 
rather a constitutive part of those actions, events and situations. 
Third, talk is action-orientated. This point follows from the previous two. 
In reflexively constituting the context in which it is produced, talk is like 
any other action. An utterance is a move in a sequence of activity, has 
consequences for the ensuing trajectory of that sequence of activity, and is 
treated as such by interactants. 
While these points are presented here in abstract form, they are derived 
from studies of the detail of people's everyday reasoning practices (eg: 
Garfinkel, 1969; Wieder, 1974). As in the case of speech act theory, they 
draw attention to the status of talk as action, and to the importance of 
social context in the interpretation of talk. However, they also go further 
in emphasising the reflexive properties of talk. These insights have had 
an important influence on the development of current approaches to the 
study of language use. In particular, they inform the research programme 
of conve{ation analysis (see below), and have also provided foundations 
for developments in discourse analysis (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). 
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Semiology and poststructuralism 
While ethnomethodology deals with language use in everyday 
interaction, other influences have come from work which has a far 
broader focus, done in the field of cultural analysis. This work is the 
legacy of Saussure's (1974) insights into the nature of language: that the 
relationship between words and the things they signify is an arbitrary one, 
and that meaning inheres in the relationship of signs to each other in a 
system of signs, rather than in the relation between signifier and signified. 
These insights led to the development of semiology, the science of signs, 
and a number of analyses of various domains of human activity as 
semiotic systems (eg: Barthes, 1974, 1985; Fiske and Hartley, 1978; 
Krampen, 1983). The importance of this work is in emphasising that 
meaning is not an inherent or natural property of objects, events or 
actions, but is the product of the systems of conventions and distinctions 
which people use to 'decode' them. Also important here is work in the 
poststructuralist tradition which developed as a response to the 
limitations of semiology. This work is notable for its concern with the 
role of 'discourses' in the constitution of various realms of human 
activity, and of subjectivity itself (eg: Foucault, 1971,1972). 
The three areas of work summarised above have been enormously 
influential in a variety of disciplines concerned with the study of 
language. Although very different in their concerns and methods, all 
three have informed current approaches to the analysis of discourse. 
Discourse Analysis 
The term 'discourse analysis' has been used to describe a variety of 
approaches to the study of language use (see Potter, Wetherell, Gill and 
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Edwards, 1990). Here, it is used to denote the research approach 
formulated initially by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), and developed by Potter 
and Wetherell (1987). Potter and Wetherell (1987) emphasise three 
characteristics of discourse which are important to their analytical strategy: 
function, construction and variation. 
Function 
The concept of function denotes the 'action-orientation' of discourse as 
discussed earlier. Discourse is used to do social actions, such as blaming, 
excusing, apologising, requesting, justifying, mitigating, and so on. 
Besides these local, interpersonal actions, 'function' is also intended to 
capture what might be termed the broader 'macrosocial' consequences of 
discourse - the way, for example, particular ways of speaking work to 
constitute particular kinds of gender relations, or to legitimate the power 
of a particular social group in society. 
Construction 
Discourse is constructed from pre-existing linguistic resources. When we 
offer an excuse, or an apology, when we offer a description or explanation 
of some event, we mobilise such resources. These resources comprise not 
only the vocabulary and grammar of the language we speak, but also a 
range of other discursive forms, such as metaphors, narrative forms, 
axioms, proverbs, and so on. The notion of construction also draws 
attention to the fact that we select from this set of resources certain forms 
rather than others. A further point here, following from the insights of 
ethnomethodology and poststructuralism, is that, as well as being 
contructed, discourse is constructive of the events, objects, actions and 
situations in relation to which it is used. 
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Variation 
On some occasions, the function of discourse may be self-evident. The 
utterance "please pass me the salt", for example, obviously functions as a 
request. However, as Wetherell and Potter (1988) point out, the functions 
of discourse are generally not so easy to determine. Interpersonal actions 
such as 'requesting' may be done indirectly, allowing a request to be 
rejected without loss of face for the person making the request (Drew, 
1984). Similar difficulties can be encoutered in specifying the 'macrosocial' 
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functions of discourse. 
The functions of discourse, then, are generally not directly available for 
study. Potter and Wetherell's solution to this problem is to direct analytic 
attention to variation in the way discourse is constructed. Variation in 
discourse is a consequence of the fact that people do different things with 
it. Just as the availability of different discursive forms serves as a resource 
for speakers/authors to perform different kinds of actions, so too can it 
serve as a resource for analysts in identifying those actions. Systematic 
variation in discursive constructions across different contexts can be used 
to test hypotheses about the function of particular constructions. It is this 
aspect of Potter and Wetherell's approach which constitutes a crucial step 
forward in the study of discourse and its consequences. 
Interpretative repertoires 
To say discourse is variable is not to say it lacks regularity. Rather, this 
regularity is to be found, not in the discourse of individual 
speakers/ authors, but in the discursive forms that are available to them to 
be mobilised in particular contexts. The analysis of variation is directed to 
the identification of such discursive forms. In particular, discourse 
analytic studies have focused on the identification of 'interpretative 
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repertoires' (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). Wetherell and Potter describe 
them as follows: 
Repertoires can be seen as the building blocks speakers use in 
constructing versions of actions, cognitive processes and other 
phenomena. Any particular repertoire is constituted out of a 
restricted range of terms used in a specific stylistic and grammatical 
fashion. Commonly these terms are derived from one or more key 
metaphors and the presence of a repertoire will often be signalled by 
certain tropes or figures of speech. (Wetherell and Potter, 1988: 172) 
The term 'interpretative repertoire' was first coined by Gilbert and Mulkay 
(1984), in their study of the discourse of scientists working in the field of 
biochemistry. Gilbert and Mulkay were initially interested in producing a 
sociological account of a theoretical dispute in the field. To this end, they 
recorded and transcribed interviews with biochemists, and obtained 
academic papers, letters and other materials related to the dispute. They 
found that the accounts in these materials were highly variable and 
contradictory, even when these accounts were produced by the same 
individual. This led them to focus their attention on the descriptive 
practices by which the scientists characterised events and actions in these 
accounts, and to attempt to identify the functions served by these practices. 
In doing this, Gilbert and Mulkay identified two distinct interpretative 
repertoires: the 'empiricist' repertoire and the 'contingent' repertoire. 
The empiricist repertoire, predominant in formal research papers, was 
used to represent the scientists' findings as reflecting an objective reality, 
and as being arrived at through the formal procedures of scientific 
investigation uncontaminated by personal or social influences. This 
repertoire involved the use of passive, impersonal forms (eg: "It was 
found that. .. ") and rarely mentioned the author's own involvements and 
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commitments. The contingent repertoire was more common in 
interviews, and involved a wider range of linguistic forms. This 
repertoire was used to represent scientists' actions and findings as 
contingent on social and personal influences, rather than purely empirical 
phenomena. Gilbert and Mulkay found that these repertoires were an 
important resource in accounting for discrepancies between the findings 
and theories of different scientists. 
Following Gilbert and Mulkay, a number of discourse analytic studies 
have used the interpretative repertoire as a unit of analysis (eg: Potter and 
Reicher, 1987i Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Soyland, 1980). A particular 
advantage of this strategy is that it avoids the tendency towards the 
reification of 'discourses' prevalent in other approaches to discourse 
analysis more closely aligned with poststructuralist work (eg: Parker, 1989). 
In such approaches, discourses are viewed as systematised sets of 
statements, and are accorded the status of causal agents. Like the notion of 
'discourses', the notion of 'interpretative repertoire' emphasises that 
speakers/authors have at their disposal a bounded and identifiable set of 
discursive resources, and also that the consequences of using these 
resources may not be intended or recognised. However, its advantage is 
that it locates these resources as "a constitutive part of social practices 
situated in specific contexts" (Potter, Wetherell, Gill and Edwards, 1990: 
209). 
Rhetoric and dialogicality 
The identification of interpretative repertoires and their variable use in 
different contexts is one means of getting at the functions of discourse. 
However, it is important to note that, while discursive actions may be 
designed to have certain effects, there is no guarantee that they will be 
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successful in achieving those effects. Excuses may not be accepted, blaming 
may be countered with mitigation, and so on. There is thus an important 
rhetorical dimension to discourse (Billig, 1987). For example, Edwards and 
Potter (1992), in applying discourse analysis to the traditional psychological 
topics of memory and attribution, demonstrate the ways in which 
versions of events are constructed in such a way as to pre-empt other 
possible versions, and identify a range of techniques which people use to 
undermine each others descriptions, attributions of blame, and so on. In 
this sense, discourse is inherently dialogical, in that situated descriptions, 
versions, attributions, etc. take shape in relation to other possible versions. 
The availability of contradictory interpretative repertoires as accounting 
resources, as identified in Gilbert and MuJkay's (1984) study, can be seen as 
another facet of this phenomenon. 
This dialogicality is also noted by Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, 
Middleton and Radley (1988) in their discussions of the 'ideological 
dilemmas' which structure common-sense talk and thinking. By means 
of an analysis of people's talk in relation to a variety of social domains, 
they demonstrate that, rather than displaying a coherent internally 
consistent organisation, common-sense is dilemmatic in character, and 
that, in their talk, people struggle with the contradictions and 
inconsistencies that it embodies. 
This work has important resonances with ethnomethodological insights 
regarding the 'openness' and 'inconclusiveness' of linguistic descriptions 
(Garfinkel, 1969; Heritage, 1984). What it points to is the inherent 
uncertainty of linguistic representation (Bowers and Middleton, 1991). 
Words do not stand in a one-to-one correspondence with the world. Any 
version is one of a number of possible versions, and rhetorical work must 
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be done in order for it to stand as .till:. version in the circumstances of its 
formulation. Thus, representation, rather than being a static, referential 
business, is recast as in dynamic terms, as an ongoing argument, which is 
never resolved once and for all, but which must be engaged in anew 
whenever we attempt to represent some aspect of our world in words. 
Before turning to the implications of the above discussion for research on 
reminiscence work, it is necessary to discuss briefly another approach to 
the study of language use which will inform the analyses presented in 
subsequent chapters. 
Conversation Analysis 
As mentioned earlier, conversation analysis developed out of 
ethnomethodology. A major concern of conversation analysis (CA) has 
been to describe the tacit systematic procedures underlying the production 
and understanding of natural conversation. Based on detailed verbatim 
transcripts, conversation analytic studies have accumulated to provide an 
elaborate account of the 'technology' or 'architecture' of conversation(eg: 
Schegloff, 1968; Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974; Schenkein, 1978; 
Atkinson and Drew, 1979; Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; Goodwin, 1986; 
Button and Lee, 1987). Like discourse analysis, CA focuses on the actions 
that are accomplished through the design of utterances. However, it is 
particularly concerned with the way in which the sequential placement of 
utterances in conversation is used by interactants as a resource for 
producing and interpreting utterances. In the turn-by-turn unfolding of 
conversation, each turn is addressed to matters raised by the turn 
preceding it. One example of this general phenomenon is the 'adjacency 
pair' structure (Schegloff, 1968; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973), in which the 
production of a first conversational action - for example, a question or a 
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greeting - is oriented to as requiring the production of a second - an 
answer, a return greeting, and so on. This, then, is a kind of rule, but not 
in any deterministic sense. Rather, it is normative. in that, in the absence 
of a response, the first speaker may legitimately repeat her action, sanction 
the non-respondent, or draw certain inferences from the non-response. 
Such rules can be seen as a resource by which interactants shape the 
trajectory of action sequences. However, they also serve as a resource for 
interactants to see how others understand their actions. This can be seen 
in the following example, taken from Heritage (1988): 
A: Why don't you come and see me some times. 
[ 
B: I would like to. 
Here, B's response, by taking the form of an 'acceptance', treats Ns 
utterance as an invitation. Had B responded by saying "I'm sorry, I've 
been so busy lately", that is, by offering an apology, she would instead be 
displying her understanding of A's utterance as a complaint. Thus, the 
relationship between actions in sequence serves as an interpretative 
resource for interactants. At the same time, and this is crucial to CA as an 
analytic strategy, it serves as a resource for analysts of interaction, in that 
turns in conversation publically display participants readings of the 
actions done by preceding turns. 
CA's concern with the sequential placement of utterances leads to a finer 
grained analysis of talk than that involving the identification of 
interpretative repertoires (Wooffitt, 1992). Such repertoires are generally 
identified across broad stretches of talk, and while they are important in 
the identification of interpretative resources at speakers' disposal, they 
32 
miss the resources available in the structure and sequential trajectory of 
talk. This means that they also miss the way in which interactants' use of 
such interactional resources is occasioned in and by the unfolding of 
conversation. 
Of particular relevance here is Wooffitt's (1992) point that an analysis 
based on interpretative repertoires fails to deal with the ways in which 
interactants mobilise 'social identities' and assumptions related to 
'category membership' as occasioned interactional resources. A range of 
studies have demonstrated that interactants orientate to the implications 
that their own and others' talk have for their identity in the current 
interaction (eg: Smith, 1978; Sacks, 1979; Watson, 1983; Drew, 1984, 1987; 
Widdecombe and Wooffitt, 1990; Wooffitt, 1992). For example, Wooffitt's 
(1992) study of accounts of paranormal experiences shows how speakers 
accounts are designed in such a way as to provide for their identity as an 
'ordinary' person, and to ward off implications that they are gullible or 
unbalanced. This work serves as an argument for treating 'identity' as a 
dynamic, situated, and interactionally-occasioned phenomenon, rather 
than as some static property internal to the individual. At the same time, 
it demonstrates that the study of the local occasioning and negotiation of 
identities requires attention to the turn-by-turn organisation of talk. 
Having discussed current approaches to the study of language use, the next 
section will consider the implications of these approaches for researching 
reminiscence work, as a prelude to the analyses presented in subsequent 
chapters. 
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Implications for researching reminiscence work 
The discursive construction of 'reminiscence' and 'reminiscence work' 
The preceding discussion directs attention to the fact that descriptions and 
definitions of reminiscence, and formulations of its value for older people 
are constructed and constructive. linguistic representations of the nature 
of reminiscence, its significance in later life, and the value of reminiscence 
work, make up a domain of discursive action, whose pragmatic 
orientation and constructive effects are analysable. From this perspective, 
the problems of reminiscence research identified at the end of the 
previous chapter appear in a very different light. 
Variability in the definition and conceptualisation of reminiscence, 
identified as a problem for research (Lo Gerfo, 1980-81; Merriam, 1980; 
Molinari and Reichlin, 1984-5; Buechel, 1986; Thornton and Brotchie, 
1987), is recast as a resource for research. Rather than attempting to 
eradicate this variability through greater consistency, clarity, etc., the 
discourse analytic perspective treats it as an inevitable consequence of the 
fact that descriptions and definitions are constructed and action-oriented. 
This variability can be examined for the clues it offers regarding the 
functional consequences of particular formulations of the nature of 
'reminiscence' and its significance for older people. 
A similar approach can be taken to the problem of the mismatch between 
positive anecdotal reports of the benefits of reminiscence work for older 
people, and experimental studies which show no consistent evidence of 
benefits. This mismatch can be seen in terms of variability in accounts of 
the nature and value of reminiscence work. Again, this variability can be 
used as a resource in identifying the functional orientation of accounts of 
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the nature and value of reminiscence work to be found in the writing and 
talk of researchers and practitioners. 
Reminiscence groups as arenas of conversational action 
As the previous chapter made clear, research on group reminiscence has 
tended to rely on measures which are removed from the context of 
activity itself. These measures consist mainly of self reports of 
'depression', 'life satisfaction', 'self-esteem', etc .. The assumption 
underlying the use of these reports is that they reflect internal states which 
may be correlated with, or changed by, participation in reminiscence 
groups. These reports are systematic descriptions of mental states and 
feelings. From the perspective outlined above, such descriptions cannot 
be taken as merely reflecting their objects, but rather as constructive of 
those objects. Such descriptions mobilise notions of 'self' and 'mentality' 
which are culturally and historically contingent, and which can be seen as 
being reproduced by psychological measures, rather than simply being 
calibrated by them (Sampson, 1983; Henriques, Holloway, Urwin, Venn 
and Walkerdine, 1984). Viewed in this way, such measures appear to bear 
little relation to what goes on in reminiscence groups. In contrast to this 
approach, the discourse analytic approach offers resources for the analysis 
of the activity in reminiscence groups as conversational action. It enables 
research to move beyond relatively crude measures of engagement (eg: 
McKiernan and Bender, 1990; Hobbs, 1983) into a detailed analysis of the 
rhetorical work being done as care workers and older people talk together. 
The analytical resources identified in the foregoing will be used in the 
analyses of talk and text related to reminiscence work presented in 
subsequent chapters. The analyses presented in Chapters 4,5 and 6 will 
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focus on variability in the discursive representation of reminiscence and 
reminiscence work, and will identify interpretative repertoires, and other 
regularities of discursive practice. In addition, conversation analytic 
resources will be brought into play where the analyses focus on transcripts 
of talk from interviews, incidental conversations and conference 
workshops. Conversation analytic work will also inform the analyses of 
talk in reminiscence groups, presented in Chapters 7 and 8. It is important 
to stress here that no attempt is being made to define certain kinds of talk 
as'reminiscing'. Rather, the interest will be in the kinds of interactional 
accomplishments which reminiscence groups afford, whether or not the 
talk produced in these groups might be described as 'reminiscence'. 
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Chapter 4 
Writing About Reminiscence: Psychology, 
Oral History, and the Social Relations of Ageing 
Recent years have seen the development of discussions about the 'image' 
of older people in society which have a parallel in discussions about ethnic 
minority groups, the disabled, and women. Common to all these 
discussions is a concern that the demographic category in question is 
represented in negative terms, and that this renders them at a 
disadvantage in society, legitimating prejudice and discrimination. Older 
people are routinely dealt with in terms of stereotypical images which 
associate ageing with decline and decrement, and which characterise them 
as dependent and socially marginal (Giles, 1991). Arguments have been 
advanced for raising consciousness with regard to the damaging 
consequences of such stereotypical assumptions about older people, and 
for developing other ways of understanding the nature of old age which 
are less oppressive (eg: Butler, 1969; Levin and Levin, 1980; Bornat, 
Philipson and Ward, 1985; Tyler, 1986; Philipson, 1989; AUT, 1991; 
Coupland, Nussbaum and Coupland 1991). 
Reminiscence work is very often located as part of such a project. It is 
common in accounts of reminiscence work to find statements which 
explicitly associate this work with an attempt to change perceptions of 
older people. Reminiscence work is variously construed as a means of 
changing such perceptions, or as itself a sign of these changing perceptions 
(eg: Beaton, 1980; Coleman, 1986; Bornat, 1989b; Gibson, 1989). Moreover, 
there is among the broad range of activities going under the name of 
'reminiscence work', a strand of work explicitly concerned with 
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empowering older people, through participation in continuing education, 
adult literacy and community publishing projects (eg: Lawrence and Mace, 
1987; Bornat, 1989a). Bornat (1989b) identifies such work as a major force 
in the development of reminiscence work. 
However, this concern with the social position of older people has not 
been prominent in reports of research on reminiscence work. Instead, the 
tendency has been to focus on the possible psychological benefits of 
reminiscence. This is not to say a concern with social relationships is 
entirely absent. For example, there has been some research on the effects 
of reminiscence work on relationships between care workers and older 
people in their care (Baines, Saxby and Ehlert, 1987), or between older 
people themselves (Norris and Abu El Eileh, 1982; Fielden, 1990). 
Nevertheless, research has concerned itself primarily with the effects of 
reminiscence work on the psychological state of the individual older 
person (eg: Perrotta and Meacham, 1981; Goldwasser, Auerbach and 
Harkins, 1987; Bachar, Kindler, Schefler and Lerer, 1991). 
The value of reminiscence for older people, then, is represented in a 
variety of ways in the research and practice literature related to 
reminiscence work. This chapter presents an analysis of these different 
representations. This analysis will show that they embody arguments 
about the nature of ageing itself, and more particularly, arguments about 
the social relations of ageing - that is, about how older people are to be 
positioned in their relations with others in society. It will demonstrate 
that these different representations have different social relational 
consequences for older people, and show how these representations are 
mobilised by authors in arguing for changes in the social relations of 
ageing. It will demonstrate further that accounts of systematic research 
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into reminiscence and ageing tend to represent the value of reminiscence 
for older people in 'psychological' terms, while 'anecdotal' accounts of 
reminiscence work tend to represent this value in 'sociological' terms. It 
will be argued that the current mismatch between 'hard' evidence and 
anecdotal reports of the benefits of reminiscence is in part a consequence of 
this tendency to favour different representations of its value, and that this 
mismatch, rather than being merely a matter of evidence, signifies a 
difference in orientation to social relational concerns between research and 
practice. 
The psychological functionality of reminiscence 
Arguments about the value of reminiscence for older people are not 
recent. Most accounts of reminiscence research or reminiscence practice 
place the emergence of reminiscence, as an object of research and practice, 
in the context of opposing formulations of the value of reminiscence for 
older people. So common are such accounts, and so similar in form, that 
they may be represented in terms of the following 'generic narrative': 
Reminiscence was once considered to be an undesirable, or even 
pathological activity as far as older people were concerned. It was 
thought to be a symptom or cause of mental deterioration, and was 
thus actively discouraged, at least in care settings. Then, in 1963, the 
American psychiatrist and gerontologist Robert Butler published an 
article in which he claimed reminiscence was a psychologically 
healthy activity for old people, in that it contributed to a vital 
process which he termed the'life review'. Following Butler, people 
have come to realise that reminiscence is (or may be) especially 
beneficial for (at least some) older people. 
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This narrative describes a reversal in ideas about the value of 
reminiscence - a move from negative to positive value, initiated by 
Butler's work. However, the move to ascribe positive value has taken a 
variety of forms in the literature. In this section, analytical attention will 
be focussed on three of the most frequently cited academic papers on 
reminiscence and ageing: Butler (1963), McMahon and Rhudick(1964) and 
Lewis (1971). The analysis will identify two formulations of reminiscence 
and its value for older people (henceforth abbreviated as 'reminiscence-
and-ageing'), common to all three papers. It seems appropriate to start 
with Butler's own contribution, given the seminal role that is accorded to 
it in the literature. Extract 1 is taken from Butler's 1963 paper, entitled 
'The life review: An interpretation of reminiscence in the aged'. 
Extract 1 
The prevailing tendency is to identify reminiscence in the aged with 
psychological dysfunction and thus to regard it essentially as a 
symptom.... In contrast, I conceive of the life review as a naturally 
occurring, universal mental process characterised by the progressive 
return to consciousness of past experiences.... Presumably this 
process is prompted by the realisation of approaching death, and the 
inability to maintain one's sense of personal invulnerability. 
(Butler, 1963: 65-66) 
In this extract, Butler formulates the "prevailing" view of reminiscence-
and-ageing, and sets his own formulation in opposition to it. In his 
formulation, rather than being a sign of "psychological dysfunction", 
reminiscence is psychologically functional for older people - it is part of 
the "life review", "a naturally occurring, universal mental process". 
Butler saw this process as the "denouement of character", as an effort to 
organise the experiences and actions of one's life into a coherent and 
meaningful whole in the face of the reality and inevitability of death. The 
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interest here is not in the validity of this hypothesis, but rather in the fact 
that it ascribes a particular value to reminiscence, and that it does this in a 
certain way, by representing reminiscing as psychologically functional. 
Extract 2 is taken from Lewis's (1971) paper, entitled 'Reminiscing and self 
concept in old age', which reports the first experimental study of 
reminiscence and ageing. 
Extract 2 
AI though this mechanism may seem rigid and tiresome to other 
persons, this may be a way of maintaining self esteem. Therefore in 
studying the aged and in caring for them, this pattern of reminiscing 
about identifying (sic) with one's past should be respected rather 
than treated as garrulous behaviour of no consequence. 
(Lewis, 1971: 242) 
In this extract, we find a similar formulation of reminiscence as 
psychologically functional for older people. In this case, its functionality is 
represented in terms of a "mechanism" for "maintaining self esteem". As 
with Butler's paper, this formulation is set in opposition to a formulation 
of reminiscence which represents it as having negative value, as 
"garrulous behaviour of no consequence". 
Extract 3 is taken from a paper entitled "Reminiscing in the aged: An 
adaptational response" by McMahon and Rhudick (1964). This paper 
reported a study involving Spanish-American War veterans who, in the 
course of attending an outpatients clinic, had impressed staff with their 
success in coping with the problems of ageing, and who subsequently 
became the focus of attempts to explain this notable success. It was found 
in interviews that the veterans engaged in a great deal of reminiscing. 
41 
Extract 3 
[Reminiscence] is popularly regarded as a sign of mental 
deterioration. Clinical evidence for such deterioration was absent in 
these subjects, and previous studies had already established them as 
well above average in both intelligence and physical condition .... 
These facts suggested that reminiscing in some way might be related 
to the success of this group in coping with problems of later life. 
(McMahon and Rhudick, 1964: 292) 
Here again the "popular" representation of reminiscence as "a sign of 
mental deterioration" is countered with a representation of reminiscence 
as psychologically functional for older people, as an aid to "coping with 
problems of later life". At the end of their paper, McMahon and Rhudick 
list a range of likely functions: "maintaining self esteem, reaffirming a 
sense of identity, working through and mastering personal losses, and 
contributing positively to society" (p. 297). 
On the basis of various kinds of evidence, these three papers represent 
reminiscence as psychologically functional for older people. This 
formulation of the value of reminiscence in later life will be identified as 
an interpretive repertoire (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). In that it is ued to 
account for the value of reminiscence in terms of psychological function, 
it will henceforth be identified as the 'psychological' repertoire. 
One consequence of this 'psychological' repertoire is that it provides a 
justification for doing further research into the functions of reminiscence 
in later life. Another consequence is that it provides a justification for 
doing reminiscence work: for actively and deliberately encouraging older 
people to reminisce, with a view to reaping the psychological benefits of 
such an activity. All three papers orient to both of these possibilities, 
suggesting directions for further research, and discussing the 'therapeutic' 
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potential of reminiscence. In these early papers, then, we see the 
emergence of reminiscence as an object of research and as an object of 
practice. 
However, this 'psychological' repertoire is also used in another way, more 
immediate to the context of its formulation. That is, it is mobilised to 
counter a formulation of reminiscence which constructs it as 
dysfunctional, or as having no value. This way of formulating the value 
of reminiscence will be termed here the 'dysfunctional' repertoire. In each 
of the three papers under discussion, this juxtaposition of contrary 
repertoires is done in the service of a particular kind of argument. 
Consider again Extract 2, taken from Lewis's paper. Here, Lewis is doing 
more than setting a formulation of reminiscence-and-ageing in opposition 
to another popularly-held formulation. He is arguing for a particular kind 
of conduct towards older people when they reminisce, and arguing against 
another kind of conduct - that reminiscing "should be respected, rather 
than treated as garrulous behaviour of no consequence". A similar move 
is made in Butler's and McMahon and Rhudick's papers, as shown in 
Extracts 4 and 5. 
Extract 4 
Recognition of the occurrence of such a vital process as the life 
review may help one to listen, to tolerate, and understand the aged, 
and not to treat reminiscence as devitalised and insignificant. 
(Butler, 1963: 72) 
Extract 5 
The advances of science and modern methods of communication 
have contributed to a decreasing respect for reminiscing behaviour 
in the aged. With the steadily increasing numbers of aged in our 
modern society, it seems essential that we find new ways to provide 
opportunities for them to contribute their knowledge of the past. 
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Anxious relatives sometimes discourage reminiscing behaviour 
within the family group because they consider it a sign of 
deterioration in their loved ones. It would appear, quite to the 
contrary, that we should create occasions for older people to 
reminisce and not expect their reminiscences to conform to the 
standards of accuracy of historical texts. (McMahon and Rhudick, 
1964:294) 
In each of these three extracts (2, 4 and 5), the 'psychological' repertoire is 
mobilised to counter the dysfunctional repertoire, and this is done in the 
service of advancing what is essentially a moral argument concerning the 
appropriate response of others to the reminiscences of older people. Each 
extract sets up a scenario in which others -"one" (Butler);"other persons" 
(Lewis);"anxious relatives" (McMahon and Rhudick) - respond in a 
particular way to such talk. It is through the responses of these others that 
reminiscence is constructed as valueless: they "treat reminiscence as 
devitalised and insignificant" (Butler); they see it as "rigid and tiresome", 
and "treat it as garrulous behaviour of no consequence" (Lewis); they 
"discourage reminiscing behaviour ... because they consider it a sign of 
deterioration" (McMahon and Rhudick). 
In the context of these responses, the 'psychological' repertoire is used as a 
basis for exhorting these people to respond differently: "to listen, to 
tolerate or understand the aged" (Butler); "should be respected" (Lewis); 
"this behaviour should be encouraged; we should create occasions for 
older people to reminisce and not expect their reminiscences to conform to 
the standards of accuracy of historical texts" (McMahon and Rhudick). 
The 'psychological' repertoire deployed in these papers implies 
consequences both for reminiscence research and practice and for the social 
relations in which older people might find themselves situated. The 
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construction of reminiscence as a 'mechanism', 'process' or 'response' can 
be used as an argument for a change in other people's conduct towards 
older people when they are reminiscing, and by implication, as an 
argument for a change in the social relations of ageing. 
Of course, it might be argued that the main purpose of these papers is to 
contribute to gerontological knowledge, and that the moral exhortations 
discussed are secondary to this purpose. However, the use of the 
'psychological' repertoire as a basis for these exhortations is more than a 
footnote to research findings. In particular, Butler's formulation and use 
of the 'psychological' repertoire must be set in the context of his more 
general concern with changing the social relations of ageing. As well as 
being associated with the 'discovery' of the psychological value of 
reminiscence, he is also credited with coining the term 'ageism' in another 
paper entitled I Age-Ism: Another form of bigotry' (Butler, 1969). Further 
evidence of the importance of the social relational implications of the 
'psychological' repertoire is to be found in later texts. For example, a 
number of papers discussing reminiscence work include in their text the 
direct quote from Butler's paper presented in Extract 4 (Buechel, 1986:34; 
Johnston,1981-82:38). Others refer explicitly to the social relational 
implications of Butler's argument. In Extract 6, for example, taken from 
an article discussing the use of reminiscence, Butler's contribution is 
constructed in terms of the legitimation of reminiscence in the face of the 
"impatience and frustration" of others. 
Extract 6 
Butler recognised the significance of such reflective activities and 
termed the process "life review". In so doing, he provided 
legitimacy to behaviour of the old that sometimes has been regarded 
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by younger people with impatience and frustration. 
(Ryden, 1981:461) 
One striking example of this representation of Butler's influence is an 
account by Dobrof (1984). Dobrof's account documents the effects of 
Butler's ideas on care practices, and is frequently quoted or referred to by 
active proponents of reminiscence work (eg: Coleman, 1986:10; Bornat, 
1989b:18; Gibson, 1989:9; Hopkins and Harris, 1991:2). 
Extract 7 
In a profound sense, Butler's writings liberated both the old and the 
nurses, doctors and social workers; the old were free to remember, 
to regret, to look reflectively at the past and try to understand it. 
And we were free to listen, and to treat rememberers and 
rememberances with the respect they deserved, instead of 
trivialising them by diversion to a bingo game. (Dobrof, 1984: 2) 
It is to be expected that, having argued for the psychological functionality 
of reminiscence in later life, Butler's work would be cited as a justification 
for the deliberate encouragement of reminiscence in the context of 
'reminiscence work'. However, Extract 7 goes much further than this. 
Rather than using Butler as a justification for practice, it is crediting him 
with transforming the social relations of care. "Liberated" from a view of 
reminiscence as dysfunctional, the old were "free" to reminisce, and their 
carers were "free" to listen to them "with the respect they deserved." 
The construction of reminiscence as psychologically functional for older 
people has social relational implications. These implications are explicitly 
topicalised in the literature - the preceding analysis has shown that the 
'psychological' repertoire is used in arguments for changing social 
relations, and is credited with accomplishing such changes. The point 
being that the significance of the 'psychological' repertoire for 
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reminiscence work does not inhere in its status as psychological 'fact', but 
rather in the consequential implications and uses previously 
demonstrated. In studying reminiscence work, it is important to address 
this issue. A research agenda which focuses only on the psychological 
benefits of reminiscence misses the consequences of the way reminiscence 
is represented in discourse. In Extract 7, Dobrofs discussion orients, not to 
the psychological benefits of reminiscing, but to the consequences of a 
particular formulation of the value of reminiscence, in "liberating" people 
from the tyrrany of another formulation of its value. 
This argument can be developed further through a consideration of other 
features of the 'psychological' repertoire, and through a comparison of this 
repertoire with another formulation of reminiscence-and-ageing to be 
found in the reminiscence literature - one in which reminiscence is 
represented as having social as well as personal value. 
The personal and social value of reminiscence 
It is important to note that the moral exhortations made in Extracts 2, 4 
and 5 are made on the basis of the 'functionality' of reminiscence for the 
older person. That is, these exhortations are not made on the basis of the 
value of the talk for its recipients. On the contrary, it is acknowledged that 
it may not have any value in this sense. Lewis, for example, does not 
exclude the possibility that "this mechanism may seem rigid and tiresome 
to other persons". Similarly, for Butler, it is the "recognition" of the 
process of life review, rather of the interpersonal value of the talk, which 
might "help one to listen". 
Extract 5 is more optimistic on this point, suggesting that "we find new 
ways to provide opportunities for [the aged] to contribute their knowledge 
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of the past." This is a reference to the lapsed "storytelling function of 
older people" (p294) in modern society, which McMahon and Rhudick 
discuss in some detail in their paper. In discussing reminiscence as 
fulfilling a 'storytelling function', they appear to be moving away from a 
strictly psychological account of its value for older people, towards a more 
sociological account. However, in Extract 5, this "storytelling function" is 
presented as having lapsed due to "the advances of science and modern 
methods of communication". Thus, in this account, reminiscence no 
longer has the interpersonal and social significance it once had, and "new 
ways" have yet to be found to re-establish it. Thus, although McMahon 
and Rhudick suggest the possibility of interpersonal value, their account is 
essentially one of personal value. 
The 'psychological' repertoire, although it accords value to reminiscence, 
restricts it to the domain of personal value. That is, reminiscence is of 
value to the reminiscer, in performing the various functions reported in 
the papers, but its social value, whether for immediate interlocutors or for 
the wider society, remains in doubt. 
It is appropriate to qualify the position of these papers, because they do not 
entirely rule out the possibility that the reminiscences of older people 
might have some interpersonal or social function. McMahon and 
Rhudick, in discussing the 'storytelling function' of older people, imply 
that their reminiscences might at least be directed towards others, even if 
they are no longer perceived as relevant to those others. Similarly, Lewis 
suggests that "reminiscence may be used as a means of initiating social 
communication, even though it is largely one-sided" (p242), and that it 
"seems to answer a need felt by disengaging old persons ... but it also in a 
sense enables them to re-engage by seeking out potential listeners." (p.243). 
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This emphasis on the personal value of reminiscence, and de-emphasis of 
interpersonal value, is an important feature of the 'psychological' 
repertoire and the moral argument in which it is invoked. In response to 
a formulation of reminiscence which represents it as valueless, the 
'psychological' repertoire does not assert that the reminiscences of older 
people have interpersonal value. Instead, it works to counter the 
dysfunctional repertoire by offering a different account of the apparent lack 
of value: that reminiscence has no interpersonal value because it is not 
meant for others, but is rather a self-directed 'mechanism', triggered by the 
ageing process. 
In terms of the social relations of ageing, the 'psychological' repertoire 
represents something of a compromise. It is used in an argument for 
giving attention and respect to older people, but it does not explicitly call 
into question the value placed on reminiscence by the "other persons" 
who may find it "rigid and tiresome" (Lewis),"devitalised and 
insignificant" (Butler), or "a sign of mental deterioration" (McMahon and 
Rhudick). This formulation, then, places the reminiscences of older 
people outside the category of normal social communication. Potentially, 
this places older people outside of the normal processes of social 
intercourse, at least when they are reminiscing. Even though they are 
speaking to us, they have nothing to say from our point of view - we must 
tolerate this socially valueless talk, and listen because it is 'good' for them. 
The 'psychological' repertoire can be contrasted with another interpretive 
repertoire of reminiscence-and-ageing to be found in the literature. Extract 
8 is an example of this way of representing the association between 
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reminiscence and ageing, and is taken from a recently published training 
pack for potential practitioners. 
Extract 8 
REMINISCENCE PRESERVES AND TRANSMIlS THE 
CULTURAL HERITAGE - To value the past is to enrich the present. 
Each time a person dies history dies with them. To have listened to 
others is to have captured some of that past, which in turn 
preserves the oral traditions of our varied cultural backgrounds. 
(Gibson, 1989:3) 
In this extract, talk about the past is represented as communicating 
"cultural heritage" and "history", as something which can "enrich the 
present". Here, then, reminiscence is accorded high social value, as oral 
history. This formulation can be contrasted with the 'psychological' 
repertoire, which accords reminiscence personal value, while leaving its 
social value in some doubt. In Extract 8, the "storytelling role" (as referred 
to in McMahon and Rhudick, 1967) is no longer defunct - there is no need 
to find "new ways" of making the knowledge of older people relevant and 
useful in the present. On the contrary, this knowledge is represented as 
unambiguously valuable for others. 
This way of representing the association between reminiscence and ageing 
will henceforth be termed the 'sociological' repertoire, given its emphasis 
on the social (interpersonal, cultural) value of reminiscence, and its 
common association of older people's reminiscences with the fulfilment 
of a 'social role' particular to them. 
This 'sociological' repertoire has, in turn, different implications for the 
way interlocutors might respond to the reminiscences of older people. 
The 'psychological' repertoire is mobilised in the course of exhorting 
50 
others to listen to and respect these reminiscences because they have 
personal value for the reminiscer, even though they may appear to have 
little social value - indeed, this accounts for the lack of social value, in that 
the talk is construed as primarily self-directed. In terms of the 
'sociological' repertoire, on the other hand, one listens for one's own 
benefit, and for the benefit of society as a whole - to "enrich the present", 
to "capture some of that past". Moreover, this is not just a past which is 
general to all older people - each individual has in their possession some 
unique piece of history, so that "each time a person dies history dies with 
them." By representing reminiscence as having high social value, this 
version serves as a much stronger argument for listening to and respecting 
the reminiscences of older people. Further examples deploying this 
'sociological' repertoire are presented in Extracts 9 - 11. 
Extract 9 
It became increasingly evident that the patients had a unique wealth 
of wisdom and experience to share with others and gained 
considerable pleasure from doing so. (Norris, 1981: 5) 
Extract 10 
Listen to the aged for they will tell you about living and dying. 
Listen to the aged for they will enlighten you about problem-
solving, sexuality, grief, sensory deprivation and survival. Listen to 
the aged for they will show you how to be courageous loving and 
generous. They are the distinguished faculty without formal 
classrooms ... they teach not from books but from long experience in 
living. (Burnside, 1975: 1801) 
Extract 11 
For the community, the expression of reminiscence can be of great 
importance to shaping local identity. The past helps develop the 
future, and the linking of older and younger people can be more 
positively approached with the rich resources of reminiscence. 
(Wright, 1988: 3) 
5 I 
Extract 9 is taken from an account of a reminiscence group session with 
psychogeriatric patients. It explictly constructs their reminiscences as 
having social value, and orients to the social relational implications of 
this: "a unique wealth of wisdom and experience to share with others". In 
Extracts 10 and 11, the social relational implications of the 'sociological' 
repertoire are made more explicit still. In Extract 10, older people are "the 
distinguished faculty without formal classrooms", and are thus accorded 
high status as teachers of younger generations. Again too, there is the 
repeated exhortation to "listen to aged". In Extract 11, the "rich resources" 
of reminiscence facilitate "the linking of older and younger people". As is 
evident from these examples, the 'sociological' repertoire is characterised 
by metaphors of wealth, and often represents older people as teachers. In 
contrast to the 'psychological' repertoire, it places the reminiscences of 
older people firmly within the category of normal social communication, 
and thus locates older people within the normal processes of social 
intercourse. Indeed, it represents reminiscence as an especially worthy 
form of social communication, and thus accords older people a special 
place in social life, at the centre rather than at the margins. 
The distribution of the repertoires in the literature 
So far, two distinct repertoires have been identified through which 
authors represent reminiscence as having positive value in later life. The 
crucial difference between these two repertoires lies in their implications 
for the social relations of ageing. Both repertoires are to be found in the 
published literature on reminiscence and reminiscence work. However, 
there are some differences in their distribution in this literature. For 
example, the 'sociological' repertoire is commonly deployed in 
contemporary accounts of reminiscence work produced by its practitioners 
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and proponents (eg: Beaton, 1980; Norris,1981; Norris and Abu El Eileh, 
1982; Wright, 1988; Gibson, 1989), but is rarely found in early papers 
reporting research on reminiscence (Butler, 1963; McMahon and Rhudick, 
1964; Lewis, 1971; Lieberman and Falk, 1971; Havighurst and Glasser, 1972). 
This difference might be explained in terms of a change over time in the 
formulation of the value of reminiscence. Extract 12, taken from the only 
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academic book devoted to reminiscence, is particularly interesting with 
regard to this hypothesis. 
Extract 12 
It has to be admitted that the storytelling function of the old has 
become devalued in modern societies.... Nevertheless, the recent 
growth of interest in oral history has done something to reverse this 
trend. It has led to a revaluing of the memories ordinary 
individuals possess of the times they have lived through. The 
memories of the oldest generations have come to appear especially 
valuable.... (Coleman, 1986: 13) 
Like McMahon and Rhudick (1967), Coleman refers to the devaluation of 
the "storytelling function of the old" in "modern societies". However, 
whereas McMahon and Rhudick in Extract 5 see the need for finding "new 
ways to provide opportunities for them to contribute their knowledge of 
the past", for Coleman, this has been achieved - the memories have been 
"revalued". This difference might well be accounted for by the fact that 
there is a difference of some 20 years between the publication of McMahon 
and Rhudick's paper and Coleman's book. 
However, another way of understanding this differential distribution of 
the two repertoires is in terms of the kinds of texts in which they appear. 
Not only is the 'sociological' repertoire encountered more frequently in 
later texts, but it is also more commonly found in the literature related to 
53 
the practice of reminiscence work, which has grown since the 1980s (eg: 
Beaton, 1980; Norris,1981; Norris and Abu El Eileh, 1982; Wright, 1988; 
Gibson, 1989). It is less commonly encountered in the research literature, 
or in texts whose authors are concerned with research rather than practice 
(eg: Langley, 1981-82; Perrotta and Meacham, 1981; Reid, 1981-82; Bender, 
Cooper and Howe, 1983; Hobbs, 1983; Baines, Saxby and Ehlert, 1987; 
Berghorn and Schafer, 1986-7; Goldwasser, Auerbach and Harkins, 1987; 
Thornton and Brotchie, 1987; Bachar, Kindler, Schefler and Lerer, 1991). 
Some support for this argument is provided by the continued appearance 
of the 'psychological' repertoire in more recent writings. Extracts 13 and 14 
are taken from a collection of papers discussing 'reminiscence theatre', 
which includes reports of actual theatre projects and commentaries on the 
general value of this kind of work. The two extracts are taken from papers 
written by psychologists, commenting on the value of the work. 
Extract 13 
We have all listened endlessly to elderly relatives and no doubt 
have been bored by stories that we have heard a dozen times, but 
perhaps we have not appreciated the importance of the event to the 
storyteller. (Langley, 1981-82: 3) 
Extract 14 
I find it sad to have to face the fact that the elderly no longer have a 
special role to play as elders, as repositories of the accumulated 
knowledge and wisdom of their culture. One of the consequences of 
the growth of other ways of storing information is that their 
reminiscences came to be of value only to the elderly themselves. 
One of the benefits of reminiscence theatre is that it puts the 
problem in focus. (Reid, 1981-82: 36) 
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In Extract 13, the lack of interpersonal and social value of reminiscence is 
represented as common knowledge, and is constructed in terms of others 
responses ("We have all listened endlessly ... and no doubt have been 
bored ..... ). In mitigation for this, it is suggested that we may not have 
"appreciated the importance of the event to the storyteller", the 
implication being that we might respond differently if we were to 
appreciate this "importance". In representing reminiscence as having 
personal value, but no social value, and in implying that an appreciation 
of this personal value might change the orientation of the listeners, the 
author is mobilising the 'psychological' repertoire in a similar way to the 
early papers on reminiscence discussed previously. Extract 14 is the final 
paragraph of another commentary paper. In this extract, the author takes a 
position similar to McMahon and Rhudick's, in Extract 5. Here, the 
'storytelling function' is still defunct, and this is accounted for in terms of 
technological change ("the growth of other ways of storing information"). 
Thus, reminiscence has no social value, but is "of value only to the elderly 
themselves". 
Two points can be made. First, the differential distribution of these two 
repertoires in the literature can be seen as part of the emphasis of social 
relational issues in the literature reporting on practice, compared with 
their de-emphasis in the literature reporting systematic research on 
reminiscence. Coleman's account of change in the valuation of 
reminiscence in Extract 12 echoes his own and other accounts which 
explicitly associate reminiscence work with changing images of older 
people (eg: Beaton, 1980; Bornat, 1989b; Gibson, 1989). The research 
literature, on the other hand, tends to be concerned with the psychological 
benefits of reminiscence, rather than the social and cultural benefits 
formulated by the 'sociological' repertoire. 
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The second point is that both the 'psychological' and the 'sociological' 
repertoires continue to coexist in the literature, albeit in different sections 
of it. Both repertoires remain current. Moreover, the two repertoires are 
not necessarily contradictory. One could for example, formulate an 
account of the value of reminiscence in which its psychological benefits 
inhere in the value it holds for others, and a number authors have done 
this (eg: McMahon and Rhudick, 1967; Norris, 1981; Thompson, 1988). 
Nevertheless, there is a tension between them. Some of the extracts 
discussed clearly contradict other extracts, most particularly in terms of the 
social value they ascribe to the reminiscences of older people. Are these 
reminiscences boring, and/or (sadly) irrelevant to the present? Or do they 
represent rich resources for understanding our own lives and 
communities? Similarly, while both repertoires have implications for the 
social relations of ageing, they have different implications. Do we respect 
these reminiscences out of respect for the psychlogical task that is being 
done, or because they are of genuine interest and value to us? Are these 
reminiscences to be understood as part of a struggle to defend the ramparts 
of the self against the incursions of ageing, or are they to be understood as 
imparting the fruits of experience, as transmitting and renewing our 
shared cultural heritage? 
The presence of these contradictions points to an ongoing argument, a 
continuing dialogue about the nature of reminiscence, and beyond this, 
about the social relations of ageing. This can be seen as a consequence of 
the inherent uncertainty of linguistic representation, discussed in Chapter 
3. In order to stand as an 'adequate' description, any formulation of 
reminiscence and its value for older people will inevitably be oriented to 
undermining or discounting other, potentially contrary, formulations. 
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Thus, the 'adequacy' or 'truth value' of a particular formulation has to be 
accomplished each time it is formulated. The battle is never won in any 
final sense, but must be joined anew on each occasion of representation. 
Just as Butler's paper opposes one representation of reminiscence with 
another representation, so do contemporary texts continue to engage in 
the same argument. 
Having identified these two repertoires, their different implications for the 
social relations of ageing, and their continued currency, it is now possible 
to consider their relationship to the cultural resources at our disposal for 
understanding the nature of ageing. 
Common senses of 'ageing'. 
Any account of the value of reminiscence for older people must of 
necessity also formulate what it is to be 'old', and what it is to be an 'older 
person' in society. To say that reminiscence fulfils a special need for older 
people is to assume that such a need is in some way a consequence of 
ageing. Similarly, to say that the reminiscing of older people fulfils a 
'social function' is to assume that ageing qualifies older people to fulfil 
this 'function'. In terms of the analytical orientation set out in Chapter 3, 
just as the nature of 'reminiscence' cannot be taken as given, but must be 
discursively constructed from available resources, so too must the nature 
of 'old age' be constructed. Moreover, just as we can sensibly account for 
the value of 'reminiscence' in a number of different (and potentially 
contradictory) ways, so too can we produce different accounts of 'old age'. 
There is a growing body of work in the contemporary literature of social 
gerontology and related disciplines, discussing 'ageing' and 'old age' as 
social constructions (eg: Freeman, 1984; Featherstone and Hepworth, 1989; 
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Gubrium and Wallace,1990; Giles, 1991). These discussions vary in their 
focus, but all have in common a rejection of structural-functionalist 
accounts (eg: Cumming and Henry, 1961; Riley, 1971; Dowd, 1975). Some 
have have highlighted the historical and cultural relativity of notions of 
the life course as an ordered and naturally-given sequence of stages, each 
with its specific characteristics and tasks (eg: Freeman, 1984; Featherstone 
and Hepworth, 1989). Others have drawn attention to the ways in which 
different constructions of ageing are formulated and deployed in everyday 
life. Gubrium and Wallace (1990), for example, present a discussion of the 
similarity between gerontological theories of ageing and 'lay' theories of 
ageing used by 'ordinary' people (ie. people other than gerontologists), and 
argue that these theories must be understood as resources for sense-
making rather than as factual descriptions. Other work in this vein has 
paid particular attention to the ways in which discursive formulations of 
'old age' are themselves used as conversational resources (Giles, 1991). 
This section will relate the repertoires of reminiscence-and-ageing 
identified earlier to the discursive formulation of 'ageing'. It has already 
been noted that these repertoires have different implications for the social 
relations of ageing. This point will be elaborated, and a further argument 
made that the different repertoires of 'reminiscence-and-ageing' embody 
or invoke different commonsense representations of ageing. The 
'psychological' repertoire can be linked to a view of ageing which 
constructs it as a process of decrement. In the examples discussed earlier, 
reminiscing is constructed as a means of coping with various aspects of 
this process of decrement: as "maintaining self esteem" (Lewis, Extract 2); 
as "prompted by the realisation of approaching death" (Butler, Extract 1); as 
"coping with problems of later life" (McMahon and Rhudick, Extract 3). 
On the other hand, the 'sociological' repertoire can be seen as embodying a 
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view of ageing which emphasises the knowledge and experience which 
inevitably accrues in the course of a long life. This knowledge and 
experience is variously constructed as "cultural heritage" (Extract 8), 
"history" (Extract 8), "wisdom" (Extract 9), "oral history" (Extract 12). 
Both these ways of representing ageing are commonplaces in our culture. 
Ageing can plausibly be represented as a process of decline, and equally 
plausibly as a process of gaining experience and knowledge. However, 
these 'discourses of ageing' can be distinguished not only in terms of the 
different aspects of ageing which are emphasised or made salient, but also 
in terms of the different implications this selective emphasis has for the 
social position of older people. 
When ageing is constructed in terms of decrement, it seems natural for 
older people to move to the margins of social life. In accounts of ageing 
informed by this view, older people are represented as turning away from 
the mainstream of social life, becoming self-absorbed, dependent and 
passive (eg: Cumming and Henry, 1961). Both the dysfunctional and the 
'psychological' repertoires locate reminiscing as part of this process, either 
as a symptom of decrement, or as talk which is essentially self-directed, as 
motivated by this decremental process and the awareness of its end point, 
death. A formalised version of this 'decrement' discourse can be found in 
Cumming and Henry's (1961) 'disengagement theory', a functionalist 
account of ageing in which 'successful ageing' is construed as involving a 
process of disengagement from social life, in preparation for the ultimate 
separation of death. Indeed, Lewis (1971) explicitly formulates his view of 
reminiscence in terms of this theory, suggesting that reminiscing may 
serve as a means of avoiding "the discrepancy in self concept that old age 
represents to a formerly engaged and active member of society" (p. 240). 
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On the other hand, when ageing is constructed in terms of the accretion of 
knowledge and experience, it is natural to accord older people a place at the 
heart of social life, as teachers, 'elders', or even leaders, as repositories of 
this knowledge. Although not elevated to the status of a gerontological 
theory, we can find formalisations of this discourse arising specifically in 
relation to reminiscence, in discussions of the 'storytelling function' of 
older people (McMahon and Rhudick, 1967; Coleman, 1986; see Extracts 5 
and 12). 
This suggests that the 'sociological' repertoire of rerniniscence-and-ageing 
can be seen as an argument against the 'decrement' discourse, as a move to 
oppose it with another discourse which has different social-relational 
consequences. A parallel can be drawn here with gerontological work 
which takes a broadly 'anti-ageist' position (eg: Levin and Levin, 1980; 
Tyler, 1986; Dant, 1988; Hockey and James, 1990; Coupland, Nussbaum and 
Coupland, 1991). Within this body of work, it is common to find, not only 
discussion of the social construction of ageing, but also an argument 
against prevailing constructions. In such accounts, we find explicit 
formulations of the 'decrement' discourse, so formulated as to mark both 
its relative status and its undesirable consequences for older people. For 
example, Coupland, Nussbaum and Coupland (1991), in a review of work 
on "social attitudes and ageism", present evidence of the ways in which 
older people are routinely assumed to have physical, mental and sensory 
deficiencies in comparison to younger people, and go on to argue that 
these assumptions are endorsed by gerontological research. They quote 
Levin and Levin (1980), who argue that "the literature in gerontology is 
shot through both with the assumption of decline with age, and, perhaps 
partly as a result of this assumption, with the findings of physical, 
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psychological and sociological deterioration in ageing individuals" (p. 2, 
quoted in Coupland, Nussbaum and Coupland, 1991:89). In another paper, 
Coupland and Coupland (1990) identify two traditions in research on 
"language and the elderly": the 'deficit' tradition, which incorporates a 
view of ageing as a decremental process, and an 'anti-ageist' tradition, 
which actively resists these assumptions, and is concerned with the ways 
in which language reproduces 'ageist attitudes'. 
This work can in turn be seen as part of the more general project to raise 
awareness of, and change, ageist practices in our society referred to earlier. 
Very often, this project is characterised by the explicit rejection of a 
'decremental' view of ageing. For example, a recent AUT policy statement 
on "age discrimination" (AUT, 1991) states: "Underlying ageism is the 
unfounded assumption that older people suffer from diminished 
intelligence and judgement and are rigid, less willing to adapt to new 
developments and unable to change. Possession of these characteristics is 
not of course dependent on age. Ageism fails totally to allow for variation 
between individuals" (p.1). 
The point being made here, then, is not simply that the interpretive 
repertoires identified can be located within these more general 
formulations of the nature of ageing, nor simply that the tensions between 
them can be seen to embody tensions between these discourses of ageing. 
It is also that the argument about the value of reminiscence is part of an 
argument about the nature of ageing. Moreover, this argument is 
essentially a moral argument; an argument about the place of older people 
in society, how they should be treated by others. It is not just about how 
ageing should be understood, or about how the value of reminiscence 
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should be understood - it is about the social consequences of different 
ways of understanding these things. 
This point is especially significant when we understand that formulations 
of the value of reminiscence do not merely 'reflect' different formulations 
of ageing, but at the same time reproduce them. Different discursive 
formulations of reminiscence can be seen as both constituting, and being 
constituted by, the different formulations of ageing discussed here. When 
an older person talks about their life and experiences, we can sensibly 
describe this talk as "garrulous behaviour of no consequence" (Lewis, 
1971:242), or as the operation of a "defence mechanism" (Lewis, 1971:243). 
In doing so, we both invoke the commonplace version of ageing as decline 
as the implicit grounds for these descriptions, and in doing so reproduce 
that version - each reflexively constitutes the other. At the same time, we 
both take as given the social marginality of older people and reproduce 
that social marginality. Such talk can also be sensibly described as the 
'voice of experience', as "cultural heritage". This is grounded in, and at 
the same time reflexively constitutes, a view of ageing which emphasises 
the accretion of experience, and the social relational implications of that 
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view. This point is not merely of theoretical interest. ItLimplicitly 
recognised in current efforts to proscribe sexist, racist or ageist language. 
These 'ways of speaking' about reminiscence and ageing can be brought to 
bear in concrete situations of practical engagement with older people; they 
are available as justifications, mitigations, as arguments for and against 
various courses of action. 
This last point is of particular relevance to the earlier discussion of anti-
ageist work. In this work, while the 'decrement' discourse is easily 
identified and criticised, there is no alternative discourse which is 
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specifically linked to ageing. Most often, resistance is done in terms of an 
'egalitarian' discourse. That is, the 'decrement' discourse is represented as 
engendering and justifying discrimination and marginalisation, and the 
argument against it is couched in terms of 'individual rights' and 'equal 
opportunities' (eg: AUT, 1991). In this context, the 'sociological' repertoire 
of reminiscence-and-ageing can be seen as the formulation of an 
alternative or counter to 'ageist' formulations which is, specifically, an 
alternative formulation of agejng. This version can be seen as re-
animating, bringing back into circulation, giving a new legitimacy to, the 
'experience'discourse. Thus, we can be more specific about the way in 
which reminiscence work is implicated in an argument for a change in 
attitudes to older people. It is implicated in virtue of its provision of 
discursive resources which can be deployed in such an argument. 
Concluding comments 
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that reminiscence as a 
discursively constructed object is implicated in an argument about the 
social relations of ageing. Two distinct interpretive repertoires of 
reminiscence-and-ageing have been identified in the reminiscence 
literature, and have been shown to have different and contrary 
implications for the social position of older people. Such implications are 
explicitly oriented to in 'seminal' research papers, where the 
'psychological' repertoire is used as a basis for moral exhortations to listen 
to and respect older people's reminiscences. A similar orientation to the 
social status of older people is found in the literature related to the practice 
of reminiscence work, where we find the 'sociological' repertoire 
deployed. This repertoire accords social value to reminiscence, and thus 
serves as a stronger argument for repositioning older people in their 
relations with others. It has been further argued that social relational 
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implications of these two repertoires derive from their invocation and 
reproduction of different discourses of ageing, and thus that the two 
repertoires can be located in a broader dialogue about the nature of ageing 
and the social position of older people. 
This chapter began by noting that, in the literature related to the practice of 
reminiscence work, such work is often located as part of an 'anti-ageist' 
project, challenging 'negative stereotypes' of older people. It has been 
argued here that the 'sociological' repertoire of reminiscence-and-ageing 
mobilised in this literature is an important contribution to this project. 
However, it has also been noted that this concern with the social status of 
older people is rarely found in the contemporary research literature, and 
that, while the 'psychological' repertoire is ubiquitous, the 'sociological' 
repertoire is almost entirely absent. In closing this chapter, this last point 
will be discussed in more detail. 
In Chapter 3, it was argued that the traditional paradigm of psychological 
research does not address the constructive consequences of discursive 
formulations of reminiscence and its value. The foregoing analysis can be 
seen as an elaboration of this argument. This analysis has attempted to 
relativise the hypothesis that reminiscence is psychologically functional, a 
hypothesis which has been the main focus of empirical research into the 
benefits of reminiscence for older people. This research serves to reify the 
'psychological' repertoire, and thus fails to address the way in which it is 
deployed in social relational arguments. Moreover, it fails to address the 
social relational concerns which have been shown to be central to the 
practice of reminiscence work. Worse still, it promulgates a version of 
reminiscence-and-ageing which is grounded in a representation of ageing 
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as decrement, and which thus lends itself to the legitimation of the social 
marginalisation of older people. 
This analysis, then, offers further insight into current debates about the 
value of reminiscence work. It demonstrates that research is at odds with 
practice, not only in terms of its criterion of acceptable evidence, but also in 
terms of its orientation to a central concern of practice, the social status of 
older people, and that in a sense, albeit unwittingly, it can be seen as 
working against the concerns of practice. 
This problem will be addressed further in Chapter 6, in the context of an 
analysis of current debates about the 'therapeutic' status of reminiscence 
work. The next chapter will extend and elaborate some of the arguments 
of the analysis presented here, by identifying other discursive practices of 
reminiscence work which evidence a concern with the social relations of 
ageing. In doing so, it will move from the medium of writing to the 
medium of talk, and to a fine-grained analysis of the ways in which 
practitioners of reminiscence work formulate the value of reminiscence 
for older people. 
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Chapter 5 
Talking about Reminiscence: Common Senses of Practice 
Reminiscence work, as an arena of practice, represents a diversity of ways of 
working with older people and their memories and biographies, of 
techniques for eliciting, recording, sharing, marking the value of, such 
material. It also embodies a diversity of discursive practices through which 
the nature and significance of these activities are formulated. Reminiscence 
work can be characterised not only by regularities of technique, but also by 
regularities of talk and text - ways of speaking and writing about 
reminiscence, about reminiscence work, and about older people which are as 
much a part of 'doing reminiscence work' as running a reminiscence group 
or working with someone to compile a life history book. 
The previous chapter presented an initial analysis of some of these discursive 
practices. This analysis focused on the ways in which the value of 
reminiscence for older people is formulated in the literature related to 
research and practice, and showed how these formulations take shape as part 
of a dialogue or argument about the social relations of ageing. In doing so, it 
sought to recast formulations of the value of reminiscence in later life as 
discursive constructions which have functional consequences. This chapter 
presents an analysis which seeks to continue and extend that discussion. It 
does so by focussing on talk rather than text, specifically on how care workers 
engaged in reminiscence work talk about reminiscence and its value for older 
people. 
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This change of focus has a number of consequences. It allows consideration 
of the specifically conversational resources which speakers use to construct 
accounts of the nature and value of reminiscence. To the extent that the talk 
examined involves two sided conversations, this furnishes us with extra 
analytical resources, in that it makes available interactants' interpretations of 
talk as a 'proof criterion' for the analyst's interpretation (see Chapter 3; see 
also Atkinson and Heritage, 1984). This then is an extra resource compared 
with the textual analysis in the previous chapter. As will be demonstrated, 
this analytic advantage makes possible an analysis of the dialogical 
structuring of discursive formulations of reminiscence-and-ageing, which 
both corroborates and extends the analysis presented in the previous chapter. 
A further consequence of focussing on the talk of practitioners, is that it 
affords examination of the ways in which they themselves make sense of 
their work; that is, some of the interpretive resources which they use in 
accounting for the value of their work for the older people in their care. 
The data for analysis in this chapter consist of extracts from transcripts of 
audio-recorded interviews conducted with care workers who run 
reminiscence groups with older people in their care. The interviews were 
open-ended and informal. The aim was to get practitioners to talk about their 
use of reminiscence work, its value for older people, its applications, 
limitations and problems. (Details relating to the selection of interviewees 
can be found in Appendix I; a copy of the interview schedule can be found in 
Appendix IT.) In the course of doing the interviews, it was found that most of 
these workers were accustomed to talking to others about their work. Due to 
the popularity of, and interest in, reminiscence, they very often found 
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themselves in the position of accounting for the practice of reminiscence 
work - why it is done, what it can do for older people, and so on - to students 
of one sort or another, or to visitors interested in what was being done. 
As in the previous chapter, the analysis is concerned with the identification 
of different and distinct formulations of reminiscence-and-ageing in 
discourse. This is achieved through a consideration of the various 
metaphors, analogies and figures of speech used by speakers to characterise 
reminiscence and old age. In addition, however, and as a consequence of 
dealing with talk rather than text, the analysis will also focus on the detail of 
how particular versions are built up in conversation. 
"I don't like to keep these away from today" 
Extract 1 consists of three segments taken from an interview with Mary 
(names have been changed), an employee of a national charity for older 
people. Her job is to care for a group of physically frail old people who are 
brought to a day centre one day a week. At the centre, they are given lunch, 
take part in a variety of organised games, and chat amongst themselves. 
Reminiscence is among the range of activities provided in the charity's 
daycentres (according to a typewritten information sheet), and Mary's 
supervisor had identified this group as particularly suited to the purpose of 
observing and tape recording reminiscence groups. The extract presents three 
segments from the interview with Mary, in chronological order. In the 
extract, Mary and the interviewer are discussing her use of reminiscence with 
the group. (A key to transcription conventions can be found in Appendix III ). 
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Extractl 
Segment (j) 
Mary y'see/ with ~ [Mary's group] they're up to date/ they 
know what went off yesterday and they know what's 
going on in the world 
(2) 
Kev right/ yeah 
Mary and I think with these/ it's best to keep 'em-/ it's alright 
to go back now and again they'll go back on their own 
anyway sometimes/ just back on their own/ but very 
often they talk about/ things now / which I think's a good 
thing to keep them up with the everyday goings on 
Kev d'y- d'you reckon it could be: like/ not a good idea then to 
talk too much about the past to encourage it 
[ 
Mary not.all the time no/not all the time not not with 
your mentally alert 
Kev no 
Mary I was gonna say these are well up with everything that's 
going on I mean he'll (indicates elderly man in room) 
discuss things he's seen on the TV the news and-/ and I 
think when you go back into the war days I think it 
depresses them enough I with what they're hearing today 
without taking them back/ to war days 
Kev right right/ but you still do it/ now and then 
Mary I still do it now and then/ and sometimes they'll take 
theirselves back/ they'll take theirselves back 
Segment (ii) 
Mary I think mine [Mary's group] are up to date so you gotta 
keep em up to date 
Kev yeah «laughing» 
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Mary 
Segment (iiO 
Mary 
you know you can't keep throwing them back because 
they're already here and in it y'know what I mean 
I don't like to keep these [Mary's group) away from today 
To begin with, consider Mary's representation of the nature of reminiscence 
and its value in old age. In all three segments, reminiscence is represented as 
a kind of time travel - to reminisce is to "go back", to be "away from today". 
The past and the present ("they're already here and in it") are construed as 
places, and talking about the past is construed as displacement from the 
present. 
As well as this, there is an implication that such displacement might be 
detrimental, at least for those older people who are "mentally alert" and in 
touch with the present - "I think mine are up to date so you gotta keep em up 
to date" ; "not all the time no not with your mentally alert". Reminiscence is 
contrasted, not just with being "up to date" but with keeping "up to date". 
Take people "back" too much, the argument suggests, and they might stay 
there, finding it impossible to "keep up" with contemporary circumstances 
and events. The use of the verb phrase "go back" suggests not only physical 
displacement, but also regression. In this account, there is a hint of an 
association between reminiscence and mental deterioration in older people. 
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This formulation, then, can be seen as an example of the dysfunctional 
repertoire of reminiscence-and-ageing identified in Chapter 4. As such, it 
invokes a formulation of ageing as 'decrement', representing old age as a 
time of life when 'keeping up' becomes difficult, when decline and 
disengagement from the present (and thus from the concerns of the rest of 
society) are an ever-present threat, and indeed ultimately unavoidable. 
In the light of the argument in the previous chapter, the fact that a care 
worker who practices reminiscence work should produce such a formulation 
seems to be somewhat anomalous. It was was suggested there that, in the 
literature related to reminiscence, the dysfunctional repertoire is routinely 
and explicitly refuted in the reminiscence literature, in favour of 
formulations which accord reminiscence personal or social value (eg: Butler, 
1963; McMahon and Rhudick, 1964; Lewis, 1971; Coleman, 1974, 1986; Kiernat, 
1979; Lesser et aI, 1981; Ryden, 1981; Mortimer, 1982; Norris, 1986; Gibson, 
1989). It was further noted that these arguments constitute an important 
justification for the practice of reminiscence work. Here, however, we find a 
practitioner producing a formulation which contradicts these arguments. 
Certainly, Mary's account of the value of reminiscence is unusual in this 
respect. Nevertheless, there is a way in which it can be reconciled to the 
argument developed in Chapter 4. In order to see this, we must consider two 
things: the work it is doing in the context of its production, and the 
conversational resources from which it is constructed. 
Most accounts of reminiscence-and-ageing given by the care workers 
interviewed can be taken as justifications for doing reminiscence work. In 
this extract, however, (and in most of the interview), Mary is expressing her 
71 
reluctance to do reminiscence work, and in the process is mounting an 
argument for llitl doing it. As the interviewer, I orientate to this 
interpretation of her talk with my statement "but you still do it now and 
then" at the end of Segment (i). This "now and then" is borrowed by Mary in 
her next turn ("1 still do it now and then"), as a description of the frequency 
with which she runs reminiscence groups. In this extract, then, Mary can be 
seen as accounting for her sparing use of reminiscence work with the older 
people in her care. The discursive resources which she mobilises to do this 
are of such a nature as to make her reportedly infrequent use of reminiscence 
eminently plausible, and indeed desirable. The argument runs along the 
following lines: if reminiscence involves displacement into the past, and if 
. older people are anyway in danger of not keeping up with the present, then 
such displacement should not happen too often, since it would reduce their 
chances of keeping up, being up to date, living in the present. It is therefore 
prudent to engage sparingly in such an activity. In this sense, Mary's 
mobilisation of the dysfunctional repertoire accomplishes the interactional 
task of accounting for her own care practices. 
In the light of the status of this account as an argument for llitl doing 
reminiscence work, more detailed consideration will be given to the 
conversational resources which Mary uses to build her account in Segment 
(i). Mary uses a number of devices to qualify her formulation of 
reminiscence-and-ageing. One way she does this is to particularise her 
account, explicitly applying it to her own group through the use of qualifying 
phrases like "with these" and "mine" (cf. Billig, 1985; Middleton, 1991). 
Another way she does this is to construct her account so as to make available 
the inference that reminiscence is detrimental to older people, rather than 
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making an explicit statement to that effect. For example, she refers to talking 
about the present as a "good thing" - "they talk about things now which I 
think's a good thing to keep them up with everyday goings on" - the implicit 
contrast being that talking about the past might not be such a good thing. 
Moreover, even in making this comparison she is guarded. She begins to say 
"I think it's best to keep em" and then cuts off this statement to offer a 
qualification of it, before producing what appears to be an different version of 
her original turn beginning - "which I think's a good thing to keep them up 
with everyday goings on" - where "~" has been replaced by "good thing", a 
construction which avoids making a direct evaluative comparison between 
reminiscing and talking about the present. 
It can be argued that Mary's account is organised in this way precisely because 
it is anomalous. It presents a formulation of reminiscence-and-ageing which 
is routinely refuted in the literature. Moreover, this refutation is part of a 
wider collection of practices predicated on the beneficiality of reminiscence, 
some of which impinge directly on Mary's own work: the provision and 
promotion of reminiscence by her employer, and the attentions of the 
interviewer, who clearly considers reminiscence valuable enough to do 
research into, and on whose behalf she has previously set up and orchestrated 
reminiscence sessions. In short, Mary is presenting an 'unorthodox' 
formulation of reminiscence-and-ageing, and its indirect and qualified 
construction, through the use of the conversational devices described above, 
marks its status as such. 
A further point of interest here is that, as the interviewer, I produce a 
version of a similar form, as an upshot to Mary's second turn, and 
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formulated as a question: "d'y- d'you reckon it could be: like/ not a good idea 
then to talk too much about the past to encourage it". Like Mary, my 
formulation avoids making a direct negative evaluation of reminiscence by 
using the phrase "not a good idea"; it formulates this as a possibility rather 
than a fact ("could be" rather than 'is'); and shows hesitancy in producing this 
formulation in drawing out the vowel in "be:" and in the pause after "like". 
In addition, the use of the word "like" can itself be seen as a further 
qualification of the formulation: it is not exactly X, but it is like X. Thus, my 
talk as interviewer displays sensitivity to the 'unorthodox' status of Mary's 
formulation of reminiscence-and-ageing. 
At this point, rather than retaining the descriptor 'unorthodox' here, this 
conditional and indirect formulation will be referred to as a 'dispreferred' 
formulation. The use of the term 'dispreferred' draws on the notion of 
'preference status' formulated in conversation analytic work, particularly in 
Pomerantz (1984) (although see also general discussion in Atkinson and 
Heritage, 1984; Sacks, 1987; Levinson, 1983). Pomerantz discusses and 
illustrates the ways in which the design of a conversational response to an 
assessment offered by another speaker reflects the response's 'preference 
status'; that is, whether or not it is oriented to by participants as being invited 
by, or relevant to, the initial assessment. In Pomerantz's analysis, one mark 
of the preference status of an action is the degree to which it is explicitly 
formulated. For example, where agreement is the preferred next action, 
disagreement will be weakly or indirectly stated. Of course, the 
conversational phenomena presented here differ from Pomerantz's data, in 
that the 'assessment' of reminiscence as an unproblematically 'good thing' 
has not been voiced in the immediately preceding conversation. 
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Nevertheless, it can be argued that there is sufficient similarity between the 
phenomena described to make the notion of 'preference status' both useful 
and appropriate. It is so in that it allows for an examination of the situated 
formulation of 'orthodox' positions within specific discursive practices, rather 
than as situation-independent, pre-existing representations. This point 
requires some elaboration. 
It might be argued that the above analysis tells us nothing we did not know 
already. We would expect that, in the context of reminiscence work, negative 
representations of reminiscence would be be resisted, and treated as 
undesirable and 'unorthodox'. Why would people who use reminiscence in 
their work, or whose employer promotes it, say baldly that it is harmful to 
their elderly clients? This argument, however, misses a crucial point. It is 
certainly plausible that such an orthodoxy exists, indeed it would be difficult 
to see how practice could continue if it did not. The point is, how is such an 
orthodoxy constituted? It can be argued that it is constituted, in part, by the 
discursive practices identified here. 
This then leads to a further point. Mary's talk has thus far been characterised 
as accomplishing a delicately-handled defence of an unorthodox position. 
However, this is only half the story. It would be more accurate to say that it 
involves a movement between contrary positions, that it embodies a dialogue 
about the nature and value of reminiscence. This dialogicality is an 
important feature of Mary's talk, in that the plausibility of her formulation of 
reminiscence-and-ageing rests on its inclusion of the view opposite to the one 
being argued for. To say that reminiscence is always a bad thing, for everyone, 
would not merely be unorthodox, it would invite immediate disagreement. 
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Indeed, such 'extreme case formulations' (Pomerantz, 1986) are commonly-
used rhetorical devices, and operate on this very basis. 
Mary herself uses such formulations in her account. For example, in response 
to the interviewers question as to whether it is a good idea to talk about the 
past, she replit~ "not all the time no". By discounting the extreme case, this 
formulation works to guarantee agreement, in that no one would agree that 
reminiscing "all the time" is a good idea. Another instance of this kind of 
formulation is her use of the word "keep" in "[ don't like to keep these away 
from today", with its implication of a state of affairs which is permanent. 
Mary's deployment of these formulations has the effect of advancing her case 
against doing reminiscence work. 
A further point about Mary's "not all the time no" needs to made here. Had 
she started her turn a second later, we would have to take its form as a 
response to the interviewer's "too much" ("all the time" clearly being "too 
much"). However, she starts her turn just as this is said, and thus her choice 
of this particular formulation can be said to be independent of the 
interviewer's overlapped talk. It is interesting, though, that I as the 
interviewer should come out with an extreme case formulation at the same 
time as Mary. "Too much" reminiscence is, by definition, an undesirable 
amount, and thus this formulation has the effect of advancing Mary's own 
argument against doing reminiscence work. Again we see further evidence 
that as the interviewer, in borrowing Mary's conversational forms, I am 
sensitive to her agenda, and oriented to the potentially 'unorthodox' nature 
of her argument. 
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Mary's inclusion of the opposing view is more than just a consequence of her 
attempt to pre-empt other arguments. It is also a consequence of the 
recognition that there is some truth in those arguments. It is the apparent 
non-recognition of this truth, the stating of the 'extreme' case, that invites 
disagreement. The dialogical structure of Mary's account handles 
contradictory 'truths' about reminiscence and later life. 
The coexistence of contradictory truths means that the argument for one 
particular version must be done anew in each situation (cf. Billig, 1987). It has 
already been suggested that the constitution of reminiscence work is 
accomplished partly through the formulation of such arguments, through 
discursive practices oriented to privileging certain versions over others. In 
this sense then, Mary's version of reminiscence-and-ageing is not anomalous. 
Through her indirect formulations, her particularisations and qualifications, 
she is marking as dispreferred a formulation of reminiscence-and-ageing 
which has negative consequences for older people. 
''You've got to remember your past 'cos thats part of you" 
Extract 2 is taken from an interview with Anne, a staff nurse in a geriatric day 
hospital attached to a large psychiatric hospital. As part of her work, she runs 
twice-weekly reminiscence groups for clinically depressed and confused older 
people. Immediately previous to the extract, the discussion has turned to 
common criticisms directed at reminiscence work. 
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Extract 2 
Kev 
Anne 
Kev 
Anne 
what about the other criticism of reminiscing erm/ that 
its/ its just an encouragement for people to live in the 
past and and not face up- no 
[ 
no I don't agree/ I don't agree with that .itl.iill./ no/ 
no/ cos I think you've got to:/ remember your past cos 
thats part of you/ your past and how/and how you've 
lived/ and that can help you deal with what's happening 
today or tomorrow/so no I don't agree with that at all/ I 
think it's a good thing to reminisce and remember 
mmm/ it is something we all do 
anyway isnt it 
[ 
mmm/ that's right/ it's not just the elderly 
In her reply to my question at the start of the extract, Anne offers a 
formulation of the value of reminiscence which constructs it as oriented to 
present circumstances, and unequivocally beneficial. Her account emphasises 
the intimate relation between memory and self, biography and identity 
("you've got to:/ remember your past cos that's part of you"), and the 
importance of past experience as a guide for action in the present and future 
("that can help you deal with what's happening today or tomorrow"). 
In presenting this account, Anne is countering my formulation, as 
interviewer, of reminiscence as "an encouragement/ for people to live in the 
past". To the extent that this latter formulation is congruent with Mary's 
formulation of reminiscence as displacement from the present, Anne's 
account might be seen as a contrasting argument to the position taken by 
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Mary in Extract 1. A number of analytical points can be made about this 
contrast between Anne's and Mary's accounts. 
First, the contrast between the two accounts is in part a consequence of the 
different kinds of rhetorical work being done with them. Whereas Mary's 
version accounts for her reportedly sporadic use of reminiscence, Anne can be 
seen as countering a formulation of reminiscence which calls into question 
the value of her own reportedly regular practice of reminiscence work, and 
presenting an alternative version which accounts for this practice. 
Formulating the value of reminiscence in terms of the maintenance of 
identity and as a resource for dealing with present and future circumstances 
renders its regular use unproblematic - in fact, one could perhaps say 'the 
more the better', given the nature of the benefits implied. 
There are, however, further interesting differences between Mary's and 
Anne's versions of the value of reminiscence. In the making her claim that 
reminiscence is not so good for the "mentally alert", Mary makes a distinction 
between "mentally alert" older people and others that are not so "mentally 
alert". Now, it could be argued here, from a developmental-functionalist 
point of view, in which reminiscence is considered to be an activity which is 
functional in later life, that these two versions of reminiscence differ because 
they relate to different populations - that reminiscence is good for the 
confused and depressed older people in Anne's care, but not so good for 
Mary's 'mentally alert' group. However, it will be suggested instead that such 
distinctions are rhetorically occasioned. 
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In Mary's case, this distinction is a central feature of her argument. Anne, 
however, makes no such distinction. Instead, she relates her argument to 
people in general, by using the generic ·you· in her response to the 
interviewer's question. The interviewer's response ("it is something we all 
do anyway") can be seen as orienting to the generality of her claim. At this 
point, Anne makes this generality more explicit still by stating "its not just 
the elderly". Here, then, in the course of constructing a plausible argument 
for the value of reminiscence, not only does Anne llill distinguish between 
different elderly client groups, she explicitly rejects a distinction between 
older people and other people, at least as far as reminiscence is concerned. 
This rejection, this inclusion of older people in the category of 'people in 
general', is occasioned in the trajectory of the conversation between Anne 
and the interviewer. 
Thus, we see that when we attend to the local and particular features of the 
different accounts of the value of reminiscence in Extracts 1 and 2, it is a 
mistake to account for their difference in terms of a distinction between 
elderly populations. Rather, they differ in whether or not such distinctions 
are occasioned in the unfolding conversation. 
A further contrast between Mary's and Anne's accounts can be seen in the 
relative directness of their construction. In contrast to Mary's conditional and 
qualified version, Anne's version is much more directly formulated. She 
states her disagreement explicitly and repeatedly ("1 don't agree/l don't agree 
with that IliJll1/ no/ no") and ends with the unequivocal assertion that "it's a 
good thing to reminisce and remember". This directness can be seen as 
marking the preference status of her version of reminiscence-and-ageing. In 
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taking the position she does, she is aligning herself with arguments that are 
routinely and widely used to justify the practice of reminiscence work: that 
reminiscence is not merely 'living in the past', that it is relevant to the 
present, and is indeed a beneficial activity for older people. The directness 
with which her account is formulated can be seen as marking it as a preferred 
formulation of reminiscence, as against Mary's dispreferred formulation. 
Moreover, this preferred formulation is one which constructs reminiscence 
as oriented to the present rather than the past, and thus has positive 
implications for older people. This positive position is further enhanced by 
representing reminiscence, and the benefits ascribed to it, as relevant to 
people in general. 
However, just as the indirectness of Mary's account is in part a consequence 
of taking into account other possible formulations, so is the directness of 
Anne's account also attributable to its position in dialogue. Anne's 
unequivocal disagreement is not only constituting an 'orthodox' position. It 
can also be seen as a consequence of the extreme case put to her by the 
interviewer. To suggest, as he does, that reminiscence is "just an 
encouragement to live in the past" is to rule out of court, with that ''just'', all 
other possible accounts of the value of reminiscence. Thus, Anne can be seen 
as responding to this extreme case formulation in equivalent terms, stating 
the opposite case unequivocally. Here again, then, we have dialogicality, this 
time as actual dialogue between two speakers. The movement between 
extremes which is evident in the first two turns of Extract 2 can be seen as the 
same movement which is evident in Mary's attempts to take account of both 
positions - to argue that reminiscence is not j.yM one thing, nor is it j.yM the 
other. 
81 
Again, then, it would be a gross characterisation of the data to say merely that 
Mary and Anne take opposing positions in relation to the value of 
reminiscence. We might even argue the opposite: that there is some 
agreement between them, in that Mary, like Anne, takes some pains to say 
that reminiscence is mU just an encouragement to live in the past, although it 
may be so for her group. In an important sense, then, Anne and the 
interviewer are having the same argument with each other, in the first two 
turns of Extract 2, that Mary is having 'with herself' in Extract 1. 
"All they've got to give is their memories" 
Extract 3 is taken from an interview with a medical nurse, Jane, working with 
elderly patients who attend a day hospital attached to a large general hospital. 
Most of the patients are suffering from the effects of arthritis or recent strokes, 
and attend the day hospital for medical check-ups, various kinds of therapy, 
and a cooked lunch. Each morning, before lunch, selected patients are 
gathered in the 'group room', where Jane orchestrates discussion groups 
which are partly reminiscence-based. Immediately previous to the extract, 
Jane has been talking at length about how she attempts to keep her clients up 
to date with what's going on in the world - men's use of make up, the price 
of petrol, changing sexual mores, the expansion of air travel - and how this 
"stimulates their thinking". This account is followed by the interviewer's 
question, at the start of the extract, about the place of reminiscence in the 
group sessions. 
82 
Extract 3 
Kev sol I mean/ we're going way beyond reminiscence here really / 
reminiscence seems to be a component in this-
Jane reminiscence is part! I mean sometimes they just sit and chat about the 
old days/ that's fine cos reminiscence is valuable/ it helps them feel 
that they've got/ something to offer/ people/ as I explain to the learner 
nurses/ if you've got/ on your ward a care for the elderly ward you'll 
hear people say / ooh he's telling me that story again about when he 
was in the war or/when he had- was shot or / something/ and as I say 
to the learners/ that's lill. these people the elderly people have to give 
in return/ I said/ look we're doing for them physically by/looking 
after them looking after their physical needs/ taking them to the toilet/ 
pulling their knickers down for them/ sitting them on the toilet/ even 
wiping their bottoms and pulling their knickers up/ they want to say 
thank you in some way/all they've got to give is their memories/ and 
that's why you find old people are always going on about the past/ 
because that's all they've got to give to say thank you/ and if anybody is 
wise enough that people should bel if somebody starts talking about 
the past instead of thinking/ oh gawd here we go again/ they should 
think «cough» make the time to listen because/ someone of the 
younger generation/ I'm thirty two but I feel very honoured that I can 
learn so much about the past/ just through talking to them they are 
walking encyclopaedias/ make the most of the elderly listen to them 
listen to what they've got to say/because once you've got a knowledge 
about/ the past about earlier this century about what they can tell you/ 
it gives you a great deal of insight for the future/ I always say the past 
gives you the wisdom for the future 
In this extract, we find a number of formulations of reminiscence-and-ageing. 
These are structured in various ways around the theme of social exchange, 
emphasising the role of others in the activity of reminiscing, as well as that of 
the reminiscer. Jane begins by accounting for the value of reminiscence for 
her elderly patients, and for their acts of reminiscing, in terms of 
reciprocation for the ministrations of their carers - "it helps them feel that 
they've got/ something to offer/ people"; "that's all they've got to give to say 
thank you". In this formulation, the value of reminiscence (for both 
reminiscer and audience) inheres in the fact that it is offered as reciprocation, 
83 
rather than in any intrinsic value it might have. This is followed by a second 
formulation, which represents reminiscence as the transmission of culturally 
and personally valuable knowledge (~I feel very honoured that I can learn so 
much about the past/ just through talking to them they are walking 
encyclopaedias"; "once you've got a knowledge about the past about earlier 
this century about what they can tell you/ it gives you a great deal of insight 
for the future"). Here, in contrast to the first version, reminiscence is 
presented as having high intrinsic value, independent of its status as a means 
of reciprocation. 
These two versions of the value of reminiscence in later life serve, in Jane's 
account, as the basis for a moral exhortation to learner nurses ("as I explain to 
the learner nurses"; "as I say to the learners"), urging them to listen to their 
elderly patients ("make the time to listen"; "make the most of the elderly 
listen to them listen to what they've got to say"). In fact, much of the extract 
is formulated as an account of how Jane describes reminiscence to student 
nurses. 
In the service of accomplishing this moral exhortation, Jane's account is 
rhetorically organised to undermine another formulation of the value of 
reminiscence. The formulation which Jane seeks to undermine is not stated 
explicitly in the extract, but is made available indirectly through the reported 
speech and thoughts of others - "you'll hear people say/ooh he's telling me 
that story again about when he was in the war or/ when he had- was shot or/ 
something"; "if somebody starts talking about the past instead of thinking oh 
gawd here we go again". From these reported reactions, we are able to infer 
that reminiscence is construed here as repetitive talk, which is by implication 
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self-indulgent and of no interest to others. This use of reported 
speech/thought accomplishes a number of things. First, it has the effect of 
ascribing this particular view of reminiscence to people other than the 
speaker crane) or her interlocutors (whether student nurses or the 
interviewer). This in turn enables Jane to mark this implicit formulation of 
reminiscence-and-ageing as problematic or prejudiced without threat to the 
'face' of her interlocutors, even though she is at the same time exhorting 
them not to take such a position (cf. Goffman, 1981, on 'footing'; see also 
Wooffitt, 1992, and Widdecombe and Wooffitt, 1989, for examples of similar 
uses of reported speech in conversation). 
Formulating the association between reminiscence and later life in terms of 
social exchange works to counter the version of reminiscence as self 
indulgent talk, and mark this version as prejudiced, by constructing 
reminiscence as meant for others. This argument builds over the course of 
Jane's account. First, in introducing the notion of reciprocation, she describes 
reminiscence as the only resource available to older people in such a process 
("that's ill these people the elderly people have to give in return"; "all 
they've got to give is their memories"; "that's all they've got to give to say 
thank you H). This formulation works to simultaneously construct 
reminiscence as a token of social exchange and offer mitigation for its 
apparent lack of 'exchange value'. Thus, it is the fact that reminiscence is 
offered as reciprocation that serves as a potential basis for a moral exhortation 
to "listen", rather than any intrinsic value it might have. One might say 'its 
the thought that counts' here. 
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This version of 'reminiscence-as-reciprocation' is then used to account for the 
supposed propensity of older people to reminisce ("thats why you find old 
people are always going on about the past/ because thats all they've got to 
give to say thank you "). This move is interesting in that this supposed 
propensity is another aspect of the association between reminiscence and old 
age, besides 'function', which has been a focus of empirical research (eg. 
Lieberman and Falk, 1971; Revere and Tobin, 1980; Romaniuk and 
Romaniuk, 1981). Here we see it being used rhetorically. Jane presents it as 
common knowledge (as something you simply "find" going on in the world) 
and using her formulationof reminiscence to account for this 'fact' increases 
the plausibility of that formulation - it 'fits the facts', so to speak. 
Following this, and continuing with the theme of social exchange, Jane 
produces a second formulation of the value of reminiscence. In this version, 
reminiscence is construed as having high exchange value, as encyclopaedic 
knowledge, as "wisdom for the future". Moreover, it is construed as being of 
particular value to the nurses she is 'talking to'- "someone of the younger 
generation I'm thirty two but I feel very honoured that I can learn so much 
about the past". This formulation provides a much stronger basis for a 
recommendation that student nurses listen to their elderly patients. 
Reminiscence is now of value in its own right, and of particular value for 
their age group. Thus, through the course of the extract, we see Jane 
formulating the value of reminiscence in such a way as to accomplish the 
business of making (or, in this case, reporting the making of) such a moral 
exhortation. 
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There are clear similarities between the rhetorical work accomplished by 
Jane's account and the work done by the interpretive repertoires of 
reminiscence-and-ageing discussed in Chapter 4. The two contrasting 
formulations of reminiscence-and-ageing which Jane uses are recognisable as 
the 'psychological' repertoire and the 'sociological' repertoire respectively. 
The first not only constructs reminiscence as having personal rather than 
social value, but also serves to account for this lack of value. In contrast, the 
second accords reminiscence social value. Both versions are formulated in 
opposition to the 'dysfunctional' repertoire. Moreover, all three versions are 
deployed in the service of a moral exhortation to "listen to the elderly", and 
are thus embedded in an argument about the social relations of ageing. Jane's 
formulations of reminiscence-and-ageing, then, can be seen as invoking the 
same contrary discourses of ageing discussed in the previous chapter, and 
their same contradictory social-relational implications. Just as authors of texts 
on reminiscence can be seen as deploying formulations of reminiscence-and-
ageing to argue for change in the social relations of ageing, so we can see Jane 
using similar resources to argue for a change in social relations between 
student nurses and their elderly patients. 
It is important to note, though, that these versions are formulated as 
arguments. In producing an account of the value of reminiscence, Jane does 
not simply say that reminiscence is reciprocation, or that it is the expression 
of wisdom. Rather, her account has a dialogical form. She formulates 
versions of reminiscence-and-ageing which accord it value, in contrast to a 
version which casts it as valueless. In advancing her own argument, Jane 
must discredit other opposing positions, which are themselves tenable - that 
reminiscence may also be experienced as boring or repetitive, and irrelevant 
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to the concerns of the care workers who may be its temporarily captive 
audience. 
Discussion 
The above analysis has brought us further along the road towards an 
understanding of discursive construction of reminiscence-and-ageing, and in 
doing so can be seen as a corroboration and extension of the analysis 
presented in Chapter 4. A variety of formulations of the nature of 
reminiscence and its value for older people have been identified. From a 
developmental-functionalist viewpoint, this variety might be accounted for 
in terms of a range of hypotheses to be tested, or as being applicable to a range 
of different groups of older people. This viewpoint, however, ignores the 
performative, indexical and inconclusive status of such formulations, as set 
out in Chapter 3. 
Instead, these formulations can be seen as accounting resources, held in 
~ 
common by speakers. The analysis shows some of( diversity of these 
resources, and also how they are used in accounting for practice. Speakers use 
different formulations of reminiscence-and-ageing, not only to argue for or 
against the use of reminiscence work with the older people in their care, but 
also to argue for or against more general care practices, as Jane does in Extract 
3. This variety is characterised by contradiction and opposition. The accounts 
examined take the form of a dialogue or argument about the nature of 
reminiscence and its value in later life. Versions of reminiscence-and-ageing 
take shape in relation to other, contrary versions, and the accounts 
themselves embody movement between these versions: reminiscence as past-
oriented or present-oriented, reminiscence as self-oriented or other-oriented, 
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reminiscence as socially valuable or of no value to others. Moreover, the 
analysis has shown that these contradictions are not only present between 
different speaker's accounts, but are also an important feature of the internal 
organisa tion of those accounts. 
The fact that this dialogicality occurs both within and across speakers shows 
that this talk cannot be accounted for simply in individual terms, as the 
expression of speakers' beliefs. Neither is it sufficient to say that speakers are 
drawing from a static 'set' of representations of reminiscence-and-ageing -
rather, these accounts are constructed through movement between contrary 
positions. What we see in this talk is evidence of a phenomenon which is at 
once dynamic and collective. 
In this respect, the data are very similar to those of Billig, Condor, Edwards, 
Gane, Middleton and Radley (1988), discussed in Cahpter 3. They illustrate, 
with examples from a variety of settings, the ways in which talk is 
characterised by the presence of opposing themes, and can be seen to be 
handling dilemmas of an ideological and practical nature. They argue that 
'common sense' is itself made up of contrary themes - that in attempting to 
account for their experiences or actions in commonly-sensible ways, people 
find themselves having to deal with contradictory 'truths', and can be seen to 
seek a balance or compromise between these contradictions in their talk: 
The presence of contrary themes in discussions is revealed by the use of 
qualifications. The unqualified expression of one theme seems to call 
forth a counter-qualification in the name of the opposing theme. 
There is a tension in the discourse, which can make even monologue 
take the form of argumentation and argument occur, even when all 
participants share similar contrary themes. (Billig et aI, 1988: 144) 
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This seems to be precisely the phenomenon identified in the foregoing 
analysis, and suggests it to be a general property of talk. However, to the 
extent that the talk examined here pertains to an identifiable arena of practice, 
it can be seen as revealing the operation of a 'common sense' of reminiscence 
work. The contrary formulations identified can be seen as the raw materials 
from which interviewees construct commonly-sensible accounts of their 
work, the materials with which they literally make sense of their own care 
practices. 
It is important to note, then, this sense-making cannot be a once-and-for-all 
matter. Rather, on each occasion of accounting for practice, the resulting 
account will not be determined in advance, but will take shape according to 
the arguments raised and how they are formulated. Thus, such accounting 
will always be situated in the flow of action, and be sensitive to the 
interactional business in hand. On this basis, then, it ca~:rgued that the 
'sense' of reminiscence work is being continually reformulated as 
practitioners talk about their work. 
Moreover, in that individual speaker's'accounts are built up in the form of 
dialogue or argument, it can be argued that they bear the mark of previous 
occasions of conversational sense-making, and thus that the sense-making 
practices identified have themselves been forged socially, in discussion and 
argument. This then leads us to locate the 'understanding' of the nature and 
value of reminiscence work (for both practitioners and analysts) at the level 
of discourse. There is no need to look beyond the discourse to a set of 
representations which informs the talk examined here. Rather, this talk can 
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itself be seen as an embodiment of a dynamic 'community of discursive 
understanding', within which practitioners continually formulate and 
reformulate the nature of their work. 
This is not to say that 'anything goes' when practitioners talk about their 
work. On the contrary, any identifiable arena of practice will by definition 
favour particular ways of representing and talking about that practice. Such 
regular 'ways of speaking' work to constitute and maintain the boundaries of 
practice. In the foregoing analysis, the work done by this talk is apparent in 
the 'preference status' of different formulations, and in the way that certain 
formulations are argued for over others. The formulations which are 
preferred and argued for are those which accord positive value to the 
reminiscences of older people, as being relevant to the present, as offered to 
others, as socially valuable knowledge. They are preferred to, or privileged 
over, formulations which construct reminiscence in negative terms, as living 
in the past, as repetitive or self-indulgent, as irrelevant to others or to the 
concerns of the present. Thus, in the detail of the design of their talk, 
speakers show resistance to formulations which marginalise reminiscence, 
and through this resist the consequent marginalisation of older people as not 
worth listening to, as having no right to speak and be heard. As in Chapter 4, 
the very discursive practices which work to constitute reminiscence work as 
an arena of practice - through representing reminiscence as having positive 
value - work at the same time to advance an argument against the social 
marginalisation of older people. 
In describing the formulations of 'reminiscence and ageing' documented here 
as 'common sense', it should be pointed out that there is also another, more 
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prosaic way in which they might deserve this description. This concerns the 
notable absence in the data of any reference to academic theories of 
reminiscence and its significance in later life. It might be said, then, that 
speakers are talking 'common sense' in that they do not appeal to scientific 
evidence to warrant their accounts. This is so even though some of the 
versions formulated by the interviewees are recognisable as versions of 
academic theories - for example, reminiscence as the transmission of socially 
valuable knowledge to younger generations, and this as the social 'role' of 
older people (McMahon and Rhudick, 1964), or reminiscence as a means of 
affirming identity in old age (Lewis, 1971). This can be seen as further 
evidence of the difference in perspective between practice and research 
discussed in Chapter 2. This debate gives the impression of 'scientific' and 
'common sense' accounts of reminiscence and ageing passing one another by, 
an impression reinforced by the absence of explicit mention of scientific 
accounts in our own data. 
Gubrium and Wallace (1990) have discussed some of these issues in relation 
to theories of ageing. They present data showing how care workers, older 
people and their relatives, invoke diverse 'theories' of ageing in discussing 
the appropriateness of a particular care regime. They draw attention to the 
parallels between this "ordinary theorising" and the theorising of age done by 
social scientists, and argue that the separation and the degree of differential 
status of these two modes of theorising are unwarranted. They observe that 
ordinary theorising shares many characteristics of its scientific counterpart, 
while scientific theories, like ordinary theories, bear the mark of lived 
experience, and of the values of those who formulate them. They suggest a 
rapprochement between the two, recommending that "scientific theory takes 
92 
serious consideration of ordinary theorising" and "science no longer has a 
corrective function with respect to ordinary theorising, but becomes ... a 
professional source of insights for understanding experience ... " (Gubrium and 
Wallace, 1990: 148). 
The foregoing analysis can be seen as one attempt to bring such 'ordinary 
theorising' into serious consideration, and in doing so, can be seen as 
extending Gubrium and Wallace's discussion. Besides revealing some 
parallels between ordinary and scientific theories of reminiscence and ageing, 
and how the former are used as accounting resources, it also reveals the 
rhetorical organisation of 'ordinary theorising', and its operation as 
discursively-grounded common sense. To treat these formulations as mere 
'lay theories', to be corrected or formalised, would be to miss their crucial role 
in understanding and accounting for practice, and in the shaping of practice 
itself. 
The last two chapters have offered an account of the discursive construction 
of the association between 'reminiscence' and 'old age' as it is realised in the 
literature and talk about reminiscence work. This account was prompted by 
the argument, set out in Chapter 3, against research approaches which study 
reminiscence as a 'mechanism' or 'function' associated with a particular stage 
of lifespan development, and seek to decide empirically between different 
formulations of the significance of reminiscence in later life. These 
formulations can instead be seen as positions in an ongoing cultural 
argument about the significance of older people's reminiscences, and, beyond 
this, about the social position of older people. 
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The discursive resources mobilised this argument are an integral part of the 
practice of reminiscence work, and work to constitute it as an arena of 
practice. This constitutive work involves the continual reformulation of 
arguments for the value of reminiscence, in opposition to arguments which 
accord it negative value. In the talk of practitioners examined in this chapter, 
and in the writing of practitioners and proponents of reminiscence work 
examined in Chapter 4, certain formulations of reminiscence-and-ageing are 
regularly privileged over others. These preferred versions have positive 
implications for the social relations of ageing, and indeed are deployed 
specifically in arguments about the appropriate conduct of others towards 
older people, and the appropriate position of older people in society. In this 
way, the very discursive practices which constitute reminiscence work also 
work to argue for a change in the social relations of ageing. 
The next chapter will move from a consideration of reminiscence-and-ageing 
to a consideration of discursive formulations of the nature of reminiscence 
work in the context of therapy and care provision. It will show how the 
implicit and explicit social relational concerns of reminiscence work in these 
contexts raise. problems for the practice and status of this work. This 
discussion will further illuminate current debates about the status of 
reminiscence work, and the need for evidence of its value. 
94 
Chapter 6 
Dilemmas of Professional Discourse: Reminiscence as Therapy 
This chapter presents an analysis of the terms of the current debate about 
the status of reminiscence work as an arena of care practice. It will show 
this debate to be concerned, not simply with the status of reminiscence 
work, nor with the evidence of its value for older people, but rather with 
the kinds of social relations that are instantiated within care practices. In 
this respect, the analysis continues to address the social relational themes 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, it was argued that, in writing 
about reminiscence and later life, practitioners and researchers tend to 
favour different discursive formulations of reminiscence-and-ageing, 
which in turn have different implications for the social relations of ageing. 
It was further argued that the formulation favoured by practitioners and 
proponents (the 'sociological' repertoire) is congruent with an explicit 
concern with a 'repositioning' of older people in their relations with 
others, and is one means by which this concern is pursued. It was noted 
that this concern is not generally addressed in the research literature, 
which tends to favour the 'psychological' repertoire of reminiscence-and-
ageing, which constructs the benefits of reminiscing in terms of 
psychological functionality, rather than social-relational change. This 
social relational theme was further explored in Chapter 5, where other 
examples of discursive practices which have positive implications for the 
social status of older people were identified in practitioners' talk. 
The aim of the present chapter is to extend this argument. The analysis 
will identify discursive practices engaged in by practitioners and 
proponents which have a similar function to those previously identified, 
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in that they are orientated to the constitution of particular kinds of social 
relations. In this case, however, these discursive practices impinge on the 
social relations of reminiscence work itself. They can be understood as 
strategies for resisting the formulation of reminiscence work in the terms 
of 'professional' discourse. The analysis will show further how the 
professional critique of reminiscence work is orientated to preserving the 
social relations of professional practice. The 'evidence problem' discussed 
in Chapter 2 will in this way be recast as a consequence of the different 
agendas of proponents and critics of reminiscence work, of professional 
researchers and non-professional practitioners. This reformulation of the 
problem in turn suggests a need for an approach to research which can 
incorporate the practitioners' agenda, thus far marginalised by current 
approaches. 
The data examined here are taken from a variety of sources: transcripts of 
interviews with proponents and critics of reminiscence work; recently 
published literature Gournal articles, conference papers, and training 
materials); and transcripts of discussions and conversations recorded at a 
recent conference devoted to reminiscence work. The discussion will 
focus especially on text and talk related to the designation of reminiscence 
work as 'therapy'. This issue can be seen as central to the debate about the 
status of reminiscence work, for a number of reasons. First, the 
designation 'therapy' is one possible indicator of the status or legitimacy of 
practice. Second, the designation 'therapy' may be seen as requiring 
certain kinds of evidence to warrant it, thus bringing into question the 
status of reminiscence work should such evidence not be forthcoming. 
Given the status conferred on reminiscence work by such a designation, 
we might expect the debate to be characterised by claims from proponents 
that reminiscence work is therapy, with critics arguing it is not. However, 
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such is not the case. Rather, there is a marked degree of variability with 
which the designation is used, espoused, or disavowed by different parties 
to the debate. The analysis will locate this variability as part of a more 
general phenomenon, which is manifest in other ways in which people 
talk and write about reminiscence work as care practice, and which is 
orientated to social-relational concerns. 
The designation of reminiscence work as 'therapy' 
In the literature related to reminiscence work produced over the last ten 
years or so, it is common to find such work referred to as 'reminiscence 
therapy', particularly in the case of work involving reminiscence groups 
(eg: Lewis and Butler, 1974; Ebersole, 1976; Lesser, Lazarus, Frankel and 
Havasy, 1981; McRae, 1982; Norris and Abu El Eileh, 1982; Cook, 1984; 
Poulton and Strassberg, 1986). There are a number of possible explanations 
for the ubiquity of this description. There is a superficial similarity in 
form between group reminiscence and group therapy. In addition, it is 
likely that the term 'therapy' articulates the feeling that group 
reminiscence confers positive benefits on elderly participants, benefits 
more substantial perhaps than other 'group activities' engaged in with and 
by older people, such as a game of bingo or a sing song. Robert Butler's 
work must also be acknowledged as an influence here. Butler (1963) 
argued for relevance of reminiscence to psychotherapeutic practice within 
a psychodynamic framework. His paper is cited in the introductions to 
most of a steady stream of papers on reminiscence since then, published in 
gerontological, nursing, and social work journals, in this country and in 
the USA, written by gerontologists, social workers, care assistants, and 
others working with older people. Butler's work, then, provides further 
grounds for describing reminiscence work as 'therapy', whether or not 
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such work is informed by his particular theories about reminiscence and 
later life. 
Given the prevalence of the term in the literature, it is not surprising that 
references to reminiscence work as 'therapy' can also be found in 
practitioners' talk. Extract 1 is taken from an interview with Jane, who 
runs reminiscence groups in a geriatric day hospital. It is part of an answer 
to the question "How do you feel about calling reminiscence therapy?". 
Extract 1 
Jane: [ ... ] the amount of patients that have said to me quite 
spontaneously without me saying to them have you enjoyed 
the group/ have said/ oh I do enjoy your groups/ I'm on my 
own all weekend your groups/ although I'm/ on my own all 
week I think about the group all through the week and then I 
start looking forward to it/ I go over it in my mind y'know / 
telling everybody about it/ then halfway through the week I 
start looking forward to 'the next group/ so obviously there's 
some valuable therapy involved 
In most of this extract, Jane is reporting the words of a typical patient, 
saying how much they enjoy and look forward to her groups. This 
positive evaluation is then used by Jane as a self-evident justification for 
describing her work as 'therapy' ("so obviously there's some valuable 
therapy involved"). In Jane's terms, then, it is the enjoyment of the 
group, and the patients consequent engagement with it, that confirms the 
status of the activity as 'therapy'. This usage can be contrasted with the 
way the word is used in Extract 2. This extract is taken from the 
concluding section of a paper published in the British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, which consisted of a review of empirical research on 
reminiscence and reminiscence work. This paper is one of the few in the 
lietrature which take a critical stance in relation to reminiscence work. 
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Extract 2 
It is possible to make a case for reminiscence as an enjoyable pastime 
which may lead to positive changes in communication and social 
behaviour among both normal and confused elderly persons. The 
most positive effects on the elderly person may result from the 
greater knowledge and understanding of their individual 
experience on the part of staff members involved in reminiscence 
groups. These are important goals and Bender et al (1983) discuss 
reasons for the usefulness of such groups in residential settings. 
Nevertheless, the role of reminiscence as a therapeutic tool is 
doubtful, and it seems that at least as far as the normal and confused 
elderly are concerned, it is best regarded as a diversionary activity. 
(Thornton and Brotchie, 1987:101, emphasis in original). 
This extract has a number of features relevant to the debate about the 
status of reminiscence work, some of which will be discussed later. For the 
present, attention will be given to its deployment of the word 
"therapeutic". Prior to the passage quoted here, the discussion in the paper 
has been concerned in part to assess the evidence that participants in 
reminiscence groups show change on various measures of 'psychological 
state'- self esteem, life satisfaction, depression, cognitive functioning and 
so on. The authors' conclusion is that there is no firm evidence of change 
on any of these measures. This lack of evidence is the basis for their 
statement "the role of reminiscence as a therapeutic tool is doubtful". In 
the terms of this extract, reminiscence work is not 'therapy'. 
If we see the designation 'therapy' as a marker of the value or status of 
reminiscence work, then these two extracts might be seen simply as 
expressing two opposing positions in the debate, Extract 1 arguing that 
reminiscence work is (or at least involves) therapy, and Extract 2 arguing 
the opposite. However, things are not so simple, in that the extracts also 
invoke different criteria for applying the term 'therapy'. The authors of 
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Extract 2 conclude reminiscence work is not 'therapeutic', even though it 
may be "enjoyable", because it does not lead to changes in the objective 
measures discussed. On the other hand, Jane argues in Extract 1 that group 
reminiscence is therapeutic precisely because it is enjoyable. 
To complicate things further, consider Extract 3. This is taken from a 
conversation with Lucy, a museum worker involved in conducting 
reminiscence groups for older people, recorded at a recent conference 
devoted to reminiscence work. 
Extract 3 
Lucy: I suppose the way it tends to be more in museums and art 
galleries now is that/ a lot of the work I'm doing is like for 
straight pleasure/ you know / whereas- whereas it seems to 
me very often people in a social work setting have always a 
high agenda for therapeutic- / sometimes pleasure and fun 
gets lost along the way 
In some respects, the speaker in this extract takes a similar position to the 
authors of Extract 2, in that she draws a distinction between "therapeutic" 
and "straight pleasure". However, there is here the further suggestion that 
the two might be not just distinct, but also mutually exclusive 
("sometimes pleasure and fun gets lost along the way"). This formulation 
can be contrasted with Extract 1, in which 'enjoyment' and 'therapy' are 
treated as entirely congruent. 
The complication here is that although Lucy is a practitioner of 
reminiscence work, her position is closer to the critical position of Extract 
2, and is potentially antithetical to that of the practitioner speaking in 
Extract 1. While Jane appears to have no problem with using the term 
'therapy' to describe her work, Lucy appears to be resisting such a 
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description by means of a formulation which directly contradicts Jane's 
position, in which 'therapy' and 'pleasure' are potentially antithetical. 
This difference is more than a matter of personal preference. It can be seen 
as a consequence of the different ways in which the words 'therapy' and 
'therapeutic' are commonly used. 
Jane's use of the word 'therapy' in Extract 1 can be read as an 'everyday' 
usage of the term, by which any activity which has beneficial consequences 
for the physical or psychological well-being of the person engaging in it - a 
game of squash, perhaps, or a heart-to-heart talk with a friend - may be 
described as 'therapeutic'. In Extracts 2 and 3, on the other hand, 
"therapeutic" can be read as being used in a more 'technical' sense. In 
Extract 2, it is used to signify the presence of certain objectively 
measureable effects. In Extract 3, it is associated with "a social work 
setting". Both these examples locate the word as part of 'professional' 
discourse, as it might be used by people such as social workers and 
psychologists when going about their work. 
Such different uses, then, belong to different spheres of activity. Whereas 
Jane's usage can be related to the doings of everyday life, the usage in 
Extracts 2 and 3 is part of, and invokes, a more specialised and 
circumscribed set of practices. The word 'therapy' has currency in both sets 
of practices. This dual currency leads to certain problems in describing 
reminiscence work as 'therapy', or 'therapeutic'. Such work is generally 
not considered to constitute professional practice. Practitioners are, for the 
most part, relatively unskilled and unqualified, at least in formal terms. 
However, the practice of reminiscence work in care settings brings it into 
close contact with professional practice and its associated discourse, with 
101 
the result that a particular description of reminiscence work as 'therapy' in 
the 'everyday' sense risks being reinterpreted in professional terms. 
This reinterpretation has a number of potential consequences for 
reminiscence work. One possibility is that professionals will be moved to 
deny the validity of the description, as in Extract 2. Another possible 
consequence of this reinterpretation is that it opens up the possibility of 
the 'professionalisation' of reminiscence work. Both these consequences 
set up problems for reminiscence work, as will became apparent in the 
following discussion. The problem of the denial of 'therapeutic' status 
will be considered later. First, we will consider the potential 
professionalisation of reminiscence work implied by the term 'therapy', 
and the way this is orientated to in the discourse of proponents and 
practitioners of reminiscence work. 
'Therapy' as a token of professional discourse 
The implied resistance to using the term 'therapy' shown by Lucy in 
Extract 3 is much more explicit in other data. Extract 4 is taken from an 
interview with John, a regional administrator, whose tasks include 
supervising the provision of resources for reminiscence work, and 
lecturing on reminiscence to care workers. 
Extract 4 
John: certainly I find when I do talks to care assistants/ they get 
frightened when you say go and do reminiscence therapy/but 
if you say to them well look/ there are a load of resources 
here which can encourage people to get talking about their 
past/ and these are some techniques you can use in setting a 
group up/ these are some things you need to look out for 
while you're running the group but you can actually do it/ if 
you put it into the er/ mystique of therapy then you're 
destroying it-/ people's potential confidence 
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It is clear that John is not primarily concerned in this extract with the 
validity of describing reminiscence work as therapy. Rather, he is 
concerned with the practical consequences of such a description. In his 
terms, if reminiscence work is described as 'therapy', potential 
practitioners "get frightened N, and "you're destroying ... people's potential 
confidenceN. "TherapyN here is treated as part of a professional discourse. 
The "mystique of therapy" can be interpreted as the expert knowledge and 
skill associated with the professional practice of therapy. Potential 
practitioners, who tend to occupy the lower levels of the institutional 
hierarchy, would not be party to such knowledge and skill, and are 
intimidated by the suggestion that they might have to engage in practices 
which require it. Thus (the argument goes) in order to ensure the 
involvement of these potential practitioners, it is important that 
reminiscence work be described in other terms, so that they feel they can 
"actually do it". 
A similar argument is advanced in Extract 5, taken from an interview with 
Anne, who runs reminiscence groups for older people attending a 
psychiatric day hospital. Anne is replying to the question 'Do you see 
reminiscence as a form of therapy?' 
Extract 5 
Anne: I think you've got to be careful with the word therapy 
because then it/ becomes something very special/ 
a:nd/ only qualified people can do it and you sort of get 
into that sort off area/ I think the most people with a 
short amount of training can run reminiscence 
groups/ erm to an extent you could argue you dont 
need any training at all/ I think you have- to an extent 
you have to know how to run groups how to get 
groups going/ erm/ but I think the- the danger is to 
make it a specialised- something very special only 
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certain people can do itl you know I mean if part 
three's [care workers in homes for the elderly] - they 
can have- y'know do reminiscence anybody can in that 
sort of situationl but I certainly think it's got a value as 
al as a form of therapy I just think you've gotta be 
careful when you start saying ( ) its a therapy I 
y'know I sort of people back off and they become afraid 
of itl and you know that's one thing that worries me 
Here again we see a concern with practical consequences of using "the 
word therapy". Towards the end of the extract, Anne uses the same 
argument as John in Extract 4: that potential practitioners find the word 
'therapy' intimidating ("when you start saying ( ... ) its a therapyl y'know/ 
sort of people back off and they become afraid of it"). However, earlier in 
the extract, she uses a slightly different argument, suggesting that if 
reminiscence work was called 'therapy', this in itself would make it 
"something very special" so that "only qualified people can do it". 
In these extracts then, the issue is the consequences of different descriptive 
practices, rather than the nature of reminiscence work itself. 
Reminiscence work mayor may not be therapy - Anne suggests it may be 
("I certainly think it's got a value as a/ as a form of therapy") - but the 
concern is with the detrimental consequences which might follow from 
such a description. A similar concern is evident in recent writing about 
reminiscence work. Extract 6 is taken from a recent conference paper by a 
prominent proponent of reminiscence work. 
Extract 6 
One of the strengths of reminiscence work with older people is its 
openness in terms of process and skill base [ ... ] By avoiding the label 
therapy we can continue to enjoy the advantages of working flexibly 
and in a variety of settings. (Bornat, 1989b: 20). 
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Again, the 'therapy' label is presented as potentially restricting the practice 
of reminiscence work, of closing off its Nopenness in terms of process and 
skill base". The word "openness N here can be contrasted with the reference 
to the "mystique of therapy" in Extract 6. Whereas therapy is cloaked in a 
mystique impenetrable to potential practitioners, reminiscence work is 
'open' to them, both in terms of its "process", and in terms of the variety 
of skills which it can accommodate. Moreover, here this "openness N is 
represented as an important characteristic of reminiscence work, as one of 
its "strengths ". 
In Extracts 4, 5 and 6, there is a contrast with the use of label 'therapy' 
noted in the previous section. Although the label has been used widely to 
describe reminiscence work, in these extracts its use is explicitly resisted. 
This resistance has its basis in reading 'therapy' as a token of professional 
discourse. Read this way, the label 'therapy' has the effect of locating 
reminiscence work as part of professional practice, with potentially 
undesirable consequences. These consequences are formulated here in 
terms of the exclusion of the very people (non-professional care workers) 
who are most likely to practice reminiscence work. But there is more to 
this than ensuring a supply of suitable practitioners. There is a more 
fundamental issue of accessibility, represented by the use of terms such 
as "mystique" and "openness". This aversion to using the 'therapy' label 
can be understood in terms of a resistance to formulating the nature of 
reminiscence work in terms of professional discourse, and thus preserving 
its accessibility. Considered in this way, it can be seen as one of a range of 
examples of such resistance to be found in practitioners' discourse. 
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Resisting professional discourse 
Extract 7 is taken from the transcript of a workshop session at a recent 
conference devoted to reminiscence work. In the session, a group of 
conference participants (care workers, museum workers, myself and 
another academic, and others) were given the task of formulating a 
detailed plan for setting up and running a reminiscence group with a life 
span of six weeks. In the extract, the participants are suggesting possible 
aims or desired outcomes for the reminiscence sessions. Ruth and Kevin 
(myself) are university academics; the other speakers are care workers who 
work with older people. I had been assigned the job of recording the 
details of the plan for reporting to a plenary session. The discussion in the 
extract is focussed on exactly what I should write down as the aims of the 
group. 
Extract 7 
Ruth: 
Joy: 
Lynn: 
Liz: 
Sue: 
Lynn: 
Kevin: 
Jill: 
Kevin: 
Lynn: 
how about identityl how about identity erml 
identity erml raising something like that 
[ 
getting to know everybody I I better 
[ 
yeah 
( ) 
[ 
gettingl to know I each other I better 
«said slowly and deliberately» 
in plain english 
okayl okay let's put increased self esteem 
yeah but you also haven't got that bit help 
them communicate (with each other better) 
( ) 
[ 
okay I'll put that tool okay I helps-= 
[ 
( ) 
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Lynn: =talking/ to/ each other/ ~ «said slowly and 
deliberately» 
«some care workers laugh» 
Kevin: okay 
The extract begins with Ruth suggesting a possible aim of the sessions as 
"identity ... raising". Joy, a care worker, interrupts this suggestion with 
another: "getting to know everybody better". This in turn is echoed and 
slightly reformulated by Lynn, another care worker: "getting to know each 
other lmifr". This last contribution is delivered slowly and emphatically. 
Liz, a third care worker agrees, and then Lynn follows up her suggestion 
with "in plain english". Lynn's contributions up to this point are clearly 
oriented to Ruth's suggestion at the start of the extract. Lynn,s 
formulation of her own suggestion as "plain english" accomplishes a 
number of things. It constructs Ruth's suggestion as being something 
other than "plain english". In doing this, it serves as a negative 
evaluation of Ruth's suggestion, the implied contrast with 'plainness' 
being, at the very least, a lack of clarity, perhaps even deliberate 
obfuscation. In addition, it invokes a generic way of speaking (plain 
english), and by implication, locates Ruth's formulation within a different 
mode of discourse. 
The slow and emphatic rendition of Lynn,s first turn works to further 
construct its 'plainness', as a no-nonsense, truth-of-the-matter statement. 
She uses the same device later in the extract, in suggesting another 
objective of the reminiscence sessions: "talking to each other 1I1QIf.". This 
appears to be a response to (and reformulation of) the contribution from 
Jill, another care worker: "help them communicate (with each other 
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better)". In this latter case, Lynn's turn is followed by laughter from other 
care workers, which can be taken as signifying recognition of the work she 
is doing here. 
The analytical point here is that Ruth's contribution "identity ... raising" 
can be seen as an example of professional discourse. Such a description is 
warranted in part by the speaker's status as a university academic, and by 
the words themselves, as a plausible (if rather incoherent) example of the 
way the aims of a reminiscence group might be formulated in a 
professional context. However, a stronger warrant is provided in the 
extract itself, in the way Ruth's contribution is orientated to by Lynn as 
another 'way of speaking', and one which is not "plain". The formulation 
of a lack of 'plainness' can be related to the invocation of the 'mystique' of 
therapy in Extract 4, and both can be related to the inaccessibility to the 
layperson of professional knowledge, professional talk, and professional 
skills. 
A similar orientation to professional discourse on the part of practitioners 
is apparent in Extract 8. This is taken from the same source as Extract 3, an 
incidental conversation with Lucy, a museum worker, which took place as 
the workshop discussion broke up. Immediately prior to the extract, I had 
mentioned that I was interested in how people talk about reminiscence. 
Extract 8 
Lucy: 
Kevin: 
its a very new thing you see so in facti lots of people 
are doing things and they're all doing it differently tool 
and its very interesting to me cos I'm from a different 
sort of background/ that a lot of the sort of social work 
jargon seems to creep in a lot of the time/ now you see 
to me 1- 1- to me its so unusual 1-
where are you from then/ what are you doing 
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Lucy: I'm from the sort ofl museums education that sort of 
background sol things- when people start talking about 
increasing ( ) awareness ( )1 and my- the way that 
we- the phrases I would use are very very different 
Again, in this extract, the speaker draws a distinction between different 
ways of speaking about reminiscence work. Here, the distinction is 
between "sort of social work jargon" and the way Lucy herself would talk 
about it ("the phrases 1 would use are very very different"). The term 
"social work jargon" can be read as a reference to professional discourse. 
Moreover, the derogatory term "jargon" reads as a negative evaluation of 
such discourse. In addition, Lucy's repetitive use of the word "very" 
serves to heighten the distinction being made, maximising the difference 
between her own "phrases" and those which are "jargon". The work being 
done with the term"jargon" here is similar to that being done with "plain 
english" in Extract 7. Both work to construe professional discourse, not 
just as specialist language, but also as gratuitous mystification. By these 
means, Lucy is displaying her resistance to describing reminiscence work 
in terms of professional discourse. 
These examples suggest that resistance to using the term 'therapy' in 
relation to reminiscence work is part of a more general resistance to 
formulating reminiscence work in terms of professional discourse. What 
exactly is being accomplished through these various instances of 
resistance? One way of accounting for this resistance is in terms of the 
social relations constituted by professional discourse. 
A common theme in these examples is the mystification of non-
professionals engendered by professional ways of speaking. Such ways of 
speaking signify the restricted and specialised knowledge of professional 
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practice, which non-professionals are not party to, hence the mystification. 
Along with this asymmetry of knowledge comes an asymmetry of status. 
To speak as a professional is to create the conditions for this asymmetry of 
status, to position other parties to the interaction as either 'fellow 
professionals', or 'non-professionals'. This is so even when the speaker 
has no other warrant for her professional status. Thus, a 'non-
professional' speaking in this way might be regarded as invoking an 
asymmetry of social relations which is unwarranted, that is, as 
'pretentious' or 'getting on his/her high horse'. Even when the speaker's 
professional status is taken as warranted, there is always the possibility of 
resisting the status and identity implications of such talk, by talking in 
such a way as to construct a different set of identity implications. 
The actions of Lynn in Extract 5 can be seen as an example of such a move. 
The implicit formulation of Ruth's contribution as not being "plain 
english" invokes a different set of identity implications. Ruth's action is 
reconstructed as one of gratutitous mystification. Lynn's identity is 
constructed in positive terms, as straightforward and honest, while Ruth is 
recast as devious and pretentious. A further point here is that the 
invocation of "plain english" is specifically orientated to the construction 
of symmetrical social relations, as a discourse of equals, which is accessible 
to all. As such, its invocation is ideally suited to resist the asymmetry of 
social relations engendered by professional discourse. 
The data examined show clearly the extent to which participants are 
oriented to the constitutive power of particular ways of speaking. In these 
data, what is at stake is not merely reaching a consensus on an appropriate 
description for reminiscence work. Different descriptions have different 
consequences; they work to constitute reminiscence work in different 
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ways, according to the interests and perspectives of the different parties to 
the debate. The descriptive practices of practitioners, particularly their 
resistance to formulating reminiscence work in terms of professional 
discourse, are oriented to the constitution of certain kinds of social 
relations. In this regard, they are congruent with explicit representations 
of the social relations of reminiscence work commonly encountered in the 
talk and writing of proponents and practitioners. 
Representing the social relations of reminiscence work 
That reminiscence work is centrally concerned with the social relations of 
ageing has already been argued in previous chapters. This concern also 
extends to the social relations of care practice and care provision. One way 
in which this concern is manifested is through formulations of 
reminiscence as an 'ordinary' activity. It is common in accounts of 
reminiscence work to find references to the 'ordinariness' of reminiscence, 
as an activity that we all engage in, know about, are familiar with, and so 
on. As an example of this, Extract 9 is taken from a conference paper 
written by Andrew Norris, a clinical psychologist and prominent 
supporter of reminiscence work. 
Extract 9 
Perhaps one of the most important features of reminiscence work is 
its immediate appeal. Unlike other techniques, approaches or 
models such as reality orientation, which are designed to facilitate 
communication with older people, reminiscence as a phenomenon 
is something which both elderly people and those who care for 
them can naturally and intuitively relate to from their own 
experience. (Norris, 1989: 26) 
In this extract, reminiscence work is represented as having "immediate 
appeal", as something which both carers and cared-for alike can "naturally 
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and intuitively relate to". This "appeal" is accounted for in terms of 
practitioner's and participants' "own experience" of reminiscence, as a 
commonplace of everyday life; it arises from the fact that both are seen to 
have common knowledge and experience of the activity they are engaged 
in. This "appeal" is further represented as "one of the most important 
features of reminiscence work", and a contrast is made with other 
approaches which are not so easy to relate to. 
This formulation of reminiscence as an ordinary, everyday activity, and 
this as one its important features, is echoed in a number of other accounts 
of reminiscence work (eg: Bornat, 1989b; Gibson, 1989). Indeed, this 
position is implicit in many of the data extracts discussed so far in this 
chapter. In Extracts 4 and 5, for example, part of the grounds offered for 
avoiding the term 'therapy' is that it leads potential practitioners assume 
they do not have the required knowledge and skill to do reminiscence 
work, whereas in fact they do (Extract 4: "but you can actually do it"; 
Extract 5: "if part threes [care workers in homes for the elderly] - they can 
have- y'know do reminiscence anybody can"). 
Extract 9, like these earlier examples, is also produced in the context of 
discussing reminiscence work as 'therapy', in this case as a prelude to 
Norris's discussion of the pros and cons of using the term. In this case, 
however, reminiscence work is represented as being accessible, not only to 
potential practitioners, but also to the older people who participate in it. In 
terms of knowledge of the process they are engaged in, both practictioners 
and older partcipants are on an equal footing. This extract represents 
reminiscence work as being a fundamentally egalitarian activity, in virtue 
of this commonality of knowledge and experience. 
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The resistance to the forms of professional discourse noted earlier can be 
seen as one means by which the 'ordinariness' of reminiscence work is 
constituted, thus preserving its potentially egalitarian nature. To call 
reminiscence work 'therapy', or to formulate its nature or benefits in other 
terms of professional discourse, is to eclipse this ordinariness and so 
invoke a different set of social relations, those of professional practice. 
This not only alienates practitioners, but also potentially alienates the 
older people they work with, by threatening to fracture the link of shared 
knowledge and experience of the 'ordinary' activity they are engaged in 
together. 
Further evidence for this argument can be found in accounts of 
reminiscence work which make explicit claims regarding its effect on the 
social relations of care. It is common to find accounts which stress the 
democratising potential of reminiscence work in care contexts; in which it 
is presented as involving, or indeed bringing about, an egalitarian 
relationship between care workers and 'clients', or even a reversal of 
status relations. Extracts 10, 11 and 12 present examples of this type of 
account. 
Extract 10 
REMINISCENCE REVERSES THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP. 
Those who have lived history are its best teachers. Older people are 
its custodians and its authorities. Involvement in reminiscence 
along with younger people moves those authorities from the 
sidelines to the centre stage, giving them an importance and 
significance lacking in most 'care' institutions. Conventional 
relationships are turned upside down. The staff become the 
recipients. The older people the givers. (Gibson, 1989: 11) 
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Extract 11 
Perhaps in 'Reminiscence Therapy' the therapists are really the old 
people themselves and so reminiscence truly becomes a new 
therapy for old therapists. (Norris, 1981: 5) 
Extract 12 
Unda: I suppose one of the other things about reminiscence that I 
haven't said is that/ for us as workers it's interesting I think 
it's interesting for us/ to encourage people to talk about 
things they used to remember cos that's something where we 
don't have the expertise we may have the expertise in getting 
it Ql!1 of people/ but we don't know the information/ we 
don't- we didn't live ihm/ so we don't/ we're not erm/ well 
we may become aware of it because we may have heard it 
many times from people/ but thats n- it's always new when it 
comes from a new person/ there's a new slant on/ I don't 
know / what somebody did as a job many years ago or how 
. they organised their domestic life or what it was like to be one 
of thirteen kids those kind of things that people tell you/ 
then that is fascinating and I think that's good that you can 
show that you-/ something that you dont know/and that 
gets you out of being in the role of the expert/ and the one 
who has to- who knows everything and is always telling 
people what to do next 
Extract 10 presents a formulation of the value of reminiscence which is 
recognisable as the 'sociological' repertoire identified in Chapter 4. Older 
people are represented as "teachers", "custodians" and "authorities" of 
"history", and thus through reminiscence can move ''from the sidelines to 
the centre stage". This formulation, however, is then related to the 
specific context of '''care' institutions". Reminiscence work is represented 
as reversing the "conventional relationships" of carer and cared-for, 
imbuing older people with "importance and significance" by allowing 
them to give rather than recebe. Extract 11 is taken from a paper 
discussing the value of reminiscence, written by a prominent supporter of 
reminiscence work. His wordplay has the effect of blurring the roles of 
therapy, levelling status and expertise. 
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Extract 12 is taken from an interview with Linda, who runs reminiscence 
groups for confused older people. Here again, reminiscence is represented 
as involving a reversal of the social relations of care, in virtue of the 
knowledge older people have of the past. This reversal is represented as 
desirable for carers as well as for their charges: "it's interesting for us/ to 
encourage people to talk about things they used to remember cos that's 
something where we don't have the expertise"; "I think that's good that 
you can show that you-/ something that you dont know/ and that gets you 
out of being in the role of the expert". 
Extracts 10 and 12 represent existing care relationships as involving 
asymmetrical status relations, with the older person in an inferior position 
with respect to the carer ("giving them an importance and significance 
lacking in most 'care' institutions"; "the role of the expert/ and the one 
who has to- who knows everything and is always telling people what to do 
next"). All three extracts represent reminiscence as means of reversing 
these status relations. In these examples then, we see formulated a set of 
status relations opposite to those constituted by professional discourse. 
Reminiscence work as formulated here is characterised by the expertise of 
the older participants, rather than that of the care worker or therapist. 
These formulations of the nature of reminiscence work are in conflict 
with formulations of 'therapy' as professional practice, insofar as they 
represent a subversion of the conventional professional-client 
relationship. Resisting professional discourse is one way of preserving 
this claimed potential for transforming existing relationships, by 
distancing reminiscence work from claims to special knowledge or 
expertise. In this sense, the discursive practices through which this 
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resistance is done can be seen as an integral part of the enterprise to change 
the social relations of care provision for older people. 
As a contrast to the previous three extracts, all produced by practitioners 
and proponents of reminiscence work, consider Extract 13, produced by a 
professional therapist. This extract is taken from an interview with Brian, 
a practising clinical psychologist. At the start of the extract, Brian is talking 
about the benefits of reminiscence work for older people in care. 
Extract 13 
Brian [oo.] it might be a way of actually instrumentally altering 
attitudes and perspectives of erm/ carers so it may 
have some use in that sense/ not necessarily erm/ 
beneficial in conveying like an expert or er an oracle or 
an old wise kind of perspective/ that kind of value I 
don't think is conveyed/ but the value that someone 
actually has a background a history and if they can 
actually enrich that history by discussing roles they 
have in work or animals pets and relationships and 
experiences might make them a different/ kind of 
person/ their memories may actually come alive and 
they become er/ biographised in a sense/ so I think its 
valuable from that point of view if that particular 
propensity for narrow stereotyping exists 
This extract begins with Brian discussing the potential effect of 
reminiscence work on care relationships, formulated in terms of "altering 
attitudes and perspectives of erm/ carers". However, following this, he 
explicitly rejects a formulation of such social-relational change in terms of 
a reversal of status relations ("not necessarily erm/ beneficial in conveying 
like an expert or er an oracle or an old wise kind of perspective"). Instead, 
he formulates the change in terms of becoming aware of someone's 
"background" and "history", which is in turn encapsulated in the term 
"biographised" . 
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The use of the term "biographised" is of particular interest here. First, it 
works to individualise what is essentially a social-relational change. That 
is, rather than constructing this change in terms of other peoples 
knowledge about the reminiscer's life, it works to construct it as a change 
in the person herself - she becomes "biographised". This formulation has 
the effect of de-emphasising the social-relational aspects of such a change. 
It is instructive to compare this formulation with P3s "getting to know 
each other better" in Extract 4, which could be seen as referring to a similar 
process, but which emphasises its relational aspects. In addition, it can be 
read as the 'plain english' equivalent of 'biographisation', with the latter 
serving as a prime example of 'jargon' (it is almost certainly a neologism). 
There is a marked contrast between this extract and the previous three 
extracts. The consequence of this de-emphasis of social-relational change 
is to make this formulation·' much less subversive for 'conventional 
relationships', in that status differences between care worker and client are 
maintained. In this sense, the speaker's status as a professional therapist is 
also not subverted. Just as the examples of practitioners' discourse can be 
seen as being oriented to the constitution of egalitarian social relations, so 
can this extract be read as oriented to the constitution of the social relations 
of professional practice. In particular, Brian's neologistic formulation of 
'biographisation' has the double function of both constituting his status 
and at the same time resisting its potential subversion. 
The 'individualisation' of the potential benefits of reminiscence work, and 
its consequent de-emphasis of social-relational change, is also apparent in 
Extract 14. This is the same quote which was presented in Extract 2. The 
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authors are practising clinical psychologists, in this case writing in their 
professional journal. 
Extract 14 
It is possible to make a case for reminiscence as an enjoyable pastime 
which may lead to positive changes in communication and social 
behaviour among both normal and confused elderly persons. The 
most positive effects on the elderly person may result from the 
greater knowledge and understanding of their individual 
experience on the part of staff members involved in reminiscence 
groups. These are important goals and Bender et al (1983) discuss 
reasons for the usefulness of such groups in residential settings. 
Nevertheless, the role of reminiscence as a therapeutic tool is 
doubtful, and it seems that at least as far as the normal and confused 
elderly are concerned, it is best regarded as a diversionary activity. 
(Thornton and Brotchie, 1987:101, emphasis in original). 
It was noted earlier that the criteria used for designating reminiscence 
work 'therapy' in the paper from which this extract is taken are measures 
of individual change. In this extract, potential changes in social relations, 
although construed as "important goals", are nonetheless treated as 
secondary, in the sense that they do not raise the status of reminiscence 
work beyond that of a "diversionary activity". Moreover, even these 
changes are formulated in individualistic terms, as changes in behaviour, 
and as effects on the individual:"changes in communication and social 
behaviour"; "The most positive effects on the elderly person may result 
from the greater knowledge and understanding of their individual 
experience on the part of staff members". 
Extracts 13 and 14 demonstrate that professionals (in this case clinical 
psychologists), in the course of going about their business, and in 
constituting their identity as 'professionals', produce formulations of the 
nature and benefits of reminiscence work whose social-relational 
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implications are at odds with those produced by practitioners and 
proponents of reminiscence work. This is not to say that professionals 
always produce one kind of formulation, and practitioners another. It is 
rather to point out that there is a tendency to produce one rather than the 
other, for the reason that these formulations are constitutive of the 
practices they describe, and constitutive of the identities of those who 
formulate them. A professional who does not talk and act like a 
professional is likely be treated as deviant, eccentric, or even 
unprofessional by colleagues, and a whole range of sanctions exist, from 
informal conversational acts through to formal disciplinary measures, by 
which such behaviour is distinguished as non-professional, and by which 
the boundaries of professional practice are continually formulated. 
The pattern of resistance to, and espousal of, particular discursive 
formulations of reminiscence work noted in the foregoing analysis can be 
related to the differential preference for the 'psychological' and 
'sociological' repertoires of reminiscence-and-ageing discussed in Chapter 
4. While the 'psychological' repertoire can be seen as working to preserve 
the social relations of professional practice, the 'sociological' repertoire can 
be seen as potentially subversive with respect to these relations, in that it is 
oriented to the possibilities of social relational change. Thus, the 
differential preference for formulations of reminiscence-and-ageing, and 
for formulations of the nature of reminiscence work, can be located as part 
of the same set of discursive practices, oriented to the constitution of 
particular kinds of social relations. 
However, there is one aspect of the data which merits further 
consideration, in that it appears to contradict the above argument. This is 
the fact that, while practitioners can be seen to be resisting the use of the 
119 
term 'therapy' in describing their work, it is not always seen as 
problematic. Indeed, as was noted earlier, it can be seen as articulating a 
feeling that reminiscence work offers special benefits to older people, 
something more than other social or group activities. At the same time, it 
has the effect of conferring a certain status on reminiscence work, as an 
identifiable arena of practice. Both these consequences are desirable, and 
this points up a dilemma for practitioners and proponents of reminiscence 
work. 
Dilemmas of professional discourse 
The move to distance reminiscence work from the 'mystique' of therapy, 
and to constitute it as an 'ordinary' activity, can at the same time function 
to undermine its legitimacy as an arena of care practice. If reminiscence 
work involves merely an ordinary, everyday process, on what grounds can 
it justify its existence as an arena of practice? The consequences of this 
move can be seen in Extract 14, presented earlier. There, in denying 
reminiscence work the status of 'therapy', the authors represent it as a 
"pastime" and a "diversionary activity". Such descriptions imply a status 
similar to bingo, card games, sing songs and so on, and are hardly likely to 
attract scarce resources for materials, development and training. Extract 15, 
taken from an interview with a practising clinical psychologist, presents a 
similar argument. 
Extract 15 
Brian: got to see things for what they really arel if 
reminiscence therapy is a device for entertaining 
people you might as well be explicit about itl destroy 
the mysticism mystique surrounding itl the exclusivity 
surrounding itl or the arrogance surrounding itl there 
may be other ways of entertaining people than er 
constantly looking at er pictures of er some city as it 
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was fifty years ago or what happened in the war maybe 
other ways 
This extract is interesting in that, like Extract 6 presented earlier, it 
expresses a reluctance to designate reminiscence as therapy, and also refers 
to the need to avoid the "mystique" associated with the term. However, 
the work being done is quite different. Whereas Extract 6 is presenting a 
strategy for the continuation of practice, this extract is implicitly arguing 
for its discontinuation. First, reminiscence work is represented as "a 
device for entertaining people", and thus a fairly low status activity, again 
on a par with card games or bingo. Following this, it is negatively 
evaluated even as entertainment, as "constantly looking at er pictures of er 
some city as it was fifty years ago or what happened in the war" - hardly 
an entertaining prospect, especially if done "constantly". The phrase 
"there may be other ways" carries the implication that there may be better 
ways of entertaining people, which might usefully displace reminiscence 
work. This extract, then, does more than simply deny reminiscence work 
therapeutic status; it appears to deny it has any value at all. 
The critical position taken in Extracts 14 and 15 seems particularly extreme. 
Again, reminiscence work here seems to be the victim of rhetorical work 
orientated to marking the boundaries of professional practice. The 
extremity of this position may be a consequence of the threat that the 
designation of an 'ordinary' activity as 'therapy' poses to the 
speaker's/authors' own claims to therapeutic expertise. However, coming 
from a professional source, such critiques are also authoritative, and may 
have a substantial influence on decisions to allocate resources for the 
practice and development of reminiscence work'! 
I In respect of this, it is worth noting the currently fragile status of reminiscence work 
as an arena of care practice. Little (1991) points out that, in the recently formulated 
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One way proponents and practitioners deal with this problem is to 'hedge 
their bets' when representing reminiscence work as 'therapy'. For 
example, in Extract 7 presented earlier, Anne manages to assert that 
reminiscence work "has a value as a form of therapy", while at the same 
time arguing it should not be designated a therapy. Other examples of this 
strategy are presented in Extracts 16 and 17, taken from a Help the Aged 
training manual, 'Using Reminiscence'. 
Extract 16 
Reminiscence can be pitched at different levels of sophistication 
depending on the competence and confidence of those involved .... 
What may begin for some workers as a largely nostalgic 'trip down 
memory lane' or 'good old days activity' may become a much more 
intense 'therapeutic' type of personal and group experience. 
(Gibson, 1989: 13) 
Extract 17 
When participation in reminiscence groups provides a release from 
boredom, a change of routine, a warm exchange with staff and peers, 
as well as an opportunity to view and talk about interesting pictures, 
artefacts and memorabilia, it is indeed therapeutic. To call it such in 
no way diminishes its importance to the participant nor 
undervalues their full and active contribution to this richly 
rewarding process. (Gibson, 1989: 1) 
In Extract 16, the dilemma is handled by distinguishing between "different 
levels of sophistication" of reminiscence practice. This move 
acknowledges that reminiscence may be merely entertainment, but also 
allows it to be something '''therapeutic'''. Even here though, the scare 
quotes, and the word "type" work to potentially distance reminiscence 
National Vocational Qualifications related to the training of care workers, 
'reminiscence skills' are not considered to be part of care workers' 'core skills'. He 
argues that as a result "reminiscence could disappear from the training and practice 
vocabulary of social carers". 
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from the status of a fully fledged therapy. Extract 17 claims unequivocally 
that reminiscence can be "therapeutic", but then moves to deny the 
presence of inegalitarian social relations implied by this claim ("To call it 
such in no way ... undervalues their full and active contribution to this 
richly rewarding process"). 
In these extracts, proponents and practitioners of reminiscence work can be 
seen to be grappling with a dilemma. One (perhaps the main) strategy 
available to them for representing reminiscence work as having special 
benefits for older people, and thus justifying the existence of reminiscence 
work as an arena of care practice, is to mobilise terms such as 'therapy' and 
'therapeutic'. At the same time, their discourse shows an orientation to 
these terms as problematic, and this orientation can be seen as arising from 
their social relational implications. This dilemma, then, can be seen as 
arising from a conflicting orientation to professional discourse; in resisting 
professional discourse, they also risk eschewing the legitimation afforded 
by that discourse. 
It is the opposition between these two positions which structures the 
debate about the nature and status of reminiscence work. This debate is 
not simply a matter of evidence, but is a matter of discursive practices 
which close off or open up possibilities for social-relational change. The 
problem of the discrepancy between 'anecdotal' and 'hard' evidence can 
itself be understood in terms of the conflicts and oppositions between 
these different discursive practices. This problem can be cast as involving 
different criteria of evidence associated with professional and non-
professional discourse. 'Hard' evidence is the product of professional 
expertise, and couched in professional discourse. 'Anecdotal' reports are 
the everyday observations of practitioners, who offer accounts of their 
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work in their own terms, based on their own experience. The resistance to 
professional discourse demonstrated above is in part a consequence of the 
authority invested in it. Ironically, however, it is this same authority 
which privileges hard evidence over anecdotal evidence, and which thus 
pronounces on the legitimacy of reminiscence work as an arena of practice. 
Just as claims for the ordinariness of reminiscence work threaten to 
undermine its legitimacy as an arena of practice, so too do the informal 
observations of practitioners fall short of conferring this legitimacy. Thus, 
practitioners find themselves beholden to an evaluative agenda which is 
not their own. 
Concluding comments 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates discursive practices similar to those 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. That is, it has shown how discursive 
formulations of reminiscence work produced by practitioners and 
proponents can be located as part of arguments concerning the position of 
older people in their relations with others, in care settings and in the 
wider community. These practices are one means by which the social-
relational concerns of anti-ageism, and the empowerment of older people 
and other marginalised groups, central to community-based reminiscence 
work (eg: Lawrence and Mace, 1987; Bornat, 1989a, 1989b), are also pursued 
in care settings. In the context of care provision, however, reminiscence 
work comes into contact with professional practice, which is potentially 
incompatible with these egalitarian aims. 
Thus, the debate about the value of reminiscence work can be seen as one 
about the social relations of ageing and of care practice. The problem of 
evidence is subordinate to this issue, in that it is itself based on the 
differential authority of different kinds of evidence, and is thus another 
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instance of the differential authority of professional and everyday 
discourse (eg: Mehan, 1983; Silverman, 1987). The risk in the present 
debate is that this authority will prevail, and reminiscence work (at least in 
care settings) will be marginalised and under-resourced. However, as the 
foregoing analysis has made clear, to simply dismiss reminiscence work as 
a 'diversionary activity' on the basis of a lack of 'hard evidence' is to 
ignore the different agendas of proponents and critics. The discourse 
analytic perspective taken here relativises this authoritative dismissal, 
locating it as part of an argument through which the nature and status of 
reminiscence work is constituted. Taking account of these different 
agendas must of necessity involve taking a different perspective on the 
question of evaluation and research. One consequence of this is to direct 
attention to the practitioners' perspective, and to consider how this might 
be incorporated into the research agenda. 
Current research can be seen as failing to do this in a number of respects. 
First, particularly when concerned with 'therapeutic' benefits, it has 
tended to focus on individual change, rather than social-relational change. 
More fundamentally, as argued in Chapter 3, it has tended to rely on 
measures which are removed from the communicative context of 
reminiscence work, and which fail to address the talk in reminiscence 
groups as discursive action. 
The necessity of a discourse analytic approach to studying reminiscence 
work has already been argued for in Chapter 3. We are now in a position 
to bolster this programmatic argument with insights derived from the 
above analyses. First, in enabling the study of the talk in reminiscence 
groups in situ, a discourse analytic approach comes closer to a 
'practitioner'S (and participant's) eye view' of what is going on. At the 
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same time, it is eminently suited to investigating the social relational 
issues highlighted in this chapter and in Chapters 4 and 5. This is so in 
that talk is a fundamental medium for the situated construction of identity 
and social relations (Goffman, 1981; Maynard and Zimmerman, 1984; 
Ham~, 1986; Drew, 1987; Goodwin, 1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1989; 
Wooffitt,1992). It is through talk that stereotypic identities are invoked or 
disconfirmed, such as those related to chronological age (eg: Coupland, 
Coupland and Grainger, 1991). It is in talk that the shifting dynamic of 
power and status relations unfolds, as interlocutors are positioned in 
relation to each other as 'care workers', 'friends', 'old/young people', 
'patients', 'teachers', and so on. 
The next two chapters will attempt to capture some of the richness of 
reminiscence work as an arena of discursive action, through an analysis of 
talk in reminiscence groups. The primary focus of this analysis will be on 
social relational issues such as identity, membership, and status relations. 
In adopting such a focus, it will consider the extent to which reminiscen~e 
groups function as arenas of social-relational change, and bring to light 
some of the benefits and problems associated with such attempts to 
transform the social relations of ageing and care practice. 
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Chapter 7 
Talk, Identity and Membership in Reminiscence Groups 
Many of the claims made regarding the benefits of reminiscence groups 
coalesce around issues of identity and social relationships. Participation in 
reminiscence groups is claimed to have positive consequences for the 
identity of older people who participate, and for relations between older 
participants, and between older participants and care workers (eg: Norris 
and Abu El Eileh, 1982; Bornat, 1989b; Gibson, 1989). This chapter is 
intended to address such claims. Talk from reminiscence groups in a 
variety of care settings will be examined. The principal analytic concern 
will be the ways in which talk about the past in such groups can serve as 
resource for the constitution of particular identities and social relations in 
the present. 
As argued in Chapter 3, the discourse analytic approach adopted here 
offers resources which can be brought to bear in studying what goes on 
within reminiscence groups, rather than limiting investigation to 
consideration of changes in psychological measures as a result of 
participation. In addition, it offers a means of explicating the actions 
accomplished in and through talk itself, and thus takes us beyond 
relatively crude observational measures of behaviour or engagement used 
in other studies (Hobbs, 1983; McKiernan and Bender, 1990) into a detailed 
analysis of the rhetorical work being done as care workers and older 
people talk together. 
The focus of this analysis will follow from the arguments developed in 
the preceding chapters. That is, it will address itself primarily to issues of 
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social relations and identity. The analytic orientation taken here takes 
'identity' and 'social relations' as inevitably interdependent, as two sides 
of the same coin. Identity is seen as an interactional and discursive 
accomplishment, occasioned by and emerging within the pragmatics of 
communication and interaction (Goffman, 1981; Maynard and 
Zimmerman, 1984; Harrt~, 1986; Drew, 1987; Goodwin, 1987; Wetherell and 
Potter, 1989; Wooffitt, 1992). It is thus an essentially relational 
phenomenon. The interest here then is in how different identities and 
social relations are negotiated, constituted and displayed in the talk. 
The groups 
The data examined for this chapter consists of extracts from transcripts of 
audio-recordings of reminiscence sessions involving three different 
groups in three different care settings. Each of these groups is described 
briefly below (see Appendix I for information related to the selection of the 
groups). 
The Hospital group 
This group was based in a geriatric day hospital attached to a large general 
hospital in the Midlands. The participants attended the day hospital for 
various medical treatments and checkups, but also for a cooked lunch and 
social contact, as many were disabled by their medical problems and were 
considered to be experiencing some degree of social isolation as a result. 
Among the activities provided was a group discussion which was largely 
reminiscence based. This took place weekly in a 'group room'. The size of 
this group varied according to attendance at the hospital, but during the 
period of data collection, there was a core membership of six older people, 
with between eight and ten members in anyone session. Ten sessions 
were recorded with this group. 
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The Daycentre group 
This group was based in a day centre in an inner city area in the Midlands, 
run by a charity for older people. Here, the main concern was to provide 
some degree of social contact to physically frail older people, again with 
the provision of a cooked lunch. The care workers in the centre provided 
their clients with a range of group activities, including the occasional 
reminiscence session. In this case, the composition of the group was more 
static, with seven regular participants, plus the occasional visitor. Three 
sessions were recorded with this group. 
The Residential group 
This group was based in a residential home in County Antrim, Northern 
Ireland. They were not contacted directly. The transcripts were produced 
from videotapes of four reminiscence sessions conducted in the home 
under the guidance of Faith Gibson, with the purpose of producing an 
edited video to accompany a reminiscence training package (Gibson, 
1989).1 The same eight older people participated in all four sessions. All 
had been resident in the home for some years. 
Reminiscence as 'experience narrative' 
The analysis will focus initially on the production of stories about past 
events and experiences, what Schrager (1983) has termed 'experience 
narratives'. This focus can be justified as follows. First, these narratives 
are forms of talk which are most commonly described as 'reminiscence'. 
That is, when people are said to be 'reminiscing', this is the kind of talk we 
generally imagine them to be engaging in. It is this kind of talk which is 
1 I am grateful to Faith Gibson for providing me with copies of the original videotapes of 
these sessions. 
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variously represented in the reminiscence literature as 'psychological 
defence', as 'oral history', as revelation of personal identity, or as 
mediating new social relationships. Such representations, however, are 
almost always concerned with such talk in the abstract. Here, the interest 
is in how such narratives are produced in situ, and what they accomplish 
as part of unfolding sequences of interaction. Second, this focus means 
that the present analysis can be informed by other work on storytelling in 
conversation, in particular that of Sacks (1992). Third, these narratives are 
rich in a range of features pertinent to issues of identity and social 
relations. Having identified these features in a single experience 
narrative, the analysis will move on to consider other examples of talk in 
the groups which exhibit the same features. Extract 1, then, is an example 
of an experience narrative, produced during the first session of the 
Hospital group. 
Extract 1 (H1I30) 
Sue: I mean I've got nothing against drink/ if people enjoy drink 
1- I think they're entitled to it/ but erm/ it's not for me/ apart 
from er/lemonade and/ shandy / I don't mind that 
«another conversation intrudes for some seconds at this 
point, until Sue continues» 
Sue: I remember when er/ my father was alive/ he used to like a 
bottle of stout/ used to ( ) bottle about like this/ and (&) 
[ 
Rose: mm/ stout! oh yes/ stout 
Sue: (&) er/ where we lived er/ we had a/ erm/ a/ firegrate with 
erm/ lliilis. I think they called them ( ) hobs/ and er / my (&) 
[ 
?f: ehh 
[ 
Meg?: yeah that's (yeah) 
[ 
Ted: ahyeah 
[ 
7f: ( ) 
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Sue: (&) dad used to/ drink it out the bottle/ and er/ he used to 
stand it on the hob/ an- and he used to say it was ~tiful(&) 
[ 
Ted: warming 
Sue: (&)/ and er «laugh» a- youll think ( ) and er/ I used to go 
to church in those days/ and erm/ the parson/ we had a 
parson that used to visit/ and er / I said to me 
dad/ the parson- / I said that the parsons coming/ (&) 
[ 
Ted: is that why he kept it on the hob 
Sue: (&) I said that you won't drink your stout while he's here 
will you/ ooh my dad was disgusted he said I will. (&) 
[ 
Ted: «laugh» 
Sue: (&) drink me stout/ he said you ought to be ashamed of 
yourself/ and there it stood on the hob y'know (&) 
[ 
?m: ( ) 
Sue: (&) and in walked the parson with his/ dog collar on 
I didn't know what to dol and «cough» to make (&) 
[ 
Rose?: «laugh» 
Sue: (&) matters worse this erm/ stou:t was/ ch ch ch ch «imitates 
noise of stout bubbling» you could hear it/ bubbling like (&) 
[ 
«general laughter» 
Sue: (&)/ yeah and er/ me father said to him er/ ooh and er/ this 
parsons name was a Mr Jackson he was a very very nice 
man/ and m- me father said er/ I don't/ I don't think going 
to church is doing my daughter much good/ he said er/ she 
asked me/ not to have my bottle of stout/ cos you were 
coming/ and Mr Jackson said well I've never such a thing in 
me life he said/ I like one meself occasionally/ I never (&) 
[ 
«general 
laughter» 
Sue: (&) felt so bad after that «laughing tone» 
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Prior to the extract, the drinking of alcohol has been a recurrent topic in 
the group, with the worker asking participants to name their favourite 
'tipple', their favourite pub, and so on. A number of participants have 
responded, and Sue has been particularly vocal, telling a number of 
stories, all of which have marked in some way her aversion to alcohol. At 
the start of the extract, Sue moves topic to the morality of drinking, 
making it clear that her aversion to drink is merely a matter of taste and 
should not be read as a moral judgement: "1 mean I've got nothing 
against drink/ if people enjoy drink 1- 1 think they're entitled to it/ but 
erm/ its not for me/ apart from er/ lemonade and/ shandy/ 1 dont mind 
that". Following this initial statement, Sue produces a narrative account 
of an event from her childhood/adolescence, which she claims caused her 
to change her attitude to drinking ("1 never felt so bad after that"). 
This story is typical of the kind of story that gets told in reminiscence 
groups. In the course of narrating a particular event from her past, Sue 
talks about herself in the past, about other people she was related to in 
various ways then (her father and the parson), and about various practices 
of the time (warming stout, parsons visiting). The analysis that follows 
will consider the how this story comes to be told, and the work it does in 
the present interaction, particularly in terms of the implications it has for 
the situated identities of Sue and of her fellow participants. 
Situated identities 
In talk previous to the extract, Sue has made it clear she dislikes drinking 
alcohol. One possible implication of her talk up to this point is that she is 
moralising about drinking. St/e.'s initial statement can be seen as attending 
to this possibility, and seeking to disclaim it. The work done by this 
disclaimer can be understood in terms of its orientation to the situated 
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identities of Sue and her fellow participants. Other people in the group 
have already identified themselves as drinkers. If Sue were moralising 
about drinking, this would have certain identity implications for these 
participants, implying that they were the kind of people who engage in 
morally reprehensible behaviour. At the same time, such a moralising 
position would also have identity implications for her, positioning her as 
someone who seeks to impose her moral standards on others, and who 
would deny them their right to the things they enjoy. Sue's initial 
statement, then, can be seen as attending to these identity implications, as 
working a particular situated identity for herself (as someone who 'lives 
and lets live') and for the drinkers in the group (as people who engage in 
a legitimately enjoyable activity). 
The narrative account which follows this initial statement, in that it is an 
account of an event which caused her to change her attitude to drinking, 
can be seen as providing a warrant for Sue's stated position, and thus as 
continuing the identity work done by her initial statement. 
One analytical question which might be asked at this point is why this 
further warranting of her position is necessary _ why is the statement 
itself not enough to deal with the negative identity implications of 
previous talk? A further question which arises is: How does the story 
work to provide a stronger warrant for her position than the statement 
which precedes it? 
Claiming and showing 
Sacks (1992) has something to say which bears upon the first of these 
questions. He points out the different interactional consequences that 
ensue from claiming to have understood another's talk, as compared to 
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showing that one has understood it. There are various ways one might 
claim understanding. One might, for example, repeat what has been said, 
or say something like "I understand". However, it is generally recognised 
that, in the first case, one can repeat something without understanding it, 
and that, in the second case, one might be saying "I understand" , but not 
really mean it. A more effective conversational move would be to put 
what is said into different words, which would then constitute showing 
understanding. Sacks' discussion is concerned with the telling of 'second 
stories' in conversation, that is, stories which are produced as a response to 
a story told by a previous speaker. He argues that a particularly powerful 
way of demonstrating that you have understood a story is to produce a 
story which is similar to it, a move which occurs frequently in 
conversa tion. 
The relevance of this to the production of Sue's story is as follows. She 
has stated a certain position with regard to drinking. This statement, 
however, constitutes a claim to, rather than a demonstration of, this 
position. Her subsequent story, then, can be seen as a demonstration of 
this position, and thus as having greater interactional currency than her 
preceding claim. This particular story, then, can be seen as being 
occasioned in the course of the identity work discussed earlier. Having 
established that, we can then ask: how does this story work to provide a 
stronger warrant for Sue's position? 
Figures and voices 
Sue's initial statement can be seen as topicalising two opposing positions 
on the morality of drinking alcohol: being "against drink", and seeing 
people as "entitled" to drink if they "enjoy" it. For the purpose of this 
analysis, these two positions will be characterised as the 'moralising' 
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position and the 'entitlement to enjoyment' position. The event described 
in Sue's narrative account is presented as causing her to change her 
position on drinking, from the 'moralising' position to the 'entitled to 
enjoyment' position with which she aligns herself in the current 
conversation. 
In general terms, it seems clear that providing a causal account of one's 
position would constitute a stronger warrant than merely stating that 
position. However, we can also look at the way specific features of the 
account accomplish this warranting. 
The account sets up a scenario in which the two positions are set against 
each other, and in which the 'moralising' position is rendered defeasible. 
It does this partly through the re-enactment of a sequence of interaction 
between three figures - Sue in the past, her father, and the parson - much 
of it in the form of reported dialogue. This reported dialogue can be seen 
as voicing the two opposing positions on drinking. Sue-in-the-past can be 
seen as voicing the 'moralising' position, in particular through the 
reported utterance "you won't drink your stout while he's here will you". 
From Sue's utterance, we are able to infer that Sue-in-the-past considered 
it inappropriate to drink stout in the presence of the parson, and thus that 
it is in some way morally questionable. 
Her father and the parson, on the other hand, can be seen as voicing the 
'entitled to enjoyment' position. The father's utterances directed to Sue 
("he said 1 will drink me stout/ he said you ought to be ashamed of 
yourself") and to the parson ("1 don't think going to church is doing my 
daughter much good/ he said er/ she asked me/ not to have my bottle of 
stout/ cos you were coming") work to position her request as itself morally 
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questionable, as something to be "ashamed of", and as inconsistent with 
"going to church". The moral issue here then is the denial of 
'entitlement to enjoyment'. Similarly, the parson's reported utterances 
("and Mr Jackson said well I've never such a thing in me life he said/ I 
like one meself occasionally") can be seen as representing drinking as a 
legitimate pleasure. 
This reported dialogue works in a number of ways to warrant the position 
on drinking with which Sue aligns herself in the current interaction. 
First, it recruits the voices of others to support her position. Second, these 
voices work to undermine, and indeed reverse, the moral status of Sue's 
position in the past, and the position she disclaims in the present. As 
mentioned above, the father's reported utterances formulate Sue's 
position as a denial of entitlement, and thus as morally sanctionable. In 
the case of the parson, his reported words position him as someone who 
enjoys drinking, and his status as a moral authority is enough to render 
this position as morally acceptable, and thus by implication, position Sue-
in-the-past as denying legitimate 'entitlement to enjoyment'. 
This sequence of reported interaction, then, is much more than a simple 
reporting of an event from the past. It is occasioned by previous talk, and 
can be seen as continuing, and indeed consolidating, the identity work 
done by the initial statement of the extract. The reported dialogue need 
not be considered as verbatim recall of what was said, but rather as being 
constructed to provide a warrant for Sue's claimed attitude to drinking (cf 
Tannen, 1989; Wooffitt, 1993). 
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Not all of Sue's account consists of reported dialogue. The analysis will 
turn now to a consideration of other features of the account, and the way 
in which these too can be seen as doing identity work. 
Working entitlement to experience 
Prior to Sue's account of the interaction between herself, her father and 
the parson, she does a certain amount of what might be called 'scene-
setting'. She begins this scene setting by introducing one of the characters 
and describing his drinking habits: "[ remember when er/ my father was 
alive he used to like a bottle of stout / used to ( ) bottle about like this" . 
She interrupts this description to provide a piece of information relevant 
to understanding it ("where we lived er/ we had a/ erm/ a/ firegrate with 
erm/ llcll.s.) and then continues:"and er/ my dad used to/ drink it out the 
bottle/ and er/ he used to stand it on the hob/ an- and he used to say it was 
beautiful". Following this, she adds another piece of information about 
Sue-in-the-past which turns out to be relevant to the story: "and er 
((laughs» a- youll think ( ) and er/ [ used to go to church in those days". 
Finally, before launching into reported dialogue, she introduces the third 
character in the story, the parson: "and erm/ the parson/ we had a parson 
that used to visit " 
In this part of the extract, then, Sue introduces the characters, and describes 
ongoing practices (what used to be done) within which the reported 
interaction can be located. This talk can be seen as providing information 
necessary for understanding the reported interaction - we need to know 
this stuff in order to make sense of what occurred between the three 
characters in the story. 
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However, it is important to note at this point that a particular kind of 
sense is to be made of the story. It is not told for others merely to make of 
it what they will. Sue is claiming that the reported events led her to 
change her feelings about drinking, a claim which can be seen as 
accomplishing a particular identity for her in the group. Thus, it is 
important not only that her audience understand what is going on when 
she describes the encounter between herself, her father and the parson, but 
also that they come to see her change of attitude as a reasonable 
consequence of the events described. In Sacks' (1992) terms, the experience 
she claims to have had in virtue of her participation in the narrated 
events must be one she is entitled to have. 
Sacks argues that, when we tell a story and say what the events described 
made us feel, what we can say we felt is closely regulated in interactional 
terms. That is, recipients of the story will be oriented to whether we draw 
from it the experience or feeling we are entitled to draw from it - if we 
make too much of a little thing, or not enough of a big thing, we will be 
told we are doing so. Sacks suggests that this entitlement is accomplished 
through the way we place ourselves in the events of the story. 
At first sight, this seems an obvious point: that it is by virtue of our place 
in events that we come to have the experience we have. However, what 
we are talking about here is the narrating of events, and the kinds of 
interactional business that are done in the course of such narrating. The 
point is that, in order to be entitled to the experience we draw from the 
story's events, we must place ourself in those events (as a character) in 
such a way as to accomplish that entitlement. 
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Sue, then, claims to have had an experience as a consequence of the event 
she describes, and both the event and the scene setting which precedes it 
can be seen as being oriented to accomplishing her entitlement to this 
experience, through the way the telling places her in relation to the 
described event. Some of this scene setting places Sue (as character) in 
relation to the other characters in the story. In introducing her father, she 
also places Sue-in-the-past in relation to him, as his daughter. She then 
moves into using the first person plural 'we', locating herself and her 
father as members of the household in which the reported event took 
place. This is done again in reference to the parson's regular visits. Her 
identification of Sue-in-the-past as a churchgoer can also be seen as 
placing her in relation to the parson. 
Other work is done to place her in events as someone with particular 
kinds of knowledge and attitudes. Thus, her description of her father's 
drinking habits, as well as informing currently present interactants of 
these habits, also informs them of Sue's knowledge as a character in the 
story. Again, her identification of Sue-in-the-past as a churchgoer carries 
implications regarding her attitude to her father's drinking.2 
The reported interaction can also be seen as working Sue's place in events. 
It does this in a more graphic way than the scene-setting talk which 
precedes it. Through the reported dialogue, the other participants in the 
group hear what she 'heard' at the time, even the stout bubbling on the 
hob: "and «cough» to make matters worse this erm/ stou:t was/ ch ch ch 
2 It is perhaps worth drawing attention here to the work being done through the way Sue 
informs the group that she was a churchgoer at the time of the reported events: "and er 
((laughs» a- you'll think ( ) and er (.) I used to go to church in those days". Both the 
laugh, and the "you'll think ( )" can be seen as displaying an orientation to the identity 
implications referred to earlier, while at the same time deflecting them."ln those days" 
does similar work, distancing Sue-in-the-present from sue-in-the-past. 
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ch «imitates noise of stout bubbling» you could hear it/ bubbling like". 
Thus, they vicariously experience events from her point of view. 
Sue's narrative account then locates her in events as someone with 
particular relationships to the other characters, as someone with particular 
kinds of knowledge and attitudes, and as witness to particular events. In 
the narrative account, it is by virtue of her place in these events that she 
comes to have the experience she claims to have. This working of her 
entitlement to this experience can in turn be seen as oriented to the 
business of warranting her stated attitude towards drinking in the current 
interaction, and thus oriented to accomplishing a particular and local 
identity for herself and her fellow participants. 
'Reminiscing' as situated action 
Taking Extract 1 to be a typical example of the kind of talk that would be 
described as 'reminiscence', there are a number of points that can be made 
so far in relation to the above analysis. Sue's story about the past comes to 
be told as a consequence of interactional business being done in the 
present. Any account of the 'functions' of reminiscence has to deal with 
reminiscing in conversation, reminiscence as talk, and thus has to take 
into account this kind of interactional business. It is clear that many 
different kinds of business might be done, and that 'function' in this sense 
will vary according to circumstances. This is the case with all talk, and 
thus, in this sense at least, there is nothing special about talk which might 
be described as 'reminiscing'. The above analysis can be seen as further 
demonstration of the situatedness and action orientation of talk in 
general, demonstrated in many other studies. 
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However, there is a sense in which the talk in Extract 1, and other talk 
which occurs in reminiscence groups, might be seen as a special kind of 
talk. This specialness derives from both the circumstances in which it is 
produced (in a gathering of older people in a care setting) and the way in 
which it constructs an account of the 'remembered past', beyond the 
specific events being narrated. The next section will consider these issues, 
and their relevance for the discursive accomplishment of 'membership' -
membership, that is, in the sense of an identity which locates speakers in 
networks of social relations and as participants, with others, in ongoing 
social practices. 
Working membership 
Membership in the past 
If we see Sue's account as talk about 'the past', both her personal past, and 
the past in the more general sense, we come closer to the way such talk is 
usually represented in discussions of reminiscence work. In the account, 
she provides us with a glimpse of her personal life at that time, and 
through this, a glimpse of the culture in which that life was lived. The 
remembered past which she invokes is not the past in some abstract, 
merely temporal sense - it is a 'peopled' past, a past mapped out in terms 
of practices that people engaged in, and in terms of the social relations of 
those people. We have already seen how Sue's account works to 
accomplish situated identities for herself and other participants in relation 
to the morality of drinking, We will consider here the way in which her 
invocation of a 'peopled' past can be seen as having further identity 
implications for herself and the other members of the group. 
For Sue, her account of the past accomplishes an elaboration of her 
identity in the present. She speaks as a member of a social group, using 
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the first person plural 'we'. Not only is she an elderly recipient of care 
provision, she is also a daughter, a one-time churchgoer, and beyond this, 
a participant in the practices of the remembered past. In the course of 
telling the story, these identities are made salient in the current 
interaction. The point here is that these identities are occasioned in the 
course of doing the identity work referred to earlier. They are used by Sue 
as resources to work her entitlement to the experience she narrates. Thus, 
it is her working of this entitlement which accomplishes, at the same 
time, an elaboration of her situated identity in the group. 
Sacks' (1992) discusses this working of entitlement in relation to the telling 
of 'second stories' in conversation. In part, his argument relates to the 
distinction between 'claiming' and 'showing' understanding, as discussed 
earlier. That is, one way of showing that you have understood another's 
story is to produce one which is similar to it. He goes on to inquire into 
the precise nature of this similarity, and suggests that a common 
procedure which recipients of stories use to find a similar story is as 
follows: if the teller appears as a character, find a story in which you appear 
as the same character (eg. witness to a car accident). The teller's 'place' in 
events, then, is not only significant in terms of working entitlement to 
experience, but is also something which recipients attend to as a means of 
finding stories which they can tell. Sacks goes on to suggest that past 
experiences are 'stored' in terms of our place in the experienced events, 
and that this is the reason similar stories can be produced so readily in 
response to a 'first story'. Whether or not we adhere to the notion of 
'storage', this discussion points up the general significance of 'place' in 
conversational remembering. 
142 
Of particular interest here is the way in which the working of place 
positions the teller in networks of social relationships. We can see Sue 
doing this in Extract 1, using the collective 'we', and introducing her father 
as a character in the narrative. Schrager (1983) takes a different angle from 
Sacks on this, and his insights can further illuminate the present 
discussion. He notes the way in which tellers of narratives move between 
different 'points of view' in the course of the telling for example speaking 
sometimes as'!', sometimes as 'we'. In doing this, the teller expresses not 
only her own perspective on events, but also that of others, incorporating 
their experiences into her account. In moving between the use of'!' and 
'we', we identify ourselves as members of various social groupings, and 
presume to speak on their behalf. Schrager argues that we give our 
audience access to the experiences we narrate by means of the different 
points of view we present. He sees this phenomenon as providing useful 
historical data, in that it can provide an insight into the collective position 
taken by particular social groups towards particular historical events. 
The work of both Sacks and Schrager, then, draws attention to the way in 
which talking about the past works to locate us, not only in the world in 
which those events occurred, but in the social world in which they 
occurred. This phenomenon is apparent in Extract 1, and is a ubiquitous 
feature of conversational remembering. However, an additional point can 
be made here, which pertains particularly to the reminiscence group 
transcripts. That is that it very often occurs during descriptions of social 
practices of the time being talked about. Thus, in Extract 1, Sue uses 'we' in 
speaking of the parson's regular visits, and the kind of firegrates that were 
common at the time. As noted in the above analysis, Sue's description is 
occasioned in the course of doing identity work related to the morality of 
drinking. Very often, however, it is these social practices, rather than 
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specific events in people's lives, which are the topic of coversation in the 
groups, with older participants being positioned as historical informants 
and being asked directly to give descriptions of such practices (see Chapter 
8). Extract 2 is a typical example of this. 
Extract 2 (D2I2) 
Mary: how about you Enid/ how did you manage in those days 
Enid: I used to do about the same you know/you used to put em 
in a tub first/ an er/give em a good punch/ my mother made 
us count to a hundred «laugh» 
Mary: did she 
Enid: yes ((laughing»/ we couldn't stop punching until we'd done 
a hundred/ and then we ad to get em out and rub em 
[ 
Mary: o::h 
Mary: yeah 
Enid: and er/ put em in a bath at the side of us/ and then we 
should get them out then/ and put em back in the tub/ give 
them another little punch/ and then we used to have to put 
em in the copper with some soda and sunlight 
Here, the topic of discussion is washing clothes in "those days". In 
response to the care workers question, Enid begins by speaking as 'I', then 
mentions her mother, and moves into using 'we', continuing this in her 
next turn. At first she appears to be talking about her washday routine as a 
housewife, and then moves into an account of helping her mother with 
the washing. It is at this point that she begins to use 'we', the implication 
being that she was one of a number of children in the family, and that they 
all helped together. 
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The move to 'we' can be seen in Sacksian terms as providing a warrant for 
"you used to put them in the tub first and give them a good punch" -
explaining just what constitutes a "good punch", and how she came to see 
it as important. Again then, as in Extract 1, we can see this as an 
occasioned description, which works to locate the speaker in relationship 
to others, as a participant in collective practices. Extract 3 shows how this 
use of 'we' can occur even in short responses to specific questions. 
Extract 3 (HS/19) 
Jane: did you have iodine put on any cuts 
Rose: no 
Jane: anybody «quieter» 
Rose: ( ) 
[ 
Alf: oh we used to have iodine/ yes 
Here, the care worker is asking for information about participant's use of 
'old fashioned' remedies. Alf responds to her question by speaking as 'we' 
("oh we used to have iodine, yes"), the implication being that the 
grouping on whose behalf he is speaking is a group of children in a family, 
or at least a family group. Extract 4 is taken from the same discussion as 
Extract 2. Here the speakers Jean and Doris use 'we' in a potentially more 
general sense. They may be heard here as speaking as a member of a 
family, but also as a member of a wider community who engaged in the 
practices they are talking about. 
Extract 4 (D2I7) 
Doris: but I think/ it's lovely to see them flying in the wind 
Mary: washing 
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Doris: your clean sheets 
Mary: that's me/ I love to see washing/ I don't like these rotary / 
lines/ I like to see it actually bl- with a prop= 
Jean: =on the line like we did 
Mary: with a prop/ I like it on the line/ I think they get a good blow 
[ 
Jean: up on the line/ yes 
Doris: because we had sheets then/ whereas you get nylon sheets 
now / so easy to wash/ but we had sheets to be ironed didn't 
we/ and pillocases/ and the lot/ blankets 
[ 
Jean: everything 
Mary: of course you had blankets then/ how did you go on with the 
blankets then/ washing blankets 
In talking about their past lives, and in particular past practices, speakers 
move readily into speaking as members of social groups, as participants in 
social relationships. Often, this seems unavoidable - sometimes it simply 
does not make sense to claim that T did something, when others around 
me were regularly doing the same thing. However, even when it might 
be possible to speak as'!', there is often a move to 'we', as in Extracts 2 and 
3. Schrager writes about the openness of reference of 'we', and the way this 
enables an account to be at once personal and collective, and collective in 
varying degrees. Similarly, in these extracts, we can see how the 'you' in 
the questions can be interpreted as individual or collective, and that the 
'we' in the responses can stand for different groupings of people, from 
family to 'the people' of that time. 
So far then, we can see that some of the talk that is typical of reminiscence 
groups - the narrating of experiences, the description of cultural practices 
- involves speakers in elaborating their identity in certain ways. In 
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particular, they move into speaking, not just as an individual, but as a 
member of various social groupings - as a participant in collective 
practices of the past. On the basis of the above, then, we can say that 
reminiscence groups provide an arena in which participants are given the 
opportunity to speak as 'members' - that is, to display and accomplish 
identities which locate them in relation to other people, as participants in 
various orders of community life. Up to this point, however, the analysis 
has focussed on single speakers - Sue's story in Extract 1, and the responses 
of individual participants to group worker's talk in Extracts 2 to 4. In the 
next section, the analytical focus is broadened to consider how older 
participants engage with each others talk in the group sessions, and how 
this works to constitute 'membership' in a further sense, as an identity 
common to the older participants in the group. 
Membership in the present 
Turning again to Extract 1, it is apparent that a number of participants 
produce responses to SuJs account as it unfolds. First, Rose responds to 
Sue's mention of stout ("mm/ stout! oh yes/ stout"). Further on, four 
participants in all respond to the mention of hobs, and shortly after this, 
Ted says "warming" in response to Sue's description of her father's habit 
of standing the stout on the hob. These utterances can be seen as indices of 
the engagement. That is, the participants are displaying by means of these 
utterances that they are engaged in listening to Sue's talk. A number of 
things can be said about the nature of this engagement. 
First, these utterances are produced in response to the details of Sue's 
description of past practices - to the names things used to be called at the 
time (stout, hobs), and to the description of the practice of warming stout. 
On this basis, then, it can be argued that Sue's account of past practices, 
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which she uses as a conversational resource, works to support the 
engagement of other participants. 
Second, the utterances we are concerned with here are typical of those 
produced when people are remembering together in conversation. They 
have been identified as resources through which interlocutors produce a 
joint account of shared experience (Edwards and Middleton, 1986). Thus, 
the contributions of Rose, Meg, and Ted (and possibly that of the second 
unidentified female participant) can be seen as ratifying Sue's account as it 
develops. Similarly, Ted's second contribution can be seen as providing 
elaboration of her account. One way of seeing this evidence of 
engagement, then, is as the co-construction of a joint account of shared 
experience. 
Such sequences of 'joint remembering' are common throughout the 
reminiscence group transcripts. Extract 5, taken from the same session as 
Extract 1, is part of a discussion about the clothes people used to wear 
when holidaying at the seaside. It serves here as another example of the 
way in which the names used in the past occasion responses from other 
participants. 
Extract 5 (H1I15) 
Sue: I mean if you see er/ old photographs/ they've all got er/ 
what we used to call billycocks 
?f: yes 
[ 
Ted: yes 
[ 
?f: bowler hat 
[ 
Meg: a bowler hat 
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[ 
Sue: a billycock/ they've all got a (&) 
[ 
Meg: yes 
[ 
Ted: yes 
Sue: (&) billycock on their head «(laugh» 
In this extract, Sue is referring to photographs taken while on holiday at 
the seaside. Her mention of "billycocks" as a term used at the time for 
'bowler hats' gets responses similar to those produced in Extract 1 in 
response to her mention of "hobs" - ratification from Ted, Meg and an 
unidentified participant, and elaboration from Meg and another 
unidentified participant. Again, the name is a point at which other 
participants engage actively with the talk, and again this engagement can 
be seen in terms of co-constructing an account of shared experience. 
The examples considered so far have involved one main speaker, with 
minimal contributions from others. These have been presented with the 
intention of showing the salience of 'names' and 'practices' to participants. 
Besides this class of instances, there are many occasions in the group 
discussions where the construction of an account of past practices is shared 
more equally. Extract 6 is taken from a session with the Oaycentre group. 
Extract 6 (0213) 
Vera: my mother used to wear erm/ sack apron/ cos years ago they 
used to make the aprons out of a/ sack bag hadn't they 
Ooris: ooh that's right 
[ 
Enid: you could buy the sack bag ( ) 
[ 
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Vera: can you remember/ I can remember 
my mother/and she used to-
[ 
Jean: yes/ yes/used to make aprons out the sack bags or a black one/ 
and you'd go and change after dinner and she'd put/ you 
know / a new pinafore and a clean dress or something like 
that 
Enid: we used to buy ours from the Beehive 
Vera: ye:s/ I can see my mother/ she used ( ) sack bag y'know / 
of her back and her front-
[ 
Jean: yeah/ that's wash day 
In this extract, we see again instances of requests for ratification ("hadn't 
they"; "can you remember"), ratification ("oh that's right"; "yeah"; "yes/ 
yes/used to make aprons out the sack bags") and also of elaboration from 
Enid ("you could buy the sack bag ( )"; "we used to buy ours from the 
Beehive") and Jean ("or a black one/ and you'd go and change after dinner 
and she'd put/ you know/ a new pinafore and a clean dress or something 
like that"). Here, then, the work in constructing the account is shared 
among participants, with contributions building on previous 
contributions to produce a joint account of the use of sack aprons. Extract 
7 is another example of this type of sequence, this time taken from the 
Residential group. 
Extract 7 (R1I41) 
BF3 we never/ we didn't have that many sheep/ at 1hll1 time 
[ 
BI wh-
BI wasn't there arrangements ( )/ and a bath/ great big bath 
and then the ( )/ and they put the sheep down after (&) 
[ 
3 Since extracts from the transcripts of the Residential group are in the public domain, 
published as part of the training pack 'Using Reminiscence' (Gibson, 1989), the names of 
participants have not been changed. As in the published extracts, participants are 
identified here by their initials. 
150 
MM (aye that was) 
BI (&) one another 
[ 
MM Hughes's had that in Ballycairn/ Hughes's had 
that in Ballycairn 
BI mm 
MM and they put them down ( ) (the other side)= 
BI =in there and out the other side/ ( ) 
MM we used to go in school to watch-/ watch ( ) «laughing» 
BF you tried to do it on a dry day so's that they'll dry out 
BI? mm 
In this extract, we see further phenomena associated with the construction 
of an account of shared experience: requests for ratification ("wasn't there 
arrangements ... "), repetition of previous speakers' words in the course of 
elaborating on their contributions ("put the sheep down"; "they put them 
down"; "(the other side)"; "in there and out the other side"). Also notable 
is the 'latching' of BIs "in there and out the other side" onto MMs 
previous turn, as evidence of the close engagement of participants in 
collaboratively building the account. 
In the sequences discussed so far, then, participants can be seen as being 
engaged in the negotiation and co-construction of accounts of shared 
experience. At this point it is apposite to unpack the notion of 'shared 
experience'. In Extracts 6 and 7, some of the participants have lived in the 
same locality, and thus share a familiarity with local places and people. 
Thus, Enid mentions a local shop ("the Beehive") in Extract 6, while in 
Extract 7, MMs "Hughes's had that in Ballycairn" assumes that 'the 
Hughes's' are known to (at least some) other participants. In the main, 
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however, the kind of 'shared experience' constituted in these sequences is 
of a different order. It is the experience of participation in the collective 
practices of the time being talked about. It is important to note, however, 
that whatever the order of 'shared experience' at issue, its commonality, its 
'sharedness', is something which is accomplished by means of the 
conversational resources identified in the preceding analysis. As Edwards 
and Middleton (1986) note, alluding to Bartlett (1932), conversational 
remembering involves an "effort after consensus". Requesting 
ratification of one's own contributions, offering ratification of others' 
contributions, overt agreement, and so on, are some of the means by 
which this consensus, and thus commonality, is achieved. It is not simply 
the case that speakers provide accounts of their individual experience, and 
that these coincide in some way as a consequence of a pre-existent 
'similarity'. Rather, speakers have to work to constitute this commonality 
through the construction and placement of their utterances in the 
unfolding conversation. This is an inevitable consequence of the infinite 
possibilities inherent in linguistic description (Garfinkel, 1969; Heritage, 
1984). 
The argument being advanced here, on the basis of the preceding analysis, 
is as follows. Just as Sue's description of practices can be seen as locating 
her as a participant in the collective practices of the past, so can the other 
kinds of conversational resources identified above be seen as doing the 
same for those speakers deploying them. The talk produced in all the 
sequences discussed so far in this chapter can be seen as locating speakers 
as members of communities of practice. Sue's account of practices in 
Extract 1, speakers' frequent use of the collective 'we' in similar accounts, 
and speakers' engagement in the joint production of accounts, can all be 
seen as accomplishing this elaboration of their identities in the current 
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interaction. Moreover, their engagement together in constructing joint 
accounts of this participation has the effect of working a common identity 
in the group, positioning them as members in the past .iilld. members in 
the present. 
Talk about past practices, then, turns out to be an important resource for 
the constitution of 'membership' in reminiscence groups. However, it is 
important to note that this talk is itself social practice. Thus, rather than 
construing this talk as talk about practices, we can see it as an integral part 
of these practices - as conversational forms through which the experiences 
and practices of the past were constituted and made accountable then. and 
are constituted and made accountable!lQl£. In an important sense, these 
speakers are not just talking about the way things used to be - they are 
engaging in the practices they engaged in then. If we see this talk as social 
practice, we can appreciate the extent to which it provides a basis for 
working membership - participants are not merely talking about doing the 
same things in the past, they are also doing the same things in the present. 
It has been argued, then, that talk about past practices affords the working 
of a common identity for group members, as co-participants in such 
practices. It is in this sense that this talk can be seen as working to 
constitute membership. The next section will attempt to clarify further 
the nature of this membership, and in doing so will make some 
suggestions as to its significance for older people. 
The cultural and moral order of the remembered past 
The working of membership in reminiscence groups can be seen as 
beneficial to the extent that the older people who participate in them are 
seen as, or feel themselves to be, 'non-members' of the communities they 
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find themselves in. One.might invoke here the social and economic 
marginality of older people (Shanas, Townsend, Wedderburn, Friis, 
Milhoj and Stehouwer, 1968; Butler, 1969; Cowgill and Holmes, 1972; 
Dowd, 1980; Walker, 1980; Bornat, Phillipson and Ward, 1985). More 
specifically, for older people in care settings, there are further possibilities 
of marginalisation, deriving from dislocation and depersonalisation 
(Miller and Gwynne, 1979; Norris and Abu El Eileh, 1982; Evers, 1985; 
Hockey and James, 1990). However, there is another sense in which older 
people today can be seen as 'outsiders' in relation to the mainstream of 
community life. That is, they can be seen as 'strangers' to the practices and 
mores of contemporary social life, as members of a 'different' culture, with 
a different set of practices and mores (Mead,1978; Dowd, 1989). Indeed, this 
notion of 'cultural difference' serves as an argument for the potential 
benefits of reminiscence work - that older people have something to tell 
us about a world we have no first hand experience of, and are thus 
positioned as historical informants, with attendant benefits for their social 
status/self esteem. 
Dowd (1989), in a chapter entitled 'The Old Person as Stranger', presents a 
particularly detailed working out of this notion of cultural difference. He 
argues that those ''born and bred before the Second World War" have a 
different world-view, deriving from a different 'social character' extant at 
that time. The difference between their past and their present, then, is not 
merely temporal but cultural. In advancing this argument, Dowd is 
advocating a social gerontology which moves beyond its present 
individualistic and ahistorical focus to incorporate a consideration of the 
ways in which social structure contributes to the constitution of the 
individual personality or character. 
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Dowd's concern to address the relationship between the social and the 
individual, between the sociological and the psychological, is one which 
informs the analyses presented in this thesis. Here, however, this 
relationship is seen in terms of discursive practices which work to 
constitute 'social structure' and 'identity'. In respect of this, we can point 
to a number of ways in which talk about the past works to constitute a 
'cultural difference' between older and younger people, through 
constituting discontinuity and difference between past and present. 
One facet of this phenomenon is the way in which 'the past' that is spoken 
and written about in discussions of reminiscence work is rarely called 'the 
past'. Instead, one encounters phrases such as 'bygone days', 'times gone 
by', 'the old days', 'yesteryear', and so on. This practice can be seen as 
constituting a discontinuity between past and present, in a way that the 
term 'the past' does not. Similar work is done in representing the past as a 
time that 'belongs' to someone - as 'my time', 'our day', and so on. Here, 
however, the past is not only marked as discontinuous with the present, 
but also as something which is coterminous with people's lives. 
Coterminous, that is, not with the mere fact of their existence, since the 
author of such words in the present is clearly still alive - rather, the past is 
here represented as coterminous with the way lives were lived, with the 
practices through which those lives were constituted. Here again then it is 
cultural rather than temporal difference that is being made salient. Older 
people speak of 'my day' in much the same way as a foreigner might speak 
of 'my country'. 
As well as discourse which constructs a discontinuity between past and 
present in general, there is also discourse which works to constitute this 
discontinuity through drawing a contrast between specific practices and 
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mores of past and present. This kind of talk is very common in 
reminiscence groups, and probably just as common outside them. Extracts 
8 and 9 are examples of this kind of talk, taken from the Daycentre group 
and the Residential group respectively. 
ExtractS (D2I15) 
Doris: I remember it because/ wasn't there a saying if your front 
doorstep was clean you home was clean/ and anybody that 
didn't do their front doorstep -
Vera: never see anybody do their doorstep these days do you 
\ 
Extract 9 (R4/30) 
FG Mister Reid do you look with pleasure on school days 
CR well I never had any unhappy moments/ I never was very 
clever/ so they didn't expect too much from me but/ er/ the 
education that I got was very little and I left school before er/ 
six and a half months before I was fourteen and worked ever 
since until retirement/ but/ er/ I was just saying to Mrs 
Coulter here/ that we weren't meek or mild and we were up 
to all the devilment of the day/the discipline in class/ no 
one would ever think of interrupting your master or mistress 
as the case may bel so it is very difficult fori me at my old age 
to understand the thuggery that goes on in schools now and 
even masters attacked 
MM if you wanted the teacher's attention you put up 
your hand ((laugh» 
CR oh golly yes/ and if- if you had you couldn't do that too often 
because you weren't allowed out too often/ (&) 
[ 
MM no 
CR (&) you might do it once a day [ ... ] 
156 
The short sequence in Extract 8 occurs after mention of cleaning the 
doorsteps of terraced houses as a regular household chore. Doris refers to 
the cultural significance of this practice, which was of such a degree as to 
be formulated as "a saying". Vera then contrasts this with present 
practices ("never see anybody do their doorstep these days do you"), in 
such a way as to mark the disappearance of this practice, and at the same 
time to suggest the moral implications that follow from this disappearance 
- that people care less about cleanliness than they used to. 
In Extract 9, one of the group workers asks CR about his schooldays. After 
a brief biographical account, he moves into an account of the discipline 
maintained when he was at school ("the discipline in class no one would 
ever think of interrupting your master or mistress as the case may be"), 
and goes on to compare this with "the thuggery that goes on in schools 
now and even masters attacked". He makes it clear that this contrast is 
not due to a difference in the nature of children ("we weren't meek or 
mild and we were up to all the devilment of the day"),thus implying that 
it is due to a difference in practice. Moreover, the contrasting descriptions 
of past and present states of affairs work to construct this difference as one 
of morality as well as practice. While in the past "interrupting" was not 
even thought of, in the present "thuggery" and attacks on teachers are 
allowed to happen. 
Both extracts, then, work to constitute a difference between the cultural 
and moral order of past and present. Speakers construct this difference in 
such a way as to express a preference for the past, as a time when things 
were better. In doing this, they can be seen as identifying themselves with 
the past, and distancing themselves from the present. This is particularly 
clear in Extract 9, where CR claims incomprehension of the present state of 
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school discipline ("so it is very difficult for me at myoid age to 
understand ... ") and invokes his "old age" in doing so. Here, age is used to 
account for cultural estrangement. 
Moreover, the older people speaking here work together to construct a 
joint account of cultural difference. For example, in Extract 8, Doris and 
Vera request ratification from others in the group ("wasn't there"; "do 
you"), while in Extract 9, MM and eR build on and ratify each others 
contributions. These features, common in conversational remembering, 
not only work to constitute 'shared experience' in the sense discussed 
earlier, but also display a common orientation to the rhetorical work being 
done - constitution of cultural difference between past and present. 
In the previous section, it was argued that accounts of past practices afford 
the working of identity and membership related to speakers' participation 
in the collective practices of the past. In the data examined in this section, 
these practices are located as part of a cultural and moral order different to 
that of the present. In these sequences, it is not merely that things were 
done differently, but that they were done for different reasons, had 
different meaning, were an expression of different values. The nature of 
the membership being constituted through this talk, then, is broader than 
that of co-participation in particular practices. Rather, it is membership of 
the cultural and moral order within which those practices are located. 
Although this cultural and moral order is 'of the past', it is constituted in 
the present through talk such as this. 
Such discursive practices are commonly encountered in the talk of older 
people, commonly enough to figure prominently in representations of 
'stereotypical' elderly conversation. Boden and Bielby (1986), in a 
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conversation analysis of 'getting acquainted' talk between dyads of older 
people in a 'laboratory' setting, show how the interweaving and 
contrasting of past and present serves as an important topical resource in 
these conversations, and suggest that such discursive practices may be 'age 
specific'. While the notion of 'age specificity' might be challenged, it is 
certainly true that the older people in their study not only frequently 
engaged in contrasting then and now, but also did this collaboratively and 
with great facility. Boden and Bielby point to the "close fitting interplay of 
overlapping turns" in such conversations as evidence both of speakers' 
understanding of the previous turn, and of the particular historical era 
being characterised. It might also be taken as evidence of speakers' 
familiarity with this kind of talk, as something they regularly engage in. 
Such close collaboration is also apparent in the sequences discussed in this 
chapter. As Boden and Bielby argue, this close collaboration, and the 
facility and familiarity which it displays, works to achieve intimacy in the 
current conversation. However, intimacy is only one facet of what is 
being accomplished. It is not merely that speakers are engaging in familiar 
conversational routines, and achieving shared perspective. They are also 
locating themselves as co-participants in the social world constructed 
through these routines, and thus accomplishing a common identity for 
themselves as members of the cultural and moral order constituted 
through their talk. 
However, as noted earlier, this accomplishment is double-edged. That is, 
in the act of accomplishing membership in this way, older people also 
position themselves as 'strangers' to the present. In this respect, there is a 
link here with Dowd's discussion of the old person as 'strangers' in 
contemporary culture. However, rather than seeing this estrangement as 
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a consequence of a 'social character' formed at some earlier time within a 
particular social and historical milieu, we can see it as an ongoing 
discursive accomplishment in the present. The talk in Extracts 8 and 9, in 
that it orients to differences between the practices and values of past and 
present, and in that it displays an alignment with the past in preference to 
the present, can be seen as instances of the discursive construction of this 
'character', and of the situated identity of 'stranger'. 
Concluding comments 
One broad aim of the analyses presented in this chapter has been to 
demonstrate that talk which is produced in reminiscence groups, and 
which might be described as 'reminiscing' is, like all talk, situated social 
action. It can be seen as accomplishing a variety of actions, 
accomplishments which are local to the situation of its production. This 
was demonstrated through analysis of two related kinds of talk commonly 
encountered in reminiscence groups: experience narratives, and accounts 
of past practices. 
With respect to experience narratives, it was shown how the story in 
Extract 1 could be seen as oriented to working particular situated identities 
for the speaker and other people in the group. It was shown further how a 
description of past practices was occasioned in the course of doing this 
identity work. This then led to consideration of the ways in which such 
descriptions, whether or not they are embedded in experience narratives, 
can be seen as affording for older speakers the working of an identity as a 
participant in the collective practices of the historical era being talked 
about. It was shown further how the collaboration of speakers in 
producing joint accounts of past practices can be seen as working a 
common identity in the present, as members of such communities of 
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practice, and beyond this, as participants in a particular cultural and moral 
order, different to that of the present. 
This analysis has a number of implications. First, it shows that talk which 
might be described as 'reminiscence' cannot be seen simply as talk about 
the past. Rather, it is seen to be both practical and present oriented. 
Second, the analysis shows that the consequences of such talk cannot be 
reduced to a determinate or determinable set of 'functions', ascribed to it 
without reference to the particular circumstances of its production. 
Nevertheless, in the course of the preceding analysis, some generalisations 
have been made about the kinds of accomplishments made possible by 
this talk. These generalisations can be related to the other broad aim of 
this chapter - to address claims that reminiscence groups have positive 
consequences for the identities and social relationships of the older people 
who participate in them. In particular, it has been argued that talk about 
social practices of the past, a common topic of conversation in 
reminiscence groups, affords the discursive constitution of membership in 
the present. 
Of course, reminiscence groups are not the only arena for this kind of talk, 
and the accomplishments it makes possible. Nevertheless, there are 
clearly circumstances in which such opportunities may be lost or at least 
reduced, due to the physical and social vicissitudes of old age. In these 
circumstances, reminiscence groups can be seen as providing more than 
the opportunity for social intercourse. They also provide an opportunity 
for working an identity of someone who 'belongs', as a member of the 
cultural and moral order constituted through talk about the practices of 
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the past. This opportunity may be even more important in care settings, 
which involve a further degree of social dislocation. 
It is being argued here, then, that claims related to the benefits of 
reminiscence groups for social relations and identity derive, at least in 
part, from a recognition of the positive accomplishments made possible 
through the discursive practices identified in the foregoing analysis. 
However, this analysis can only be seen as an initial and partial attempt to 
address these issues - partial in the sense that it deals with only some of 
the talk which occurs in groups, and also in the sense that it has focus sed 
deliberately on positive accomplishments. In respect of the latter, it is 
pertinent at this point to consider again the double-edged nature of the 
membership constituted in the talk examined here. That is, in working 
membership, it also works 'cultural estrangement'. This then seems to be 
a less than positive consequence, in that it can be seen as positioning older 
people as marginal, as non-participants in the' culture of the present'. 
However, there is a way in which such an identity can be turned to 
positive advantage. That is, older people, in virtue of their membership 
of 'another culture', can be positioned as informants on that culture. The 
basis of their membership of the 'culture of the present' would then lie in 
their role as providers of valued knowledge of the 'culture of the past'. 
Here we encounter again the 'sociological' repertoire of ' reminiscence-and-
ageing' discussed in Chapter 4. This time, however, the interest is not in 
the representation of reminiscence, but in the talk that takes place in 
reminiscence groups, and how this talk works an identity for older people 
as historical informants, teachers, bearers of cultural heritage. Working 
this identity depends on having someone to inform/teach, and in 
reminiscence groups, this would be the care workers running the group, as 
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representatives of another generation, of a different culture. An analysis 
of the way this identity is worked would thus demand attention to the talk 
of care workers as well as older participants. Such an analysis will form 
the substance of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
Talk, Knowledge and Status Relations in Reminiscence Groups 
Previous chapters have demonstrated a central orientation to the 'social position' of 
older people in discourse about reminiscence work. Discursive formulations of the 
nature of reminiscence and reminiscence work have been shown to embody 
representions of ageing and of the demographic category 'the elderly' which have 
implications and consequences for the positioning (Davies and Harr~, 1990) of older 
people in their relations with other (younger) people. With particular regard to care 
settings, these formulations often take the form of claims regarding the potential of 
reminiscence work to change status relations between older people and care 
workers. That is, care practices are seen as positioning older people as dependent 
and of lower status in relation to care workers; reminiscence work is seen as a 
means of democratising this relation, through joint participation in an 'ordinary' 
activity in which both workers and clients have equal expertise; or as reversing 
status relations, through positioning older people as bearers of 'cultural heritage' or 
historical knowledge. Such claims are the point of departure for the analyses of talk 
in reminiscence groups presented in this chapter. In particular, attention will be 
given to the ways in which talk about the historical past in reminiscence groups 
works to constitute different kinds of status relations between older participants and 
group workers. 
Older people as historical informants 
It has been noted in previous chapters that the reminiscences of older people are 
often represented as communicating useful historical knowledge. Indeed, some 
authors see reminiscence work itself as developing out of oral history and 
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community history projects, with a shift from a concern with the collection of oral 
tesimony as historical data to a concern with the consequences for those older 
people of providing such data (Thompson, 1988; Bornat, 1989b). Much of the talk 
produced by care workers in the course of orchestrating reminiscence groups is 
oriented to the elicitation and marking of such knowledge. One might even say this 
is the standard format of such groups. Care workers will introduce a topic, perhaps 
with the aid of pictures or artefacts from a particular historical era, and ask questions 
designed to elicit talk related to it. Extract 1 is a typical example, taken from the first 
session with the Residential group. 
Extract 1 (R 1/ 2 8 ) 
FG s:o would the/ the thresher bel hirm out/ not every farmer would 
have had his own thresher 
AP no no/ hired/ hired out/ hired out= 
[ 
CR? (most people keep em) 
[ 
?f (oh no) 
MC =«to HM» did the farmers bW:. these/ machines= 
[ 
AP yes 
HM oh aye/ they'd (hire them) out! because there was machines around 
the country= 
MC =and he went around the country and/ each farmer hired him 
fori a certain time/ yes 
[ 
HM ar 
[ 
?f (aye) 
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This sequence is part of a discussion which began with the presentation to the group 
of an old photograph of a thresher, a type of farm machinery. This then led to 
discussion of activities and experiences associated with the harvest in the days when 
the picture was taken. At the start of the sequence, FG, one of the group workers, 
asks a question of the group ("s:o would the/ the thresher bel l1i.r.m out" ), followed 
by a statement displaying the reasoning prompting the question - that, presumably 
due to limited resources, "not every farmer would have had his own thresher" • 
This then elicits responses from a number of participants. MC, the other group 
worker, then directs the same question to one participant, HM, who furnishes more 
information ("because there was machines/ around the country"). MC responds to 
this with a candidate elaboration of this information ("and he went around the 
country and/ each farmer hired him fori a certain time") which is ratified by HM 
and another participant, and then marked as ratified by MC herself ("yes"). 
Positioning participants as experts 
In the above sequence, both group workers ask questions related to the practices 
being discussed, and in doing so, they position themselves as ignorant with respect 
to these practices. At the same time, they position those questioned as potentially 
knowledgeable informants. In providing answers to these questions, the older 
participants in the group are afforded the opportunity of working such an identity 
for themselves. Most often, things proceed as in Extract 1, and such sequences are 
common in all three of the groups studied. However, this positioning work on the 
part of the group workers also manifests in other ways. For example, a particular 
participant might be explicitly positioned as an 'expert' on a particular topic. Extract 
2 is an example of such a move, taken again from the Residential group. 
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Extract 2 (Rl/17) 
FG pass that round for you to= «passes photograph» 
MM =its not- it's it's not a plough it's not a pl-/ it's not a plough/ (it's not a) 
(2) 
MM don't know lrllll that is 
(2) 
FG well shall we ask/ ask Hugh Mullen he'll know 
what it is 
HM () 
1f well what is it 
MC what is the machine Hugh what a-I what is it doing 
HM ( ) a cultivator 
(1) 
MC a rotavator/ cultivator 
HM ( ) tearing up the ground 
MC oh/ mm hmm 
At the start of this sequence, FG hands round a photograph of a farming 
implement, with the aim of identifying it, and presumably eliciting talk related to it. 
In the absence of any such identification, and after MM's explicit statement of 
ignorance, FG produces an utterance directed at the group: "well shall we ask/ ask 
Hugh Mullen he'll know what it is". It has become apparent earlier in the 
discussion that HM spent his working life on farms, and he has already provided 
information related to farming practices. FG's utterance works to position him as 
something of an expert on these matters, and moreover someone who is known to 
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be an expert and can be relied on to enlighten the rest of the group. 
Marking 'new' information 
Similar work is done is through the explicit formulation of participants' responses 
as informative. Extract 3, taken from the Residential group, is a particularly explicit 
example of such a move. 
Extract 3 (R4I26) 
FG had you ever heard of ~ans 
KM no 
FG Annie? 
AP I heard about it but I never saw it 
[ 
?m ( ) 
FG and Hugh? I Hu-I Hugh? I did you ever hear of sowans 
[ 
MC (our) neighbours 
[ 
CR ( ) at all 
HM no 
FG nol well youve taught us all something this afternoon 
BF what 
FG youve taught us all something new this afternoon I you've never 
heard of it 
MJ no I was erml I was from Portrush 
[ 
BF (ah well she was) ( ) (town) 
FG sol these townies really didn't know about it at all 
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Prior to the sequence, BF has been telling the group about 'sowans', a kind of jelly 
made from oatmeal. At the start of the sequence, FG proceeds to ask a number of 
participants in turn if they are familiar with this dish. The negative responses she 
receives allow her to formulate BF's account as genuinely informative for the whole 
group ("youve taught us all something this afternoon"; "you've taught us all 
something new this afternoon"). This kind of explicit marking of new infomation 
is not as common as the phenomena illustrated in Extracts 1 and 2, and seems to 
occur mainly in the Residential group!. However, transcripts from the other groups 
show some evidence of a similar concern with the novelty of information on the 
part of the older people in the groups. Extract 4 is an example of this, taken from the 
hospital group. 
Extract 4 (H8/6) 
Sue: this er I it was gM tar they called itl black stuff! you could scoop 
it up an-I y'know I make a ball with itl and erl we used to play 
with itl used to get it on our knees I when we got home I 
we used to have tol me mother used 
to rub some lard on em 
[ 
Rose: scrub 
[ 
Dot: rub it with-I lard on yesl ( ) lard I yes 
[ 
?f: yesl yes 
[ 
Kay?: lard yes 
! This difference may be a consequence of the fact that the Residential group sessions 
were to appear in a videotape showing examples of group reminiscence, forming 
part of the training package 'Using Reminiscence' (Gibson, 1989). The manual 
accompanying the package frequently represents older people as custodians of 
historical and cultural knowledge, and represents group reminiscence as a means of 
allowing them to impart this knowledge to others, thus changing the status relations 
between care workers and their older clients. It may be that the group workers, one 
of whom is the author of the package, were especially oriented to displaying this 
'benefit' of reminiscence work. 
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[ 
Sue: used to have the 
lard spread onl have you heard !hni 
[ 
?f: yes 
Tina: no 
«simplified transcript» 
This sequence is part of discussion about games played as children. Sue describes 
playing with road tar, and how her mother used to use lard to remove the tar from 
her knees. Other participants join in at this point, ratifying Sue's account in the 
manner discussed in the previous chapter. Following this ratification, Sue repeats 
the point about lard, and then asks "have you heard lhat". Given that many 
participants have already displayed their knowledge of this practice, this utterance 
appears to be directed to the group workers, and one of the group workers (Tina) 
responds in the negative to Sue's question. Sue's question can thus be seen as 
displaying an orientation to providing group workers with information not 
previously known to them. 
Personalising group workers' ignorance 
Another move sometimes made by group workers is to ask questions about past 
practices in such a way as to locate them in relation to their ~ concerns, to 
personalise them as it were. Extract 5 is taken from a discussion about 'old 
fashioned remedies' which took place in one of the Hospital sessions. 
Extract 5 (H8/20) 
Tina: has anyone done anything with ieYerfew 
Alf: pardon 
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Tina: did anybody do anything with a herb called feverfew I only somebody's 
given me one the other day, and I wondered what that's used for 
Meg: is it migraine 
Tina: I don't know I I thought it was something to do with headaches 
Meg: yes 
Tina: it's a herb that'sl quite a kafy one that somebody's given me to put in 
the garden 
Rose: oh 
(2) 
Rose: well the flu was something that erl happenedl in later years isn't itl 
when you were young you never heard of flu 
At the start of this sequence, Tina, one of the group workers, asks a question directed 
at the group as a whole, about the herb feverfew. Asked to repeat the question, she 
does so, and then goes on to provide a reason for asking it: "only somebody's given 
me one the other day, and I wondered what that's used jor". In providing this 
reason, she sets up a different agenda to that set by the question alone. An answer to 
the question would now not only have the value of providing information asked 
for, but would also be helping her with a problem, solving a puzzle that is personal 
to her. In this case, no solution is forthcoming, and Rose changes topic. 
Nevertheless, this move on the part of Tina can be seen as a particularly effective 
means of positioning the potential respondent as providing desired knowledge, in 
that the information provided would not only remedy Tina's state of ignorance, but 
would be of practical help to her. 
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The sequences examined so far are similar in many respects to some of those 
examined in the previous chapter, in that they involve accounts of past practices. 
Here, however, we are concerned with the ways in which the group workers elicit 
and respond to such accounts.· Their questions and responses can be seen as 
working to position the older people in the group, not just as participants in the 
collective practices of the past, but as informants on those practices, able to dispel the 
ignorance of group workers. Most commonly, this is accomplished through simple 
questions, with the other discursive practices identified being less common. 
Nevertheless, all show a common orientation to positioning older participants as 
historical informants. 
The significance of these practices is that they can be seen as working to constitute 
situated identities and social relations which can be set in contrast to those 
commonly available in care settings. That is, it could be argued that, in care settings, 
clients will generally be positioned as subordinate to, and dependent on, care 
workers (Estes, 1979; Bowl, 1986; Phillipson, 1989; Hockey and James, 1990). Care 
workers will tell them where to go and what to do, when to do it, and so on. In 
contrast to this dependent and subordinate status, the practices identitifed above can 
be seen as placing older people in a position of superior status in relation to care 
workers. Outside the group, the care workers are in a position of authority; inside 
the group, it is the older clients who assume this position. The relation might be 
cast in a number of different ways - as expert and non-expert, perhaps, or as teacher 
and student. In this respect, these practices can be seen as instantiations of the 
'sociological' repertoire of reminiscence-and-ageing discussed in Chapter 4, in 
which the reminiscences of older people are represented as imparting socially 
valuable knowledge (,cultural heritage', 'oral history') to younger people. The 
sequences examined so far in this chapter might thus be seen as providing evidence 
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of the 'validity' of such a representation, evidence that group reminiscence can 
indeed work to set up this kind of social relation. 
However, there is a certain ambiguity about the social relations constituted in the 
above extracts. While the questions and responses of group workers can be seen as 
positioning older participants as authorities on the past, they can also work to 
constitute a quite different kind of social relation, one which can be seen as 
perpetuating the dependent and subordinate identity of older people as recipients of 
care provision. This phenomenon will be explored in the next section. 
'Pedagogical' talk in reminiscence groups 
In the previous section, it was noted that one common way in which older people 
are afforded the opportunity of working an identity as historical informant is 
through group workers questions about past practices. This accomplishment is 
predicated on the 'knowledge state' of those asking the questions - it depends on 
them displaying their ignorance, and displaying a change of knowledge state in their 
response to answers, as in Extracts 2 through 5. However, asking a question need 
not constitute a display of ignorance, and there are many occasions in the group 
sessions where workers ask questions about the past, the answers to which are 
already known to them. Extract 6 is one such example, taken from the Hospital 
group. Jane, the group worker, has started the session by presenting the names of 
two public houses to the group, and asking if anyone remembers them. At the start 
of the extract, she asks participants when and why these buildings were demolished. 
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Extract 6 (Hl/3) 
Jane: yeah=when were they demolished/ when when was the white hart 
and what was it demolished for 
Ted: oh few years ( ) 
[ 
Meg: oh that/ oh I th- that was that (&) 
[ 
Rose: that was 
Meg: (&) was in er/ humberstone gate wasn't it 
[ 
Rose: 0- 0- yes/ over twenty years ago 
?f: yes 
Meg: yep/ it was up an alleyway wasn't it 
Rose: yes 
Jane: and it was demolished to make way for the haymarket centre 
wasn't it 
[ 
Sue: yes that's right yes 
[ 
Rose: yes= 
Meg?: =mm 
Jane: can anybody remember when the haymarket centre was built 
Jane's questions in this extract are clearly not asked from a state of ignorance. They 
are 'quiz' questions, asked to test participants' knowledge, rather than add to her 
own. This 'quiz' style is encountered mainly in the Hospital group. It can be seen as 
one way of facilitating the engagement of participants in discussion, and indeed 
seems to work in this extract. Extract 7 shows another style of question asking 
involving prior knowledge, this time from the Daycentre group and occurring 
during a discussion about games played as children. 
174 
Extract 7 (03/24) 
Mary: and there's another one you used to play/another game you used to 
play none of you've mentioned your very cheap game/ what about 
your chestnuts that fell off the trees 
Jean: about what 
[ 
Bill: what conkers 
Jim: ooh yes 
[ 
Jean: conkers/ ooh ar 
[ 
Mary: what did you do with those 
Jean: used to play conkers yes 
Mary: yeah but what did you d!l with them 
Ooris: put them on a string 
Jean: put them on a string and hit one another 
[ 
Bill: conker yeah/ string it/ knot on the 
bottom 
Mary: yeah but if you cheated what could you do to the conker 
Ooris: hit it 
Bill: ( ) split it 
Mary: if you w- to cheat! it was something you could do to your conker 
Ooris: that was a boy's game 
[ 
Bill: you baked it= 
Vera: =burn it= 
Bill: =you baked it/ we baked it/ that hardened it 
Mary:hardened it 
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Here again, Mary's questions are not asked from a position of ignorance. Clearly, 
she knows the answers to them already. Her aim is not to find out things she does 
not know, but rather to remind participants of what they know, and get them to talk 
about it. Again, the object seems to be to elicit talk and keep participants engaged in 
the discussion. The questioning strategies in both extracts can be seen as oriented to 
managing the group discussion. They get people talking, and they get people talking 
together, which might be seen as one of the basic objectives of running a 
reminiscence group. 
The interesting thing about these strategies is that they are similar to those 
encountered in educational settings. In classroom discourse, teachers tend to ask 
most of the questions, and one of the implicit 'ground rules' of this discourse is that 
the teacher already knows the answer to the questions she asks (Mercer and 
Edwards,1981). These questions then are not asked to get information. Rather, they 
function to assess children's learning, check their attention, and direct their thought 
and action in the lesson. They are used to define and direct the agenda of 
classroom discussion (Edwards and Mercer, 1987). Moreover, since it is understood 
that the teacher already knows the answer, her response to answers offered by 
children is read as evaluative. When the required answer is offered, a simple 
affirmative evaluation may be given; where the answer is not the one required, the 
teacher may simply repeat the question, and this repetition will be read as a negative 
evaluation of the proffered answer. This gives rise to the frequent occurrence of 
what have been termed IRF (initiation-response-feedback) exchanges in classroom 
discourse, where the teacher initiates with a question, the pupil responds, and the 
teacher then gives feedback on that response (Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975). 
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Jane's questioning style in Extract 6 can clearly be read as pedagogical talk. Her 
questions are asking for information she already has, and can thus be seen as 
eliciting or even testing the knowledge of the older people in the group. Mary's 
style in Extract 7 is somewhat different. Her first question is asking about a game 
played by children which has not yet been mentioned by participants. Rather than 
simply reminding them of this game by naming it, she proceeds to give them cues 
to elicit the name from them ("your very cheap game/ what about your chestnuts 
that fell off the trees"). Having obtained a response, she asks another question 
("what did you do with those"). Jean then says "used to play conkers yes", which 
mayor may not be produced as an answer to Mary's second question. Mary repeats 
her second question more emphatically ("yeah but what did you d.Q with them"), 
acknowledging Jean's utterance, but marking it as the 'wrong' response at this point 
in the conversation. After participants respond to this question, she makes a similar 
move, giving a more precise cue as to the answer she requires ("yeah but if you 
cheated what could you do to the conker"). After further responses from 
participants, she repeats the question in a slightly different form ('if you w- to dw11/ 
it was something you could do to your conker"). Bill and Vera offer further 
candidate answers ("burn it"; "you baked it/ we baked it/ hardened it"). Mary 
responds by repeating part of Sid's answer ("hardened it"), thus implying that this 
was the information she was seeking in asking her earlier question "what did you 
do with those". This sequence can be seen as being made up a number of IRF 
exchanges, with Mary's questions and responses closely controlling the trajectory of 
the conversation to the point where the 'right answer' is offered and acknowledged. 
The above extracts show that group workers' discursive practices sometimes 
engender sequences of interaction which are recognisably pedagogical in character. 
The significance of these sequences inheres in the social relations constituted by 
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them, relations which are in some ways diametrically opposite to those discussed in 
the previous section. Whereas group workers' actions in Extracts 1 through 5 can be 
seen as enabling older participants to work a high status identity as historical 
informants, those in Extracts 6 and 7 work to position them as lower in status in 
relation to group workers. This latter relation is constituted through the way in 
which group workers' questioning and responses control the trajectory of the 
discussion, and the way these questions and responses work to display the status of 
group workers' knowledge of the topic being discussed. The questions display a state 
of knowledge rather than a state of ignorance, and older participants' responses to 
these questions, rather than being treated as informative, are treated in terms of 
their degree of correlation with the response the questioner has in mind. Thus, the 
group worker rather than the older person becomes the 'authority' in the discussion. 
There is, then, a certain ambiguity about the group workers' position in the group, 
an ambiguity which turns on the status of their knowledge. This is graphically 
illustrated in Extract 8, taken from a session with the Hospital group. 
Extract 8 (HlIll) 
Jane: and what about gee nephews/ what was the difference between gee 
nephews/ and adderleys/ cos they were next door to each other weren't 
they= 
Rose: =yes 
[ 
Sue: well erm/ di- did gee nephews erm/ trade more in gentlemans 
[ 
Rose: werent quite so up to date 
Rose: yes 
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Jane: I don't know it's all before my time 
[ 
Sue: I.think they did/ I'm not sure 
[ 
Rose: yes 
Rose: yes 
Sue: I think they did 
This sequence is part of a discussion about local shops as they used to be. Previous 
to the sequence, Jane has been asking questions in the 'quiz' style illustrated in 
Extract 6. Her question at the start of Extract 8 is thus oriented to by Sue as a question 
to which Jane knows the answer, this orientation being displayed by the 
interrogative and hesitant form of her response ("well enn/ di- did gee nephews 
erm/ trade more in gentlemans"). In response to this, Jane makes a move which 
positions herself as ignorant of the answer to the question, and, moreover, ignorant 
on the basis of her age ("I don't know its all before my time"). Jane's utterance here 
can be seen as a succinct articulation of the position taken by group workers in the 
extracts discussed at the start of this chapter, a position which affords the 
opportunity for older participants to work an identity as historical informants. 
Here, however, such a move sits uneasily with, and is indeed contradicted by, what 
has gone before, where, even though it was all before Jane's time, she knew all about 
it. A more subtle example of this ambiguity is shown in Extract 9, taken from the 
same session. 
Extract 9 (H1I14) 
Jane: there's something else I want to ask you that I noticed/ I was looking at 
some old family photographs of our family on holiday at Mablethorpe/ 
in about nineteen sixties nineteen sixty five it was/ and there's a lovely 
photograph of my grandpa/ but he's in his everyday work dothes/ 
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were there no/ holiday clothes as we a- as we know now/ I mean IlQW: 
when/ we go on holiday you take your jee- y- your shorts and yer-/ it's 
a it's a different wardrobe of clothing to what you wear/ every day 
[ [ 
Sue: absolutely yes 
Meg: yes 
Sue?: yes 
[ 
Ted: well there was/ (several things) you could/ ~ or borrow / 
at these ( ) shops (but) 
[ 
Jane: mm 
Jane: but thi- they show/this photograph is of my grandfather/ 
on the beach at Mablethorpe/ and it's nineteen sixty five and he's (&) 
[ 
Ted: . ah 
[ 
?f: mm 
[ 
Ted: and he's-
Jane: (&) got his bowler hat/ his overcoat his jacket his waistcoat his shirt 
and his trousers and his shoes and his socks 
Sue: well I don't think they did. have holiday clothes then did they 
[ 
Kay: 
Jane: 
Sue: they-
Ted: ( ) 
[ 
Jane: that's what I wanted to find out 
no 
[ 
oh didn't they 
In some respects, this extract is similar to Extract 5 above. Jane sets up a puzzle or 
problem for participants to solve, and locates that problem in her personal life. The 
question being asked is: "were there no/ holiday clothes as we a- as we know now". 
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After various responses from other participants, Sue says "well I don't think they 
did. have holiday clothes then did they". Jane's response to this displays ignorance 
of this fact ("oh didn't they"), and she then marks it as the solution to her personal 
puzzle ("that's what I wanted to find out"). On the face of it, then, we might say that 
Jane is positioning herself as ignorant, and Sue is thus positioned as an historical 
informant, capable of enlightening her. However, this reading is undermined by 
other features of the extract. Of interest here is the response offered by Ted to Jane's 
query: "well there was/ (several things) you could/ 1lR or borrow/ at these ( ) shops 
(but)". Jane offers only minimal acknowledgement of this response, and follows 
this by repeating her question, prefaced with a "but". This repetition is similar to 
that noted in Extract 7, and is a common feature of pedagogical talk. Appearing 
here, it can be seen as a rejection of Ted's answer as 'wrong'. This move gives the 
sequence a pedagogical character, giving the impression that Jane already knows 
what she wants to hear - it is difficult to see any other reason for such a response to 
Ted's utterance, since it is in itself just as informative as Sue's. Here again, then, the 
discourse reveals an ambiguity in the status of group workers knowledge, which in 
turn leads to an ambiguity with respect to the status relation between herself and 
older participants. 
TopicaIising pedagogy 
H.e..r 
The argument being advanced here iSk the sequences of interaction discussed in the 
previous section are recognisably pedagogical in character, and that this kind of talk 
occurs regularly in reminiscence groups. Further support for this analytical 
argument is provided by instances in which group workers and participants 
themselves characterise the activity they are engaged in as pedagogical. Extract 10 is 
one example of this, taken from the Daycentre group. 
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Extract 10 (D1I31) 
Bill: I ask I'll ask em what ( ) when that girl jumped out of a plane (&) 
[ 
Mary: you ask em (you take over love) 
Bill: (&) in Abbey Lane= 
?: =yeah 
Mary: listen to Bill/ he'll take the class 
In this extract, Mary, the worker, characterises Bill's intention to "ask em" as a move 
to "take over" and to "take the class". In doing this, she can be seen as making 
humorous reference to her own questioning activity as potentially pedagogical. 
Similar explicit references to pedagogical activities and settings occur in talk between 
participants in the Hospital group, in this case recorded prior to the start of the 
reminiscence sessions. Extracts 11 and 12 present examples of this. 
Extract 11 (G3/1) 
((Myself and three or four older people are sitting in the group room waiting for 
others to arrive and for the session to start. lane, the nurse who conducts the 
reminiscence sessions, comes in and then goes out again.» 
Sue: we'll make whoopee while she's away 
?f: «laugh» 
[ 
Ted: yes 
Sue: heh 
Ted: get your cards out/ «laugh» 
182 
«A few minutes later, Rose is brought in by Jane and helped into a seat. Jane leaves. 
People sit in silence for some seconds.» 
Rose: what are we in ~ fori a lecture 
(2) 
Ted: I think we're going back to school here 
Rose: mm 
Extract 12 (G9IPRE) 
«Myself, Sue and Meg are sitting in the group room waiting for others to arrive and 
for the session to start. Sue and Meg are trying to remember what topic has been 
planned for the session» 
Sue: I mean she usually tells us (don't she)/ she usually says next week we'll 
discuss ( )= 
Meg: =yeah 
(3) 
Sue: better be ready with the answers else I shall get chucked Ql!1 
Meg: «laugh» 
[ 
Sue: «laugh» 
The talk of the older people in these extracts shows their awareness of the 
pedagogical overtones of the group discussions they are participating in. In Extract 
11, 'making whoopee' and 'getting the cards out' are the kind of thing 
schoolchildren might be expected to do when left alone by their teacher. These 
humorous comments are followed by Ted's explicit reference to being at school. 
Similarly, in Extract 12, Sue's "better be ready with the answers else I shall get 
chucked !lJl1." can be read as constituting her position in the group discussion as akin 
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to that of a schoolgirl, who is expected to have answers ready for the teacher's 
questions. 
It is notable that these sequences are characterised by humour. The representations 
of the group activity they contain can be seen as caricatures of the situation, 
overstating the authoritarian nature of the group workers' actions and position in 
the group. Clearly, Sue would not really be 'chucked out' if she failed to come up 
with the answers; neither is the group workers' presence so oppressive that the 
participants are moved to 'make whoopee' in her absence. On the part of group 
workers, such humorous overstatement can be seen as a device to distance 
themselves from an authoritarian role which would be inappropriate to the 
egalitarian ethos of reminiscence work.2 In a similar fashion, the talk of the older 
participants can be seen as distancing their position in the group activity from the 
position of schoolchildren in class, and can thus be seen as an attempt to defuse the 
negative identity implications which go along with this. This topicalisation of 
pedagogy, then, at the same time as it acknowledges the possibility of reading the 
group activity as pedagogical, is oriented to defusing or undermining the 
implications of that reading for the identities and status relations of group workers 
and older participants. 
2Middleton and Mackinlay (1987) identify a similar strategy in their study of talk in a 
muItidisciplinary child development centre. The working relationships of the centre 
are informed by a democratic ethos, and talk between staff of different statuses is 
shown to be orientated to conforming to this ethos, avoiding as far as possible the 
authoritarianism of rank. The authors present an example in which a speech 
therapist makes a request of a nursery nurse which might be read as overly 
authoritarian, and then immediately proceeds to parody her own request by 
repeating it in the humorously exaggerated tone of a sergeant major, thus distancing 
her own request from such an overly authoritarian act. 
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Discussion: The dilemma of care 
The broad aim of this chapter has been to address claims made regarding changes in 
social relations between care workers and the older people in their care which are 
said to occur as a result of participation in reminiscence groups. The foregoing 
analyses have shown the ways in which group workers' questions and responses 
work to position older participants as historical informants. Older participants are 
thus able to work a high status identity in relation to group workers, and this status 
relation can be contrasted with that which generally holds in care settings. 
However, it was further demonstrated that group workers' actions also engender 
interaction which is recognisably 'pedagogical'. In this kind of interaction, older 
participants are positioned as lower in status in relation to group workers, who 
assume the discursive position of 'teacher', evaluating contributions to the 
discussion from a position of knowledge rather than ignorance. 
These findings, then, both support and contradict the claims referred to above. 
Some of the time, group workers' actions in reminiscence groups do indeed work to 
bring about a change in status relations. On other occasions, however, they produce 
relations which can be seen as a perpetuation of those commonly existing between 
care workers and their charges, with older participants being positioned as 
subordinate to the authority of group workers. Moreover, on such occasions, the 
association of the discursive actions of group workers with pedagogical settings 
means that older participants are positioned not merely as subordinates, but also as 
'schoolchildren'. This consequence is particularly unfortunate, in that it aligns 
reminiscence work with other practices, both within and outside of care settings, 
which 'infantilise' older people and perpetuate their dependent and marginal status 
(Hockey and James, 1990). There is thus a particular resonance to these pedagogical 
sequences which is fundamentally at odds with the stated aims of reminiscence 
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work. 
The possibility that reminiscence groups may not of necessity be arenas for 
transforming the social relations of care is alluded to by Bomat (1989b), a leading 
proponent of reminiscence work, who suggests that "reminiscence has occasionally 
been left to become just another panacea or passing time activity in some 
institutions" (Bomat, 1989b: 21). Hopkins and Harris, (1990) make a slightly 
different point, but one which has the same general implications: 
[Tlhere is a tendency to base reminiscence on 'scripts' of a particular kind, 
utilising either a set of materials or artefacts to illustrate historical periods as a 
focus for the group's central themes. The way in which such materials are 
then used is very much determined by the worker. Thus, reminiscence runs 
the risk of being or becoming a process in which the selection, deployment 
and evaluation of materials is very much in the hands of service providers, 
and very little in the hands of service users. This tendency is in conflict with 
the alleged change in power relations which reminiscence work is said to 
bring about. (Hopkins and Harris, 1990: 10) 
These points are clearly related to the same issues of power relations in 
reminiscence groups which have been the focus of analysis in this chapter. One way 
of understanding the actions on the part of group workers which engender the 
pedagogical sequences identified is to see them as a strategy for managing the group 
discussion. Running a group is not just about getting people talking, it also 
involves exercising a certain degree of control, to ensure that the group discussion 
does not break down, either through the development of side conversations, or 
through a simple lack of things to say, whether on the part of group workers or 
older participants. To ask questions about that which one already knows, and to 
employ the forms of pedagogical discourse, are ways of making the ensuing talk 
more predictable and controllable. 
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One way of understanding this phenomenon, then, is to see it as poor group 
management, as 'bad practice'. This understanding might then inform the training 
of reminiscence group workers, with a view to maximising actions which afford the 
working of a high status identity for older participants, and minimising those which 
work to perpetuate the 'conventional' status relations of care provision. The points 
made by Bornat (1989b) and Hopkins and Harris (1990) can be interpreted as taking 
such a position, locating the problem at the level of the practices of particular 
institutions. However, to leave it at that would be to miss an important aspect of 
the activity which takes place in reminiscence groups. In the foregoing analysis, 
even in the sequences in which older participants are being positioned as historical 
informants, this accomplishment is made possible by the actions of group workers. 
Even when they ask questions from genuine ignorance, and allow the older people's 
contributions to dictate the agenda of discussion, they still remain in control of the 
group. Indeed, their control of the group is a necessary condition for the 
repositioning practices discussed earlier - it is they who create the conditions for the 
working of high status identities on the part of older participants. 
In a sense, then, the ambiguity of status relations noted in Extracts 8 and 9 is only a 
particularly gross example of an ambiguity which is present throughout the 
sessions. The movement in and out of pedagogical sequences can be seen as a 
consequence of this ever-present ambiguity, rather than as a simple case of bad 
practice. In attempting to provide conditions for older participants to work high 
status identities, group workers find themselves caught in a dilemma, since in the 
very act of providing such conditions, they position older participants as 
subordinate to their status as managers of the group. It is oversimplifying matters, 
then, to say that in the extracts discussed at the start of this chapter, older people are 
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accomplishing a higher status identity in relation to group workers. Rather, there is 
a complex interplay of identities and status relations, arising from the dilemma in 
which group workers find themselves. It is this dilemma which underpins the 
movement between, on the one hand, interactions approaching the form of an oral 
history interview, and, on the other, interactions which approach the form of 
classroom discourse. Moreover, this dilemma is not peculiar to reminiscence work, 
but can be seen as an inherent feature of care provision, where such provision is 
oriented to changing the social relations between care workers and their clients. 
The dilemma of care is that it is both serving and supervising. To take care of 
someone is to serve them by providing for their needs. At the same time, care 
involves management and supervision. To have someone 'in your charge' is to be 
'in charge' of someone. In the process of providing for a person's needs, the 
provider assumes control, and this places the person provided for in a potentially 
dependent and subordinate position with regard to the provider. The dilemma is 
that, in the very act of giving, care provision potentially erodes autonomy and 
personal freedom. This can be seen as an 'ideological' dilemma, of the same kind as 
those identitified by Billig et al (1988). In their analyses of talk in a variety of 
settings, they demonstrate that common-sense understandings of such social 
domains as education, health and illness, prejudice and gender are inherently 
contradictory. They show how people's talk related to these issues can be seen as 
wrestling with these contradictions, and argue that such contradictions are the very 
'engine' of thinking and discourse - it is in virtue of the fact that there is not simply 
Q)Jg way of understanding these things, that we are able or motivated to talk about 
them at all. 
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This problematic of care, and its embodiment in care practices involving older 
people, has also been noted by Atkinson and Coupland (1988). Working within the 
framework of speech accommodation theory, their concern is with the 
oyeraccommodatiye nature of some talk addressed to older people - that is, that the 
talk can be read as demeaning or patronising. They present an analysis of home 
help training materials, noting how these materials are explicit in stating the need 
for home helps to counteract stereotypical images of older people which position 
them as dependent, and to treat older people as individuals with autonomous 
rights, thus implying the advocation of 'overaccommodation avoidance'. However, in 
their analysis of a simulated interaction (forming part of a tape/slide package) 
between a prototypical home help and her older client, they show how the 
representations of the home help's and the older person's talk work both to display 
and legitimise overaccomodation. 
The contradictory discursive practices of group workers identified in the foregoing 
analysis can be seen as an embodiment of the problematic of care. Such practices can 
be seen as working against the anti-ageist orientation of other discursive practices 
which constitute reminiscence work, identified in previous chapters. However, this 
need not be taken as cause for undue pessimism. The analyses presented in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have shown how discursive formulations of the nature and 
value of reminiscence work embody an ongoing 'cultural argument' concerning the 
social position of older people, whether in care practices or in the wider community. 
The talk and texts of proponents and practitioners of reminiscence work are 
oriented to the privileging of formulations which work against the marginalisation 
of older people. These formulations are always moves in an argument. Moreover, 
this argument is always embodied in actual practices. We can see the same 
argument being played out in reminiscence groups, in the movement between 
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marginalising practices, and those which work against marginalisation. 
This argument is never won in any final sense, or resolved once and for all. We 
cannot expect reminiscence groups to be unproblematically transformative of the 
social relations of care provision. Nevertheless, new moves develop in the course 
of this argument. The very emergence of reminiscence as an object of practice and 
research, in early papers reporting research on reminiscence (Butler, 1963; McMahon 
and Rhudick, 1964; Lewis, 1971), can be seen as such a move, involving as it does the 
mobilisation of the 'psychological' repertoire as a counter to the 'dysfunctional' 
repertoire in the service of an argument for change in the social relations of ageing. 
A similar move can be seen in the recruiting of the representation of ageing as 
involving the accretion of knowledge and experience, mobilised in the 'sociological' 
repertoire of reminiscence-and-ageing, formulated in opposition to the 
representation of ageing as a process of decrement, mobilised in the 'psychological' 
repertoire. In a similar way, although marginalising practices form part of 
reminiscence work, it seems likely that new practices will develop in opposition to 
them, developing out of the cultural dynamic through which reminiscence work is 
constituted. Some speculations as to what these might be will be offered next 
chapter, which discusses the implications of the research reported in this thesis. 
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Chapter 9 
Discussion 
The analyses presented in previous chapters represent an initial step 
towards an account of reminiscence work as an arena of discursive 
practice. This chapter presents a summary of that account, and considers 
its implications for reminiscence work and reminiscence research. 
The discursive constitution of 'reminiscence' work as care practice 
Reminiscence work as anti-ageist practice 
In focussing on the ways in which the nature and value of 'reminiscence' 
and 'reminiscence work' are represented in the discourse of practitioners, 
researchers and proponents of reminiscence work, regularities of 
discursive practice have been identified. These practices can be seen as 
working to constitute particular kinds of social relations in which older 
people are inserted, both within and outside of care settings. 
They can be seen as moves in an ongoing argument related to the 
appropriate social position of older people, and to the nature of ageing 
itself, formulated against moves which work to position older people as 
marginal to community life, and which construe ageing as a process of 
decrement. 
In characterising these practices as moves in an argument, it is important 
to emphasise their status as practices. Talk and texts which formulate the 
nature of reminiscence work, or the significance of reminiscence for older 
people, are not to be seen merely as a descriptive commentary on these 
things. These discursive formulations are constitutive and thus have 
functional consequences. There are a variety of ways in which 'ageing', 
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'reminiscence' and 'reminiscence work' can be represented in discourse, 
and there is no objective arbiter of the 'truth' of these various 
representations. Whichever representation is to be taken as 'true' depends 
on the rhetorical resources which are mobilised on the actual occasions 
when these representations become the topic of discourse. In constituting 
the nature of 'ageing' and 'reminiscence', such representations have 
consequences. Implicitly or explicitly, they can be used to justify the ways 
in which older people are treated - whether they are listened to or 
ignored, whether they are respected or derogated. The concern with anti-
ageism expressed by proponents and practitioners of reminiscence work is 
not just an aim or intention which informs their work, but is pursued 
through the ways in which this work is constituted in discourse. 
Anecdote, evidence and therapy 
This analysis has a number of implications for current debates regarding 
the value of reminiscence work for older people. In particular, it recasts 
the discrepancy between anecdote and 'hard' evidence as implicated in the 
cultural argument discussed above. Accounts of reminiscence work based 
on experimental studies can be seen as mobilising a different set of 
discursive resources to those mobilised in the 'anecdotal' accounts 
emanating mainly from practitioners and proponents of reminiscence 
work. In formulating the value of reminiscence in terms of 'psychological 
function', experimental accounts can be seen as working against the anti-
ageist concerns of reminiscence work. This is so, not simply in that such 
accounts fail to engage with practitioners' claims for the social-relational 
benefits of reminiscence. It is so in that these accounts mobilise 
formulations of reminiscence which represent ageing in terms of 
decrement and disengagement. In addition, the authority of these 
accounts means that they take precedence over practitioners' accounts, and 
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thus work to undermine the legitimacy of reminiscence work as an arena 
of practice. 
This problem is compounded when reminiscence work is represented as 
'therapy'. Here, practitioners are caught in a dilemma. While 
formulations of reminiscence as 'therapy' can be used to argue for the 
'special' benefits of reminiscence work as compared to other group 
activities, these formulations carry with them the social-relational 
implications of professional discourse. In doing this, they come into 
conflict with the common formulation of group reminiscence as an 
'ordinary', egalitarian activity, through which the social-relational 
concerns of reminiscence work are pursued. Moreover, the representation 
of reminiscence work as 'therapy' serves to legitimate its evaluation in 
psychological rather than social-relational terms. However, the 
representation of reminiscence work as involving an 'ordinary' activity 
lays it open to trivialisation as a mere pastime, with no 'special' benefits, 
again undermining its legitimacy as an arena of practice. 
The stated need for 'hard evidence' of the benefits of reminiscence work, 
then, is implicated in the cultural argument concerning the social 
relations of ageing and care provision through which reminiscence work 
is constituted, and is a consequence of the differential concerns of research 
and practice. The pursuit of 'hard evidence' will not resolve the problem, 
if this pursuit involves taking measures of 'psychological functioning' 
which are displaced from the actual terms of conversational engagement 
within reminiscence groups (see Chapter 2). 'Anecdotal' accounts are, in 
the main, focussed on descriptions of what goes on within reminiscence 
groups. What is needed is a research programme which addresses this 
conversational activity, and which offers the possibility of lending 
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authority to practitioners' accounts of reminiscence work. The analyses 
presented in Chapters 7 and 8 can be seen as first step in addressing this 
need. 
Conversational activity in reminiscence groups 
The analyses in Chapters 7 and 8 were, in a general sense, intended to 
address claims that participation in reminiscence groups has beneficial 
consequences for the 'identity' of older people, and for the social relations 
between older participants, and between older participants and group 
workers. Given the scope of this thesis, these analyses constitute little 
more than an illustrative argument concerning the accomplishments 
afforded within reminiscence groups. Nevertheless, they provide some 
indication of the nature of these accomplishments. 
Membership 
In particular, Chapter 7 showed how talk about the practices of the past can 
be seen as working to constitute situated identities for older people as 
members of the cultural and moral order of the past. In reminiscence 
groups, this talk can further be seen as constituting membership in the 
present, as older participants collaborate in producing accounts which 
constitute 'shared experience' of the practices and mores of the past. The 
results of this analysis can be related to claims regarding the beneficial 
effects of reminiscence on identities and social relations of older 
participants in the groups. However, it emphasises that the talk in the 
groups works to constitute these identities and social relations in situ, 
rather than being a causal agent operating on, and separate from, identity 
and social relationships. It is important to be clear here that no 
assumption is being made about feelings or mental states which might be 
a consequence of these ways of speaking. As argued in Chapter 3, such 
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things are not accessible as an object of study which can be definitively 
described or measured. What is. accessible to analysis is talk which displays 
and constitutes identity and social relationships. 
Strangers, informants and pedadgogy 
Also in Chapter 7, it was noted that talk about past practices, in working to 
constitute membership of the past, also worked to constitute 'cultural 
estrangement' from the present, which could be seen as problematic for a 
practice oriented working against the marginalisation of older people. . 
Chapter 8 presented an analysis of one way in which this problem might 
be resolved, through the positioning of older people as historical 
informants with respect to group workers. A variety of discursive 
practices were identified through which group workers positioned 
themselves as ignorant, and through which older participants were 
afforded the opportunity to work a high status identity as informants for 
group workers or the group as a whole. Such positioning practices can be 
related to claims made regarding the potential of reminiscence work to 
transform the relations of care practice. 
However, this analysis showed that group workers' actions also engender 
sequences of interaction similar to classroom discourse, which worked to 
position older people as lower in status to group workers, and which could 
be seen as working a negative age-identity for them, in a similar way to 
other 'infantilising' practices (Hockey and James, 1990). These practices, 
clearly antithetical to the stated anti-ageist orientation fo reminiscence 
work, were identitifed as a consequence of the problematic of care 
provision, involving the potentially contradictory functions of service and 
supervision. It was suggested that the embodient of this problematic in 
the contradictory practice of group workers might be a spur to the 
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development of new forms of reminiscence work. Some possible 
developments will be suggested below, in discussing the implications of 
this research for the practice of reminiscence work. First, a brief note on 
representativeness. 
Representativeness 
Given that only three groups provided data for this research, it is pertinent 
to question the representativeness of its findings. To what extent can we 
consider the groups studied here to be representative of reminiscence 
groups in general? This question can be answered as follows. The three 
groups differ in many respects: in terms of setting, membership, and also 
in terms of the group leaders' approach to practice. It is quite likely that 
further variation in practice would be found if data from other groups 
were added to the corpus. This variation could itself be usefully made the 
focus of analysis, and may well be in later work. For the present, however, 
this variation itself provides one basis for arguing for the 
representativeness of the analytical conclusions presented here regarding 
the talk in these groups. That is, features have been identified which are 
common to these three groups, despite the differences between them. 
This commonality serves as a warrant for arguing that these features are 
likely to be common to many reminiscence groups conducted with older 
people in care settings. 
Implications for practice 
One aim of this thesis has been to provide a systematic analysis of 
reminiscence work which addresses practitioners' claims regarding the 
value of their work. However, it is to be hoped that research of this kind 
will constitute more than just another reference to cite in making claims 
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regarding the benefits of reminiscence work for older people. In 
particular, the analytical insights provided by this research could 
be used reflexively by practitioners to inform their practice. 
One issue of relevance here is the designation of reminiscence as 'therapy'. 
While some practitioners and proponents of reminiscence work are 
attuned to the problematic consequences of this label (eg: Gibson, 1992; 
Bornat, 1989b), some of the extracts presented in Chapter 6 suggest that 
others are happy to describe their work in this way. Gibson's and Bornat's 
arguments related to this issue will no doubt be taken up and acted on by 
others. However, the work presented here might be seen as contributing 
to these developments, in offering a systematic analysis of the problems 
involved in describing reminiscence work as 'therapy'. 
With regard to how the analyses of talk in reminiscence groups might 
inform practice, perhaps the most obvious feature here is the 
identification of sequences of 'pedagogical' interaction in the groups. As 
implied in Chapter 8, this might be used to inform the training of group 
workers, who can be cautioned against engaging with participants in this 
way. However, as Atkinson and Coupland's (1988) study of home help 
training materials makes clear (see Chapter 8, p.25), this may not solve the 
problem. Another possibility is to develop new forms of practice. There 
are signs of this happening in commentaries on reminiscence work. For 
example, Hopkins and Harris (1990) suggest that, in contrast to the current 
tendency for group workers to determine the selection and use of 
materials used in reminiscence groups, older people might be "offered 
more opportunity to shape the content and process of their reminiscing" 
(p.10). Bornat (1989b) documents other developments which might be 
taken up more widely: 
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Amongst the best and most committed carers, interests lie in de-
routinising reminiscence activities. In group sessions these workers 
are their best enthusers and resourcers. Some have become part-
time researchers into memorabilia and local history.... In some 
homes and hospitals, knowledge of individual past lives has led to 
outings and visits, closer staff and relatives involvement and 
shared experiences from personal histories. (Bornat, 1989b: 21) 
The 'routinisation' referred to by Bornat might be seen as another instance 
of assertion of the 'supervision' side of care problematic in the context of 
reminiscence work. In this quote, she documents responses to this 
'routinisation' which might also work to counter the 'pedagogical' 
tendencies identified in Chapter 8. 
Suggestions for further research 
It has already been noted that the research reported here is only first step 
in applying discourse analysis to reminiscence work. There are many 
aspects of reminiscence work which could be addressed in future research. 
One possibility, conspicuously absent from the present account, is to 
undertake an analysis of older peoples' accounts of their experience of 
participating in reminiscence groups. Such an analysis is likely to offer 
insights which could inform current practice. 
In addition to this, there are a number of issues that could be addressed in 
the analysis of conversational activity in reminiscence groups: 
1) Changes in conversational activity in the groups over time could be 
studied, particularly with respect to the situated identities and social 
relationships displayed and constituted in the talk between older 
participants and care workers. This would improve on the analyses 
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presented here in being more directly addressed to claims that 
reminiscence groups are associated with changes in social relations and 
identity. 
2) The formulation of situated 'age identities' could be examined in more 
detail, particularly in relation to discursive practices which work to 
constitute 'cultural difference' between past and present. Another possible 
focus, again related to age identity, would be the ways in which the 
association between 'ageing' and 'memory functioning' is topicalised in 
the group conversations, something that was noted in the course of this 
research, but not followed up. 
3) As well as looking at how older participants collaborate in producing 
joint accounts of past practices, as in Chapter 7, analysis could also focus on 
disputes, in which older participants and group workers formulate 
contradictory versions of the past. Again, this phenomenon was noted in 
the data examined here. In particular, it appeared that there was a 
tendency on the part of group workers to encourage nostalgia, asking 
questions related to 'favourite things', 'pleasurable experiences' and so on. 
This construction of the past as 'the good old days' was resisted by some 
older participants. A related phenomenon is noted by Hopkins and Harris 
(1990), who argue that reminiscence practice tends to assume a 
homogeneity of older peoples experiences, de-emphasising diversity and 
differences. 
4) Innovative formats for reminiscence groups could be studied, 
particularly those in which older people are given more control over the 
content and process of group sessions. Such research could be carried out 
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in the form of an 'action research' project, and might be addressed to the 
problems with reminiscence practice noted in Chapter 8. 
5) Finally, it would be interesting to consider how practitioners' 
formulations of the nature and value of reminiscence inform their 
practice. There was some indication in this study that differences between 
the three groups might be related to differences in group workers' 
orientations to their work, as noted in interviews. Such a study might be 
useful in offering a systematic account of variations in practice. 
A reflexive note 
This study demonstrates the value of discourse analysis as a means of 
researching remiscence work. Its advantage over current approaches is 
that it deals with reminiscence work as a culturally-situated practice, and 
engages with the argument through which that practice is constituted, 
rather than claiming to stand apart from that argument as an arbiter of the 
true value of reminiscence work. In doing this, it renounces a certain 
authority. The account presented here cannot be taken as a definitive 
account of the value of reminiscence work. like all discourse, it is 
constructive and action-orientated. However, it cannot be discounted on 
this basis. As Edwards and Potter (1992) argue, "there is no non-discursive 
discourse for doing proper, accurate, non-action-orientated description" (p. 
173). This thesis is another move in an argument which is not just about 
reminiscence work, but which constitutes reminiscence work. I hope it is 
taken up in a way which serves to benefit the older people who participate 
in such work. 
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Appendix I 
Selection of Groups and Interviewees 
This research began with inquiries into the nature and extent of reminiscence 
work in a large city in the Midlands. It was assumed that reminiscence 
practice in this city would be as representative as that to be found in any other 
area of the country. Besides this geographical criterion, the selection of the 
groups was informed by two aims: to study groups in a variety of care settings, 
and to limit the study to groups whose participants were not 'mentally 
impaired' in any way. Access was gained to two groups, identified here by the 
settings in which they were located: the Daycentre group and the Hospital 
group. It was intended to gain access to a third group in a residential setting 
in the same locality. However, when Faith Gibson offered to loan videotapes 
of the reminiscence group recorded for the ''Using Reminiscence" training 
pack, it was decided that this group would serve as the third group in the 
study. 
The care workers running the Daycentre and Hospital groups, named Mary 
and Jane respectively in this study, were obvious candidates for interviews. 
The other interviewees were selected according to the same geographical 
criterion as the groups. Efforts were made to contact as many reminiscence 
workers as possible through local networks, and a further six people were 
interviewed. 
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Appendix 11 
Interview Schedule 
(Questions were not necessarily worded exactly as shown) 
Objectives 
Evaluation 
Training 
Groups 
Participants 
Therapy 
Popularity 
Literature 
What are they? Are they achieved? Examples? 
For you, what is most important benefit of reminiscence? 
Can reminiscing ever do any harm? 
Is there any? What form does it take? 
Is it done? how? 
Is it necessary? 
What skills are needed? 
What problems? 
How directive should one be in running a group? 
(eg. sanctioning sub-conversations) 
What skills are needed? 
What is a successful session? 
Do some get more out of it than others? Why? 
Do you see reminiscence as a form of therapy? 
What do you mean by that? 
How do you feel about it being called a therapy? 
Why do you think reminiscence is so popular? 
For you, who has made the most valuable 
contribution to the reminiscence practice/research 
li ter a ture? 
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Appendix III 
Transcription Key 
(This key is based in part on the system developed by Gall Jefferson - see 
Atkinson and Heritage, 1984) 
/ pause of less than 1 second 
[ point of overlap between utterances 
(&) continuation of talk 
= no discernable gap between turns 
(2) pause of 2 seconds duration 
o::h stretching of vowel sound 
added emphasis 
Jane? doubt about speaker's identity 
?f unidentifiable female speaker 
(town) doubt about accuracy of transcription 
() indecipherable speech 
«cough» non-speech sound, or contextual information 
? rising intonation 
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